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IN THIS ISSUE

RICHARD K. BETTS GORDON H. McCORMICK
ROBERT D'A HENDERSON MARK E. MILLER
ROBERT KENNEDY PEDRO RAMET
WILLIAM R. KINTNER ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
ROMAN KOLKOWICZ ALAN NED SABROSKY
BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN LORD SAINT BRIDES
WILLIAM L. SALISBURY

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Reflections on the Quarter:

Toward a New Strategy of Independence	William R. Kintner	279
Mitterrand's France	Lord Saint Brides	281
Yugoslavia's Mounting Difficulties	Alvin Z. Rubinstein	286
America in NATO: The Conventional Delusion	Alan Ned Sabrosky	293
U.S. and Soviet Approaches to Military Strategy: Theory vs. Experience	Roman Kolkowicz	307
Soviet Theater-Nuclear Forces: Implications for NATO Defense	Robert Kennedy	331
American Seapower at Risk: Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Naval Planning	Gordon H. McCormick and Mark E. Miller	351
Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia	Pedro Ramet	369
The Fragmentation of Arab Politics: Inter-Arab Affairs Since the Afghanistan Invasion	Bruce Maddy-Weitzman	389
Nigeria: Future Nuclear Power?	Robert D'A Henderson	409
Reader Feedback: Letters to the Editor		425
Overseas Research in Review: International Relations Research in Spain	William T. Salisbury	429
Review: From Changing the Guard to Guarding the Change	Richard K. Betts	433
Selected Publications Received		447

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reflections
ON THE QUARTER

TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY OF INDEPENDENCE

The greatest deficiency in U.S. security today is the lack of a comprehensive grand strategy capable of checking and subsequently reversing the expansion of Soviet power and derived influence across the globe. The development of such a strategy is the greatest intellectual challenge facing the United States and those U.S. allies who wish to maintain their independence. It is doubtful that such a strategy can be developed solely within the formal structures of the American and allied governments. A grand strategy might be developed, however, by a small group of strategically minded persons in collaboration with their own governments.

After World War II, the United States adopted a comprehensive policy of containing the Soviet Union within its historical frontiers. This policy, for many years backed by superior U.S. military power, was generally successful. Since the abandonment of the containment policy—that is, since the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam—however, the United States has lacked a basic concept from which a strategy capable of frustrating Soviet expansionism might be developed.

As we move further into the decade of the eighties, America's capacity to protect its own vital interests has decreased. The Reagan administration, aware of this situation, is seeking a significant increase in U.S. defense expenditures in order to restore a global military equilibrium. But it will take more than money to solve our problems. The American people need to understand the meaning of the long-term Soviet strategy. We must also understand—if we are to repair the damage—what has happened to America's global position.

Even before their massive missile buildup, Moscow was laying the foundation for its own "forward strategy." The Soviets recognized, far earlier than the West, that the most vulnerable spot in the West's armor is its economic dependency on Middle Eastern oil and on African sources of raw materials. By dint of great and sustained effort, the Soviets achieved strategic parity with the United States. They are now searching for superiority. Many Western observers, however, focus on Soviet weakness and pass over Soviet belligerence. The full range of the ubiquitous Soviet threat needs to be dealt with if we are to restore our capacity to control the future course of America.

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A complicated turn of events (too long to detail here) has, moreover, nearly immobilized the U.S. machinery for gathering intelligence and asserting influence by means short of war. While control should certainly be exercised on the intelligence and covert operations community, it must be realized that under the present system of limitations, the U.S. intelligence community has been crippled at the most critical time in our national history. The Soviets are advancing their interests through a well-organized and ruthless intelligence and covert operations organization (the KGB) of several hundred thousand people.

In the short run, our principal task must be to parry and counter the Soviet offensive while we gather our own energies and join our allies in reversing today's adverse trends in the correlation of forces; for, as Paul Nitze suggests, "until those trends have been reversed and the military balance has become more favorable than it is today, the watchwords must be prudence, fortitude, and courage."

Thus, the United States needs to create a new power relationship with the Soviet Union. This, however, can only be the *beginning* of U.S. efforts to prevent the "world correlation of forces"—to use a Soviet phrase—from moving in a direction irreversibly favorable to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, America lacks a comprehensive strategy designed ultimately to regain the initiative in the global struggle with the Soviet Union.

Although the United States must take the lead in the development of a common strategy for the West, its allies must cooperate on what is to be done. Agreement on fundamentals can best be obtained if leaders of the industrialized democracies reach a consensus on the intrinsic nature of the global threat. Even if agreement cannot be reached on every detail, those leaders probably can reach a consensus on the essential facts of the Soviet threat to the survival of democratic societies.

The great task of our time is to create a new order out of the global disorder that the Soviets have helped develop and that they have constantly exploited in order to impose their oppressive writ on the future. If the United States and its foreign friends and associates are to revive that spirit of "doing great things together" which animated the leaders of the postwar world, on whose accomplishments we have lived so well for more than thirty-five years, then a new approach is required.

Perhaps the best way of developing a creative, comprehensive, and integrated strategy for the United States, its allies, and its friends in the Third World is to mobilize a small band of strategic thinkers from the most important democracies to wrestle with this problem. Many analytical tasks will confront these strategists. How can we do better in the global competition of ideas that is so crucial to the maintenance of pluralism in the world? How can we communicate better with our natural

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allies—the peoples living under the totalitarian rule of our adversaries? How can we convince our own people that the outcome of this struggle will be important to them personally? How can we harmonize economic competition and security cooperation with our allies? The creation of such a strategic group, drawn from here and abroad, can lead to an understanding of our mutual problems and can further the development of a common strategy.

Obviously, answers for many other problems must be sought. The strategy we need must go well beyond containment, which is necessary but not sufficient. Soviet society will not generate its own disintegration even if the USSR is successfully contained. In fact, as was argued in *Protracted Conflict* (written by members of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in the late fifties), the East-West struggle takes place almost exclusively in the noncommunist part of the world. It is worth asking, then, whether these old rules should not be changed.

In the last resort, argues Paul Seabury—and I agree—"the main realm in which Western strategy should operate is in the realm of ideas." Yet, Western efforts in that area have been almost completely lacking. We have mounted a narrow military defense against a comprehensive Soviet grand strategy. Simultaneously, we have dropped our military guard so that everywhere our position has become increasingly precarious. We need to get on with the business of restoring a military equilibrium so that the real intellectual struggle for the future can begin.

The ideological arena is the one in which the Soviet and democratic approaches are fundamentally irreconcilable. Whether one likes it or not, we remain engaged in a competition for the design of tomorrow's world. Consequently, the conception, articulation, and propagation of a new strategy for coping with the Soviet global threat is the most pressing task confronting free men.

WILLIAM R. KINTNER
President
Foreign Policy Research Institute

MITTERRAND'S FRANCE

The majority of those voting in this year's parliamentary and presidential elections in France were not seeking any significant change in France's existing foreign and defense policies. Indeed these were not at issue in the elections. Nor did the voters express any desire in general to change

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France's present political institutions, tailored as they were by Charles de Gaulle to fit his own august and authoritarian personality. Rather, the French electorate has decided that these same institutions (with one possible adjustment) should now be used under different leadership to promote within France radical-reformist social and economic goals, instead of the conservative ones that have prevailed for the last twenty-three years.

Democracy is, among other things, a system of government under which people are enabled at appropriate intervals to choose their rulers or, in other words, to put the ins out and the outs in. By 1981 it had become important to many French voters to demonstrate that even after this long spell of ascendant conservatism, *l'alternance* (alternation) between ruling parties was still possible. They wanted to prove to themselves, and to the world, that France was still a democracy; that the left wing of French politics could and would be allowed its turn to govern.

Many voters felt in any case that another seven years of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as president of France would be altogether too much of a good (or, as some thought, not so good) thing. Giscard is a gifted and experienced political figure. His shrewd and sober guidance has brought France through the difficult years from 1974 until 1981 in good economic shape, when compared with her British, Italian, or even her German neighbors. Nevertheless, France has not been unscathed by the world recession. By French standards both inflation and unemployment have reached alarming heights. So—as happens in all democracies nowadays—Giscard, together with the right wing and centrist groups that had helped him govern for seven years, paid the price for economic failure; that is, for a performance perceived in France to be a failure, even if in world terms it can hardly be called a failure without qualification.

The presidential election result showed nevertheless that a large minority of French voters still admired and trusted Giscard, and wished him to go on leading them for another seven years, which would have given him the considerable cumulative total of fourteen years as president of France. The (once-renewable) seven-year presidential term, or *septennat,* is the only feature of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic that is as yet seriously under question in France. President Mitterrand, for his part, has come out in favor of a *non*renewable seven-year term and says that he intends to take steps to introduce it.

During the last two years of Giscard's *septennat,* his personal approval ratings among the French public at large, which had been at or near the remarkably high figure of 60 per cent, wavered and then dropped off fairly steeply. This was no doubt partly because of the country's disappointing economic performance (as it was perceived) under his regime. It also, however, reflected some popular disillusionment with Giscard's

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personality and style of government. This last oscillated between a contrived folksiness, shown in carefully stage-managed and televised social get-togethers with Paris bus drivers and dustmen and their families, on the one hand, and a revived monarchical idiom that for some citizens carried echoes of the days before the French Revolution, on the other. In addition, hackles began to be raised by Giscard's television manner. Always solemn and didactic, Giscard came to be judged as too elitist and patronizing by half. If there is one thing the French people cannot stand, it is being talked down to.

Moreover, there was the minor, but baffling and never satisfactorily explained, affair of Emperor Bokassa and the diamonds that he gave as presents to President Giscard and his family. This episode, too, told against the incumbent president when the chips were down.

By contrast, François Mitterrand is a quieter, more reserved, and (despite having written eight books) less visibly cerebral and articulate man than Giscard. Mitterrand has no gift for small talk. He is bad at remembering his collaborators' names. He likes going for long walks by himself. ("It is by devoting time to solitary thought that I am able to keep my roots in the life-giving soil, without which there will be nothing but a mind repeating the same things over and over again in a vacuum without inventing anything new, divorced from the source of life.") He comes from a modest, middle-class family in the Charente area of southwestern France. He is comfortable with his origins and, as he himself says, is extremely faithful to them.

Politically he is an adroit operator who has steered the French Socialist party over the last ten years into and out of partnership with the French Communist party, and past the many pitfalls which association with that most Stalinist of all the West European communist parties was bound to entail. Now he has triumphed. The Socialist party, with more popular support and more seats in the new National Assembly than any other, is the strongest single party in France and—contrary to all the predictions, which were being made as recently as May 10, when Mitterrand was elected president—has gained a parliamentary majority of 285 seats in the 491-strong assembly. He thus needs no support from any other party to rule for the full five-year life of the National Assembly. The Communist party has lost almost half its seats (from 86 to 44). The combined right-wing parties, formerly in the majority, have fallen from 274 to 156.

Though the Communist party is at its lowest ebb electorally for years, Communist voters helped to put Socialist candidates into the National Assembly at the second round, or runoff, of the parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, it was clear that although the French public wanted changes, it did not intend the Communist party to be the one

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that makes them. Mitterrand has nevertheless made four Communists ministers in his new forty-four-member government. His reasons for doing so are debated below.

Mitterrand is a Delphic character, who as a matter of principle never reveals more of his hand than he has to. However, as an article in *The Economist* pointed out on May 22, 1981, elements of two distinguishable patterns of future government, now that Mitterrand has achieved power, can be found in what he has been saying over the last few years. The more moderate and restrained of the two would aim at diminishing unemployment (7.1 per cent of the work force in April 1981), redistributing private wealth, and devolving state power to the regions. In other words, it would aim at bringing about some of the changes needed to create a more just and less rigid society in France, without causing additional inflation (as measured by consumer prices, 12.7 per cent in the twelve months to April 1981).

The other pattern would "thumb back through the history books to the dusty pages of nationalisation," create large numbers (210,000) of new (and *ex hypothesi* unneeded) civil service jobs, and hand out an assorted basket of inflationary goodies to the French populace. (Those goodies might include a thirty-five-hour work week; the fifth week of an annual paid vacation, which already stands at four weeks; retirement at age sixty; a 50 per cent rise in family allowances, housing subsidies, and pensions; and a 23 per cent rise in the minimum wage.) Such a program, if put through in its entirety, could hardly fail to do deep further damage to the competitiveness of French industry, already under fierce challenge from the up-and-coming industries of some of the more dynamic countries in the Third World.

Some steps toward these objectives were taken by Mitterrand between the presidential and parliamentary elections: namely, a 10 per cent rise in the minimum wage, a decree calling for a mandatory fifth week of paid vacation, a rise in the minimum old-age pension by 20 per cent and in family allowances and low-income housing allowances by 25 per cent. Higher taxes were announced on top salaries, corporate earnings, yachts, and four-star hotels.

During the concluding stages of his campaign, Giscard made much of the dangers for France that would follow if Mitterrand's highly inflationary program, as he described it, were put into effect. He predicted that the French would soon be hankering after the prudence and good sense with which he and Raymond Barre (his prime minister from 1976 to 1981) had conducted France's financial and economic affairs; within two years, predicted Giscard, he would once again be the most popular political leader in France.

How far were the voters who have put Mitterrand and his party

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into power attracted by the quite tangible and specific welfare benefits that they were promised if the Socialists won? Some among them must have been powerfully tempted. In welfare states (and France already has a very advanced one) the popular appetite is apt to grow by what it feeds on. A state of mind can develop in which there is never for long such a thing as *enough* welfare—only a constantly ascending spiral of dissatisfaction, of which in some countries politicians inevitably take advantage. Nevertheless, the French as a nation are mature, energetic, and have their feet firmly enough placed on Mother Earth to be able to resist "welfaritis." It is likely that their response took the more sophisticated form of believing that Giscard's and Barre's deflationary policies were leading nowhere, and that the right course was to create purchasing power and a domestic market that would help revitalize French industry, and thus lead to renewed growth. Given France's outstanding record of growth between 1958 and 1974, and even in the far less favorable circumstances of the later seventies, it was natural enough that French voters should take this view. (There are no dismal "stop-go" exercises in France's recent national experience, as there are in Britain's.) For a variety of reasons, moreover, French nationalized industry has by and large been a success. (Renault is the outstanding example.) Hence, this part of the Mitterrand program did not seem to the French voter nearly as daunting as his or her British counterpart finds the prospect of transferring still further sections of British industry to the overmanned and unprofitable public sector.

Why has Mitterrand brought Communist ministers into his government? (Between the presidential and parliamentary elections, he refused to say whether or not he would do so, evidently for fear that if he said he would, this would frighten off some of the undecided voters. His right-wing opponents had charged him with having just this step in mind.) All four of the Communists have been appointed to important cabinet posts. For example, Charles Fiterman, who has been number two in the Communist party and secretary of its Central Committee, is minister of transport and the ranking member of the cabinet after the prime minister. Fiterman is thus now in a position to ensure, as time goes on, that Communists or their sympathizers are appointed to key posts in the French airline and railway systems. He and his three colleagues (as Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson has pointed out in an endeavor to allay American misgivings) will *not* have access to classified information arising outside their own spheres of competence (in the realm of defense, for example). As cabinet ministers, however, they will have a say not only about what is done in their own bailiwicks, but also in regard to all those wider policies over which the cabinet exercises a general responsibility. It is this aspect that Georges Marchais, the Communist party leader, has in his mind when he claims that his party will henceforward be running

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France in equal partnership with the Socialists. It has struck many Frenchmen, besides outside observers, as odd that the Communists should be accorded a position of such influence in the new government on the morrow of their worst-ever electoral defeat.

As his whole record shows, Mitterrand is a cautious man who will probably not try to implement his program at a faster rate than the economy can bear. He may well find some of his supporters growing impatient. If he has brought Communist ministers into his government, it is presumably in an attempt to ensure that he can carry the Communist party—and especially the Confédération Générale du Travail, the Communist-led main grouping of French trade unions—with him, rather than incur their overt and embarrassingly publicized hostility. It will suit him if this potentially vocal section of the French Left can be seen to share the responsibility within his administration for any delays and setbacks, rather than condemn his performance from outside.

As the price for their role in Mitterrand's government, the Communist party has been constrained to agree to a joint statement with the Socialists, issued on June 23, calling for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and no Soviet interference in Poland. To adopt these two positions, however, marks a major reversal in the previous attitude of the French Communist party. The change is clearly tactical and expedient. It could prove short-lived. Mitterrand no doubt has in mind that if his alliance with the Communists proves to be as fragile as many Frenchmen currently expect, he will at least be able to claim that he has done his best to unite the French Left (as his own more left-wing colleagues undoubtedly hoped he would); and he will still have his own massive Socialist majority in the National Assembly to fall back on. Meanwhile, the two positions on which he has extracted Communist assent, albeit reluctantly, are important elements in Mitterrand's own declared foreign policy stance, which (as he has been at pains to assure his principal Atlantic partners) does not differ essentially from his predecessor's.

LORD SAINT BRIDES
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YUGOSLAVIA'S MOUNTING DIFFICULTIES

The outbreak of violence on April 7, 1981 by ethnic Albanians at the university in Pristina, capital of the autonomous region of Kosovo, which is part of the Constituent Republic of Serbia (one of several within the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia), has drawn attention to the

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growing difficulties faced by post-Tito Yugoslavia. As with many other Western countries, Yugoslavia is groping for policies capable of solving or managing ethnic, political, economic, and social problems while preserving stability in the existing political system.

Certain problems, such as the soaring international debt, high unemployment (about 15 per cent), low productivity, and rampant inflation (more than 40 per cent during the first half of 1981) have been evident for some time; others, such as the agitation in Kosovo for independence, are new. All are terribly complex, perhaps even insoluble, and entail a fundamental clash between the requirements for maintaining control in the hands of the communist leadership and the pressures for extensive economic change, which can flourish only in an atmosphere of diminished governmental regulation and greater flexibility.

The danger of ethnic divisiveness is especially worrisome. The nationalist spark struck by the Albanians in Kosovo threatens to ignite the ethnic tinder that has only been smoldering since 1945. [For another view of the ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, see Pedro Ramet's article in this issue—ed.] A mosaic of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural contrasts, Yugoslavia must try to accommodate six constituent republics (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia); two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina), integral parts of Serbia; four languages (Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, Slovenian, and Albanian); three religions (Greek Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Islam); and two alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin). The animosities between the diverse ethnic groups are rooted deeply in the history of the area, and historical memory is an ever-present fact of political life.

The Albanian problem is the knottiest of all. The 1.5 million Muslim Albanians of Kosovo are the poorest and most backward ethnic group; they are also the fastest growing and least assimilated portion of a total population of 22 million. Feared and looked down upon by the Serbs, the Albanians constitute more than 80 per cent of the population of Kosovo, which is juridically part of Serbia. Their unexpected militancy alarmed the government and led to the closing of the University of Pristina in late May—the first time since 1945 that a Yugoslav university has been shut down.

The central government is unwilling to upgrade Kosovo's status from autonomous region to constituent republic for several reasons. First, the Serbs strongly object to relinquishing Kosovo as part of their republic. The region is the emotional focus of a mystical attachment to their history—a combination, as it were, of Valley Forge, Williamsburg, Boston, and Philadelphia. Yugoslavs in other republics tend to see Kosovo as a uniquely Serbian problem and acknowledge that it would be extremely difficult for the Serbs to sacrifice control over the roots of their

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national heritage to the growing numbers of Albanians. "How," remarked one Croatian official, "can Serbs give up the Decani Monastery or the seat of the Serbian archbishop in Pec?" Second, the government assumes that it is not possible to have *two* Albanias in Europe and views the demands of the ethnic Albanians for republican status as the first step toward secession from Yugoslavia and unification with neighboring Albania. Finally, it dare not open the Pandora's Box of demands by other ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy from republics in which they find themselves a minority: nearly 1 million Serbs, for example, live in Croatia. To reconsider the political-territorial subdivisions of Yugoslavia would jeopardize the integrity of the state.

For the moment, the government blames the violence on Albania's interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, and on corrupt officials in Kosovo who, acting on the time-tested principle that the squeaky wheel gets the grease, stage-managed the protests in order to get more federal money for welfare and local economic projects. In late May, two officials of the Kosovo provincial government resigned, and hundreds of members have been expelled from the local Communist party. An extensive purge of the Kosovo party organization is under way, and the army has been sent in to maintain order. Few Yugoslavs take seriously the occasional allegations that the Russians are responsible.

The government hopes to tranquilize the outbursts in Kosovo with a mixture of military control, money, bureaucratic shakeups, quick trials for political agitators, and symbolic improvements in the status of the local population. Implicit in this reasoning is an assumption that those responsible for the violence do not have a large following and that the bulk of the ethnic Albanians prefer to remain part of Yugoslavia, which has done far more for their socioeconomic and educational improvement than Tirana has done for their ethnic compatriots in Albania—still the most Stalinist, repressive regime in Europe.

The nub of the problem is that not enough is known about the political outlook of the arrested agitators or the extent of their support among Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. Some Yugoslav analysts hypothesize the existence of three groups, though without yet assigning any hierarchy of importance. One group of ethnic Albanians may seek greater autonomy. Conceivably, its aspirations might be satisfied by the grant of republican status. For the generation that has grown up in post-1945 Yugoslavia, the benefits have been considerable and the advantages rather obvious. Those benefits acquire added luster in light of the fact that Albania remains a closed, harshly ruled, and repressive society. A second group, perhaps to be found mainly among the youth, may be attracted by the romantic vision of a united Albania. Like the IRA in Ireland, the Basques in Spain, and the Kurds in Iraq, these Albanians may see inde-

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pendence as the only way to realize their national aspirations. Their political outlook, therefore, may become increasingly radical, militant, and uncompromisingly violent. Yet a third group may also exist, its roots lying perhaps in the strong anticommunism that led many ethnic Albanians to side with the Italian Fascists and the Nazis during World War II. At this early stage, it is impossible to know which group among the current crop of nationalist agitators predominates.

The difficulty of any assessment is compounded by the paucity of reliable information. Few details of the unrest in Kosovo or of the arrest of suspected political agitators have appeared in the Yugoslav media. On Yugoslav TV, there is more coverage of the violence in Ireland than that in Kosovo. Indeed, some Yugoslav newspapers have complained that the government's secretiveness about the situation has made informed commentary impossible.

Perceptions that the government is unsure of itself are reinforced by the absence of an official explanation for the events in Kosovo and by the common knowledge that strong military units are deployed there (reservists have been recalled for temporary duty). With Tito's death in May 1980, a strong hand was removed from the helm for the first time in thirty-five years. The nine-member collective presidency, established by Tito to ensure an orderly succession, is now being put to the test. It is essential to know whether annual rotation of the office of the president (i.e., the chairmanship of the collective presidency)—among a group comprising one representative from each of the six republics, the two autonomous regions, and the League of Yugoslav Communists (as the Communist party is called)—can provide decisive leadership in time of crisis. For the moment, the premium seems to be on caution. A round of party congresses is slated for next year, and with rival factions competing for control of the party organizations in the various republics, no one wants to push a policy that might backfire, resulting in a loss of support in the political maneuvers that lie ahead. Beyond that is the challenge of adapting the system of ethnic balances that Tito fashioned, and mastered, to suit times when there is no charismatic leader whose undisputed authority can settle party and government disputes. In short, can Titoism function without Tito?

In situations of uncertainty in authoritarian societies, the leadership usually opts for repression rather than reform, for centralization of power rather than its diffusion. Though there are no conclusive signs that this is to be the case in Yugoslavia, one occasionally hears word play on the country's initials, SFRY, to the effect that now there is a need for Rankovic, former head of the secret police and close aide to Tito.* Purged

*SFRY, or Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, also represents, in Serbian, the slogan *Sada Fala Rankovic Yugoslavia* (Yugoslavia Needs Rankovic Now).

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in 1966 for accumulating excessive power and bugging Tito's house, Rankovic was also known for his harsh suppression of the ethnic Albanians. No one expects Rankovic's rehabilitation, notwithstanding a recent TV news clip that showed him placing a wreath on Tito's gravestone, but there is an implicit questioning of whether a permissive, indecisive leadership can cope with Yugoslavia's complex problems.

The failure of the stabilization policy—introduced in 1980 to curb inflation and improve the country's dire economic situation—has also diminished confidence in the leadership. The world recessions of 1974 and 1979 hit Yugoslavia particularly hard. Widespread unemployment in Western Europe resulted in reduced remittances by the 800,000 Yugoslavs working abroad. Energy costs have risen, without any compensating increase in export earnings. Moreover, Yugoslavia's productivity is low, greatly diminishing its competitiveness in hard-currency areas and deepening its reliance on markets in the Soviet bloc.

There are many objective explanations for Yugoslavia's economic plight, but the most telling may be political in character: namely, the inability or unwillingness of the leadership to adjust traditional modes of behavior to the requirements of a modern industrial state. Such an adjustment, it is feared, might weaken the popular base whence comes the party's support. Yugoslav productivity should not be as low as it is. Abroad, Yugoslav workers are highly regarded: hard-working, skilled, disciplined, and efficient. Once back home, however, they revert to indifference and inefficient behavior. Lack of incentive is partly responsible; so is the thick web of restrictive regulations.

Managerial personnel tend not to be risk takers, for they can be removed easily for political as well as economic reasons. Workers cannot be fired for incompetence, with the result that absenteeism is endemic. Poor work habits—the party's euphemism for laziness and indifference—are explained in terms of the workers' failure to reach the stage of "socialist consciousness." The attempt in 1974 to introduce a nine-to-five workday encountered such widespread opposition that it was quickly abandoned. A sense of time as an integral part of productivity is absent. The prevailing ethos is perhaps best captured in the comment of one Yugoslav acquaintance: "I brought an antique chair in to be repaired, but when I went back for it a year later, the cabinetmaker had died." No effort is made to change the work ethic from a mentality that asks "What for?" to one that asks "Why not?"

Yugoslav leaders are unwilling to press economic changes that might have dire political consequences. The revolution in Poland, which they publicly support, has nonetheless made them a bit nervous. With a decline in the standard of living of more than 10 per cent during the past year, and the expectation that the coming year will be even worse,

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the Yugoslav leadership is trying to mute any protest that could get out of control.

Student unrest is another source of concern. The universities churn out graduates for whom there are no jobs and dim prospects. Given the continued recession abroad and the ingrained Yugoslav resistance to relocating in a republic other than their own, prospects are bleak for those in their twenties and thirties. Alienation is growing, the obvious manifestations being cynicism, alcoholism, and the beginnings of a drug problem. But violence and petty crime, though on the increase, are nowhere near the problem they are in American cities; and Yugoslavia's urban areas are eminently livable, which helps account for the unwillingness of the young to move to less developed parts of the country.

Yugoslav leaders worry about the potential of student unrest: they remember the events of May and June 1968, when only the prompt and personal intercession of President Tito defused an explosive situation. The leadership fears a Polish-type crisis—a coalition of workers and students demanding democratization and jobs—even though there is not any indication now that such a politically dangerous combination is in the making. The Yugoslav scene is quiet but troubled, and the outbreaks in Kosovo may have signaled the beginning of a period of difficulty for Tito's heirs.

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AMERICA IN NATO: THE CONVENTIONAL DELUSION*

by Alan Ned Sabrosky

"Stability," it has been said, "is a first-priority objective of a great power in the nuclear age."[1] In fact, since the end of the Second World War, the fundamental strategic objective of U.S. defense policy has been to maintain the stability of two closely interrelated balances: (*a*) the Soviet-American strategic-nuclear balance and (*b*) the theater military balance in Europe.[2]

The importance of the first balance for the security of America and its allies cannot be overemphasized. If the essential strategic balance between the United States and the USSR were to shift significantly in favor of the Soviet Union, the political and military implications of that change would be far-reaching, indeed. The problem is not only that the fundamental security of the United States itself would be called into question. America's position in world affairs would also be irretrievably undermined, as each of the theater balances eroded to the advantage of the Soviet state. In many respects, the present position of the United States vis-à-vis the USSR is analogous to that of Great Britain vis-à-vis imperial Germany in the early years of this century. Britain, much like America today, depended for its security on the maintenance of an essential strategic balance favorable to itself. So long as that key balance—then based on the relative strength of battle fleets—was maintained, Britain could defend its interests, exert influence, and do it all with a rather small army. London could even accept the theater superiority of the German army, so long as Berlin did not seriously challenge Britain's strategic naval position. Faced with such a challenge, however, Britain had to take countermeasures, even at the risk of war. The British realized that for their principal rival to have both a superior theater capability *and* a strategic force equal to their own would spell political disaster.[3]

*An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Philadelphia, March 18-21, 1981.

[1] John Newhouse, "The United States and Western Europe," in Henry Owen, ed, *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1973), p. 42.

[2] See W. R. Schilling, T. R. Fox, Catherine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Puchala, *American Arms and a Changing Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 1.

[3] It is worth noting that Britain did not feel obligated to match the theater capability of its continental rival single-handedly, but turned to its allies. That course of action entailed certain risks, but it also reflected a sound appraisal of the relative political utility of strategic and theater military balances.

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It is also very clear, however, that the security of the United States cannot yet be decoupled from that of Western Europe.[4] It is equally apparent that the security of Western Europe has been, and remains, ultimately dependent on the ability of the United States to maintain a stable military balance in the European theater. There is little doubt that Europe is the key theater of operations for U.S. forces. It is the principal area of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe provides the principal rationale for maintaining the U.S. Army at its present force level.[5] There should be even less doubt in Europe regarding the consequences of an attenuation of America's political commitment to the security of Western Europe. The United States, as Colin Gray recently noted, "is far more a producer than a consumer of security within the Western Alliance. . . . In the last resort, NATO Europe has no realistic alternative to the American connection [through NATO] for the underwriting of its security."[6]

The difficulty today is that much concern persists with respect both to the effectiveness of NATO as an alliance and to the proper military character of the aforementioned "American connection." In a sense, of course, such concerns have always seemed to be in attendance on the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, NATO occupies much the same place in security affairs today as the Austro-Hungarian Empire once held in political affairs, until the First World War put an end to it and its pretensions. NATO is a venerable institution with which Western statesmen and soldiers have become accustomed to dealing; its defects are widely recognized, but no one seems willing or able to contemplate a future without it.

Tradition aside, the specific problems that confront the NATO nations give no indication of disappearing of their own volition; nor is there any reason to discount their potential role as a cancer in the body politic of the alliance. I will not dwell here on the economic ills besetting most NATO countries, or on what one writer has called "the symptoms of Finlandization,"[7] other than to note that both pose a grave threat to the long-term health of the Atlantic Alliance.[8] Rather, my concern is with the

[4] This was realized even as American strategic superiority passed. See, for example, Morton H. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), esp. pp. 99-112.

[5] See Kenneth Coffey, *Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), chap. 7; *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request, and FY 1982 – 1986 Defense Programs*, January 19, 1981 (hereafter, DOD Annual Report, FY 1982), p. 63.

[6] Gray, "SALT II and the NATO Alliance," *International Security Review*, Summer 1979, p. 179.

[7] Walter F. Hahn, "Does NATO Have a Future?," ibid., Summer 1980, p. 156.

[8] See Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds, *Atlantic Community in Crisis* (New York: Pergamon, 1979).

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vitality of the *military* foundation of Western security, as that is embodied in NATO.

Unfortunately, it is all too easy to discern a number of flaw lines (and some outright fissures!) in that particular edifice. Official NATO military policy emphasizes "deterrence—and, if necessary, defense against any attack, at any level [i.e., strategic-nuclear, theater-nuclear, or conventional]."[9] Yet, as is so often the case with "official policies," there is a substantial disparity between design and execution—one that has existed since the passing of American strategic superiority was seen to undermine the doctrine of massive retaliation. The latter's replacement, flexible response, implied two things: (*a*) NATO willingness to use the minimum force necessary to contain an attack and (*b*) sufficient escalatory dominance to allow NATO to outbid its Eastern opponent if initial defensive efforts should fail. This required NATO to have conventional forces adequate to halt an attack without recourse to nuclear weapons, or at least a sufficient nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union. Yet, in reality, NATO lacked the former, and the United States allowed its nuclear advantage to disappear as a matter of policy, retaining a doctrine that had become, for all intents and purposes, a strategic curiosity.[10]

By 1981, the fact that flexible response no longer fit the European security environment was understood in many circles, at least outside the several governments. The passing of our escalatory dominance was seen to enhance the role of NATO's conventional forces, including U.S. forces already in or designated for Europe[11]; the growth of Soviet theater forces in Europe, both nuclear and conventional, was also seen to be impressive. The USSR's demonstrated ability and willingness to project its military power abroad, moreover, suggested a number of unsettling things about the future stability of the fundamental strategic and theater balances. In fact, former Defense Secretary Harold Brown's last annual report concluded that "the challenge to NATO is clear: to maintain the necessary military balance in Europe."[12]

That conclusion, which seems to be shared by the Reagan administration, raises three important questions that I will address in this paper. First, precisely what is the "necessary military balance in Europe"? Second, to what extent is the conventional defense of NATO Europe both feasible and desirable? And third, what is the proper American military contribution to the security of the Atlantic Alliance?

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[9] DOD Annual Report, FY 1982, p. 64.

[10] Steven L. Canby, "General Purpose Forces," *International Security Review*, Fall 1980, esp. pp. 317, 322, 325; Gray, "SALT II and the NATO Alliance," pp. 188, 190.

[11] Raymond E. Burrell, *Strategic Nuclear Parity and NATO Defense Doctrine* (Washington: National Defense University, Research Directorate, July 1978), p. 10.

[12] DOD Annual Report, FY 1982, p. 63.

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The "Necessary Military Balance": A Reconsideration

Any military balance necessarily encompasses quantitative as well as qualitative factors, and both must be taken into account here. Regrettably, neither aspect offers much reassurance. For both balances, the "numbers game" has been addressed, frequently and at length,[13] and need not be rendered yet again in this publication. What is worth noting, however, is that the original "balance of imbalances" in Europe[14] — wherein U.S. *strategic* superiority was believed to offset Soviet *theater* superiority — no longer obtains. By 1981, the USSR had attained at least a position of strategic-nuclear parity with the United States. Depending on the indices used, and taking into account the "follow-on" offensive strategic systems being deployed by the two superpowers, it could even be argued that the Soviet Union was moving into the ascendancy in some respects.[15] At the theater level, the situation was a bit more complex. NATO retained an edge in tactical-nuclear weapons, tactical-air capabilities, and other selected weapon systems (e.g., antiarmor). But the Warsaw Pact (especially the USSR) maintained and, in some cases, improved its advantage in operational divisions, manpower, all major classes of armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense.[16] Despite some optimism in official NATO circles, the overall advantage — especially in forward-based forces — lay with the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

From a qualitative perspective, the status of the theater balance in Europe is especially uncertain. Each side has assets and liabilities whose combined effect on the European balance cannot yet be ascertained. The Bundeswehr, for example, is widely considered to be a far better force today than it was a decade ago, and even the U.S. 7th Army — whatever its deficiencies — is now a far cry from its lowly state when the United States retreated from the Vietnam War. In contrast, many of the non-Soviet contingents in the Warsaw Pact are considered to be of dubious reliability, at least for offensive purposes. It would be difficult to include them in any aggregate summary of the Warsaw Pact's active threat capabilities, especially since such an offensive might go badly.[17] Whether or not the qualitative institutional improvements in some NATO forces are sufficient to counterbalance the Soviet qualitative and quantitative gains

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[13] The most comprehensive compendium of data now available to the public is John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960–1980* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

[14] The phrase appears to have originated in Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[15] See, among others, R. J. Rummel, "Preparing for War? The Third Reich Versus the Soviet Union Today," *International Security Review*, Fall 1979, and John F. Lehman, "The Soviet Nuclear Advantage and How to Eliminate It," ibid., Fall 1980.

[16] DOD Annual Report, FY 1982, chap. 5.

[17] The present Soviet apprehension concerning the political reliability of the Polish army is a very notable case in point.

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in weaponry cannot, unfortunately, be determined with any degree of certainty. Moreover, besides the technological upgrading of WTO forces, gains have also been registered by NATO. In particular, the effect of new precision-guided munitions on a NATO-WTO conflict is uncertain. Soviet and WTO armor may be less useful now than in the past; U.S. and other NATO tactical aircraft may also be less effective; and the net effect of modern weaponry on armor and tactical airpower together may be to return to the *status quo ante*. Finally, the U.S. reliance on high-technology weaponry may have produced a force whose arms exceed in sophistication the skill levels of many of its soldiers.[18]

It seems clear, then, that WTO theater capabilities have increased, though perhaps not so precipitously as some have claimed. In fact, at the theater level, the military balance has always been precarious, at best, and was far more adverse (from our perspective) in NATO's early days than it is now. The conventional balance has certainly been shifting more to the Warsaw Pact's advantage lately. Yet it can be argued that the changes under way in the NATO-WTO military balance influence the ease with which a Soviet attack could take place, and not the probability of such an attack occurring or its prospects for success. Indeed, a deliberate Soviet attack on NATO *might* occur only if (1) the strategic balance had shifted in favor of the USSR to such an extent that an American strategic response was no longer credible, (2) the theater balance gave Soviet and usable Warsaw Pact forces a clear (3:1 or better) edge over NATO forces on the central front, and (3) the foregoing advantages were unequivocably believed by Moscow to be transitory, the Soviet leadership having concluded that the global and theater "correlations of forces" were — contrary to Marxist-Leninist doctrine — on the verge of shifting irrevocably against the Soviet Union.

That there now exists some sort of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, therefore, does not mean that a Soviet attack on Western Europe is imminent. In fact, there is little reason to expect a Soviet attack on Europe under virtually *any* circumstances. Europe intact is worth more to the USSR than Europe devastated, even if no nuclear weapons reached the Soviet homeland. There is precious little evidence in support of the proposition that the USSR sees any point in presiding over a NATO Europe in ruins, which would surely be the end product of a general war on the Continent.[19] Further, the Soviets could never be certain that they would escape unscathed from such a war, regardless of the extent of their nuclear edge over the West. Some Western response could be forthcoming in the event

[18] This comes through with particular force in Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980).

[19] This conclusion is reinforced far more by Soviet writings on the subject than it is by Western interpretations thereof.

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of a Soviet invasion, and the risk of incurring serious losses certainly outweighs the possible advantage of gaining militarily what the USSR believes it will eventually gain through political means. One might gamble everything to gain something that is otherwise unattainable; one does not act so rashly simply to speed up the acquisition process by a few years.

If this is indeed the case, why, then, are the Soviets augmenting their theater forces? There are, I believe, two reasons. In the first place, the Soviet buildup compels the West to continue maintaining, or even to augment, its own theater capabilities. Otherwise, the West risks a further loss of political confidence that would, in its turn, very likely undermine the cohesion of the NATO alliance and the allegiance of some of its members. Paradoxically, even the attempt to enhance NATO theater capabilities may produce that effect, as attested by the ongoing alliance debates over the proposed modernization of long-range theater-nuclear forces and over the call for a 3 per cent real annual increase in defense outlays by all NATO members.[20] Many NATO European governments would find it extremely difficult to implement the political and economic measures that such steps would necessitate. For them to divert resources from "welfare" to "warfare" would be politically expensive at home and might bring into power regimes even more faint-hearted than some of the incumbents. Any one of these outcomes, of course, would accelerate the political process in Europe favoring the USSR and its own preferred objectives.

Secondly, Moscow clearly intends to have a substantial theater war-fighting capability, if only for the political leverage that it can provide in negotiations with the United States and other Western nations. Should the strategic balance tip so far against the United States that a military option becomes feasible, that capability also has a residual military role, at least on the periphery of Central Europe. Finally, the growing restiveness in Eastern Europe — most recently in Poland — argues for a major conventional buildup for the dual internal-security purpose of forestalling incipient revolts, if possible, and crushing handily any that might break out. Again, the emphasis is political — as it properly ought to be — and not military.

Corrective Action I: Dispensing with Delusions

How is this situation to be managed? If one considers only the United States, there are, as Colin Gray recently noted, two principal choices. They are (*a*) to augment NATO, especially U.S., theater capabil-

[20] *The Three Per Cent Solution and the Future of NATO* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1981).

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ities or (*b*) to go for some form of strategic superiority.[21] In reality, though, the first option is no option at all: it reflects a set of strategic, tactical, and political delusions that collectively inhibit a realistic appraisal of the military requirements for security and stability in Western Europe.

The Strategic Delusion

First of all, it is a strategic delusion to think that a war between the opposing coalitions in Europe can be localized in scope or limited in means. It is little more than an exercise in sophistry to draw distinctions between a war with the Warsaw Pact in Europe and "a worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union," as the U.S. Department of Defense did in its most recent annual report.[22] Even if a war in Central Europe did not begin (or end!) with a nuclear exchange, a Soviet attack in Europe would likely result in conflicts in other areas, as well — not necessarily at Soviet behest but, rather, because ambitious local leaders might well determine that they would never have a better opportunity to achieve their objectives. At the very least, a Soviet-American conflict in Europe would also entail conflict between them in Asia.[23] Certainly there is no good reason for the Soviets to fight us in Europe but not in Asia, for to strike in both theaters would place an almost insurmountable burden on existing U.S. general-purpose forces (which are unable "to simultaneously support NATO and a major contingency in Asia").[24]

There is even less reason to think that such a conflict, once begun, would end without one side (and, therefore, both sides) resorting to the use of tactical-nuclear weapons and, if necessary, strategic-nuclear weapons. The prevailing NATO doctrine of flexible response, as noted earlier, explicitly defines recourse to higher levels of violence (i.e., nuclear weapons) as an acceptable alternative to conventional defeat. Soviet doctrine is even less "flexible," in the generic sense of the term. Although Soviet first use of nuclear weapons in the opening phase of a conflict is not considered inevitable by the USSR, the most one finds in Soviet doctrine is "acknowledgement of a *possible conventional phase*, which is expected to undergo transition into nuclear war."[25] Any Soviet decision to attack NATO forces in Europe, even one not coinciding with an attack upon the United States proper, would necessarily have reckoned with the possibility that we would call upon our strategic forces to stave off defeat. Indeed, that much is inherent in the announced U.S. strategy for the

[21] Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978).
[22] DOD Annual Report, FY 1982, p. 197.
[23] See U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, Hearings*, pt. 1, p. 98.
[24] Ibid., pt. 2, p. 1381.
[25] Joseph Douglass, Jr., *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe* (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

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defense of Europe. Moscow would therefore have already decided that the possible gains to be realized from such an attack (whatever they might appear to be) are worth both the risk and the reality of a strategic exchange, should that come to pass. Obviously, such an appraisal would also mean that the USSR — like NATO — would be willing to resort to the use of theater- or strategic-nuclear weapons rather than let its offensive fail and accept battlefield defeat. There can be little reason to attribute to the USSR a degree of restraint that the United States has declared it will not exercise. Indeed, both NATO doctrine and Moscow's predisposition to pre-emption argue for a Soviet use of tactical-nuclear weapons at the outset, unless Moscow were to believe it would lose at the conventional level (thereby relieving NATO of the need to escalate) — a situation in which the USSR would not be inclined to attack in the first place!

The Tactical Delusion

Second, it is regrettably a tactical delusion to believe that the USSR/Warsaw Pact is likely to lose at the conventional level. The prospects for stopping a full-scale Soviet offensive solely with conventional forces, while not preposterous, are certainly far from good. Nor is it likely that a Soviet Union whose leadership had decided to run the risk of a nuclear war would be deterred in any significant degree by the anticipation of a brutal, costly conventional campaign in Europe. To argue otherwise is to ignore Russian history, Soviet military doctrine, and Marxist-Leninist ideology and is on a par with the earlier belief that horse cavalry would maneuver too quickly for machine guns to be brought to bear effectively.[26]

It is only slightly less unwise to believe that the presence or absence of a few U.S. divisions or tactical-air squadrons will make a significant difference in the outcome of a European battle, or that reinforcements from the continental United States will arrive in sufficient numbers to make a difference. The point is often made, for example, that the majority of NATO's general-purpose forces are provided not by the United States, but by the European members of the alliance. This argument is usually advanced in order to counter criticism that U.S. allies are not "carrying their share" of the defense burden. Too often overlooked is an interesting fact: this argument also implies that the conventional defense of Europe is not primarily a function of U.S. conventional forces and, therefore, is not one of their primary missions. Their presence would certainly increase Soviet losses, and would probably (but not certainly)

[26] See Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response," in John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., eds, *American Defense Policy*, 4th ed. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

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prolong the conflict; but little more would be accomplished unless reserve formations from the United States were to arrive in time, in strength, and with most of their pre-positioned equipment intact.

Such an eventuality is extremely problematical at best. Even discounting serious reservations about the quality and reliability of those active and Selected Reserve formations designated as reinforcements for the European theater,[27] the nominal ability of the United States to secure NATO Europe in the event of conventional hostilities is based on five assumptions. They are that (a) pre-positioned equipment and unit stocks (POMCUS) will remain intact until units from the strategic reserve arrive; (*b*) air bases and ports in, or adjacent to, the threatened area will remain secure; (c) no significant losses will be sustained by the air/sea transport forces en route; (*d*) the conflict will last long enough for forces from the strategic reserve to make a difference; and (e) any war in Europe large enough to necessitate a commitment of the divisions in our strategic reserve will not escalate to the nuclear level.

Such assumptions are individually dubious and collectively preposterous. All things considered, American forces in Europe will be in a difficult position if war should begin. Without major reinforcements, they could avoid defeat only by resorting to nuclear weapons. In all probability, reinforcements would not be forthcoming; the evacuation of the Army (much less its dependents) would be hazardous at best; and the decision to use nuclear weapons would render meaningless all of the elaborate plans for reinforcement and resupply of U.S. forces in Europe. The net effect would be a European battle fought, from the U.S. perspective, largely by forces-in-being and one that would likely face Western commanders with a terribly demanding decision: accept battlefield defeat or use nuclear weapons. Both doctrine and the probable character of a NATO-WTO conflict environment suggest all too clearly what the choice would be.

The Political Delusion

Finally, it is a political delusion to assume that we can — or even that we should — wage a conventional battle in Europe, as some have suggested.[28] We must not forget that even a "successful" defense of Western Europe would be a disaster for several NATO nations — and that "success," as I have shown, is far from certain. For the United States to lose the better part of five divisions, while other NATO forces are severely mauled and the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany — the eco-

[27] It is worth noting that these questions apply principally to the U.S. Army ground formations in the Selected Reserve.

[28] Steven Canby is foremost among the advocates of this approach.

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nomic and military cornerstone of Western Europe — is devastated, would be a net gain for the Soviets, even if the WTO should lose the entirety of its first assault echelon.[29] Indochina should have taught us that loss ratios are not necessarily reliable indicators of success. Russian history (viz., the Second World War) as well as contemporary Soviet military doctrine should reinforce that lesson. The economic dislocation and political instability that would follow such a war could easily break both the European Community and NATO. The result could all too easily be a Pyrrhic victory in which (to paraphrase an American officer in Vietnam) the United States, having destroyed Western Europe in order to save it from the Soviet Union, finds the institutions for which it has fought crumbling around it in the ensuing peace. This is hardly an auspicious outcome from any point of view, and certainly not one to be encouraged by allowing Moscow to think that NATO might withhold its nuclear weapons even in the face of certain conventional defeat.

Corrective Action II: Redressing the Balance

To deal with the dual question of American and European security, in light of the considerations discussed above, requires the United States to concentrate its efforts on regaining escalatory dominance over the Soviet Union with a maximum economy of force, both in the strategic-nuclear and the theater balance. The Reagan administration seems committed to a major military buildup; but priorities must still be set, simply because the United States cannot significantly augment all its forces at the same time.

Precisely which forces should be given priority is very much a matter of debate. Some favor "a strategic nuclear force posture which could provide extended-deterrent protection for NATO-Europe in the 1980s"; others assert the feasibility and desirability of achieving "conventional superiority vis-à-vis the USSR."[30] A case can be made, of course, for each of these positions, as well as for their numerous derivatives. In my view, however, there is a grim logic at work here that is unlikely to be appreciated by the U.S. Army and by some defense analysts. If the Soviet Union is the principal threat, then the "name of NATO's game" can *only* be deterrence, and deterrence is enhanced by nuclear forces (strategic or long-range theater) capable of delivering warheads into the territory of the Soviet Union itself,[31] regardless of the degree of battlefield success that the

[29] See Burrell, *Strategic Nuclear Parity*, pp. 9-10, and Pierre Gallois, "The Future of France's *Force de Dissuasion*," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1979, p. 36.

[30] For opposing points of view on this issue, see Gray, "SALT II and the NATO Alliance" and Canby, "General Purpose Forces."

[31] Note that the same calculus need not apply to Soviet forces stationed outside the Soviet Union (e.g., in Eastern Europe).

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Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies might be enjoying in Western Europe. Therefore, corrective measures should aim at upgrading nuclear forces rather than at adding to the inventories of those lucrative targets known as POMCUS or at preparing for a conventional war that could easily be a political and economic disaster, no matter who might prevail in the military confrontation.[32] In short, the most valuable Western card in Europe has been and still is the nuclear deterrent forces.

Because the American nuclear guarantee has been the keystone of European security, strategic-nuclear parity now requires the United States to resolve a fundamental strategic dilemma: how to ensure the security of Western Europe on some basis other than U.S. strategic-nuclear superiority.[33] It is clear that the basic strategic objective of the United States must be to reassert the nuclear guarantee to Europe by at least stabilizing—and reversing if possible—unfavorable trends in the strategic balance. It is, of course, quite likely that the strategic balance is not so delicate a mechanism that slight shifts in favor of one or the other superpower are readily convertible into political gains, especially if those shifts are not seen to be permanent. If, however, the USSR should acquire *and retain* a margin of strategic superiority, and perhaps even increase that margin, then Moscow might well be in a position to realize some political advantage from its ever-more-favorable military position.

There is a wide range of options that the United States could adopt to reverse existing trends, re-establish American escalatory dominance in Europe, and erode the political leverage that the USSR has been acquiring. Some are "quick fixes"; others are more fundamental, long-term programs. Both types are needed.[34]

Four specific measures ought to be adopted without delay. One is to proceed with the proposed upgrading of strategic offensive and defensive programs, including Trident II and a "follow-on" manned bomber. A second is to upgrade U.S. forward-based systems and long-range tactical-nuclear capabilities (including the cruise missile program) in order to provide a rapid, cost-effective, and substantial increase in "Eurostrategic" delivery vehicles. The third is to defer further SALT negotiations until more favorable strategic- and theater-nuclear balances can be devised, thereby avoiding the need to negotiate and act in the shadow of an uncertain security environment. And the fourth is for the United States to encourage and assist in the development of the French nuclear weapons program. France does sometimes enjoy playing the role of spoiler in world politics, but the *force de dissuasion*—or, at least, those

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[32] Use of the Rapid Deployment Force is a different matter, of course.
[33] See Schilling et al., *American Arms and a Changing Europe*, pp. 1-3, 5-15.
[34] Lehman, "The Soviet Nuclear Advantage," offers a number of useful corrective measures.

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who control it—also complicates the USSR's position and is therefore something to be endorsed rather than hindered.

The precise effect that this ordering of priorities would have on U.S. general-purpose force requirements in Europe is uncertain. This is particularly apparent with respect to the ground forces. Put simply, no one knows how many divisions are required to provide adequate linkage with the U.S. strategic retaliatory forces or to reassure U.S. allies of the American commitment to NATO's defense. President Truman and General Eisenhower initially estimated that no more than two U.S. divisions would be required in Europe.[35] Such a force clearly could not have been intended to fight and win a theater battle; its role was obviously to provide a linkage between the U.S. commitment to Europe and the U.S. strategic forces, as well as to reassure U.S. allies. Much has changed since Truman and Eisenhower made that judgment. Still, the *objective* requirements for linkage and reassurance would not seem to mandate a U.S. ground force at present levels. The *subjective* requirements, on the other hand, may actually exceed present levels. Far too many analysts, European and American alike, seem to be convinced that even a partial reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Europe might well be seen as a harbinger of decoupling, and thus detrimental to the political goals of both the alliance and U.S. policy.

It is obvious that any reduction in the size of the U.S. garrison in Western Europe would have to be made with the greatest caution. At the very least, an explicit redefinition of U.S. policy toward NATO and of U.S. doctrine in NATO will be necessary. It might well be advisable to incorporate aspects of two rather different proposals advanced in late 1980, increasing the number of divisional formations (at the cadre level or greater) while reducing both the size of each formation and the total number of personnel stationed in Europe with the U.S. 7th Army.[36]

Three principal objections have been made to such reductions. It is argued that a significant reduction in U.S. general-purpose forces in Europe would (*a*) reduce the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe, (*b*) encourage Soviet "adventurism" in Europe, and (*c*) undermine the political cohesion of NATO.

None of these objections, in my opinion, is grounded in political-military reality. In the first place, the U.S. commitment to any country has never depended upon the presence of U.S. forces in that country, or even upon the existence of a formal alliance between the United States and that country. Without such a presence or such an

[35] Noted by Senator Stennis in U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 1975, Hearings*, pt. 1, p. 202.

[36] The two views are presented in Canby, "General Purpose Forces," and Alan Ned Sabrosky "U.S. General-Purpose Forces: Four Essential Reforms," ORBIS, Fall 1980.

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alliance, America committed troops to Korea in 1950. The sanction of the United Nations made American intervention more palatable in some circles, but it would doubtless have been forthcoming with or without UN approval. Similarly, the U.S. commitment to Israel — whatever its objective merits — is well known. Certainly the use of Soviet troops against Israel, as may have been contemplated at one point in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, would prompt U.S. intervention. Unless one is willing to argue that all of Western Europe is less important to us than the state of Israel, the same response would occur if the Soviets were to invade Europe. The NATO alliance and the presence of some U.S. troops, then, are a form of insurance in this respect; but neither significantly alters U.S. policy toward Europe.

Second, as I have emphasized above, the principal deterrent to Soviet adventurism in Europe is, and has always been, U.S. strategic-nuclear forces. If the latter were to become so weak that the USSR no longer feared nuclear retaliation from the United States, then the presence of a few American divisions would not significantly change things. Nor is a limited Soviet "incursion" into Western Europe politically or militarily realistic, however much it may serve as a rationale for U.S. force deployments abroad and for maintenance of the Army force structure as a whole. Even discounting Soviet doctrine and the enduring Soviet view of the meaning of a European war, there is no good reason for Moscow to risk American nuclear retaliation for such a limited incursion. How, indeed, could the Soviets be certain the West would know that it was "only" an incursion? In any event, NATO even now deploys sufficient forward forces to require the USSR to commit all its divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, *plus* the entire East German army, *plus* the Soviet divisions in Poland and Czechoslovakia — just to have a chance at forcing an entry. But the point of an incursion is to keep engaged-force levels below those of a major conflict. It is difficult to see how an invading assault force of more than thirty divisions qualifies as an "incursion" even if it succeeded — and it might well fail.

Third, and finally, the effect of any U.S. force reductions on the political cohesion of NATO is clearly the most unpredictable outcome to be considered. Cynics might remark that NATO cohesion is not very great in any case.[37] Certainly, whatever cohesion does exist may be largely attributed to the maintenance of a stable strategic balance and to the European belief that America simply cannot abandon the Continent to the Soviet Union without compromising its own vital interests. More to the

[37] Even apologists for NATO have been known to criticize it for lacking cohesion. See the appraisal of that school of thought in Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Allies, Clients, and Encumbrances," *International Security Review*, Summer 1980.

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point, it is clear that the cohesion of NATO varies directly with perceptions of a Soviet threat to Western Europe, not with changes in U.S. general-purpose force levels. When the Soviets seem threatening, as in the aftermath of their invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the alliance becomes more cohesive. During periods of détente, the alliance begins to unravel. It seems, moreover, that a major U.S. general-purpose force presence in Europe may be counterproductive, at least from the American perspective, since it provides the European members with an excuse for not doing more. In recent years, the United States made the great error of postponing "Vietnamization" of the military burden in South Vietnam. Let us hope we have not delayed "Europeanization" of the defense of Europe so long that we can no longer achieve it.

Toward a New Balance in NATO?

The principal thesis of this paper is that we have misapprehended the source of stability and security in NATO Europe. We have labored under a triple delusion about NATO's conventional forces. One has been that those forces constitute a significant deterrent to Soviet aggression. A second has been that a conventional defense of NATO Europe could be managed successfully if deterrence should fail. Still a third is that American conventional forces, particularly the 7th Army, make a significant contribution to the preceding mix of deterrence and defense.

In point of fact, the durability of these three delusions says more than one ought to have to hear about the bureaucratic infighting skills of the U.S. Army and the poverty of strategic thinking in the United States. The key balance is nuclear, not conventional. A conventional defense of NATO Europe is improbable at best, and the result would be only slightly less disastrous if it were to "succeed on the battlefield." The only legitimate roles of any importance for U.S. general-purpose ground forces are (*a*) to underwrite America's political commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and (*b*) to provide the necessary linkage as hostages to U.S. strategic-nuclear forces. The existing "imbalance of imbalances" must be corrected; escalatory dominance in Europe must be regained; and the U.S. conventional presence in Europe must be streamlined in order to provide greater economy of force. If the steps necessary to achieve these objectives are taken, we will be better able to protect our allies as well as ourselves.

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U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO MILITARY STRATEGY: THEORY VS. EXPERIENCE*

by Roman Kolkowicz

Soviet and American approaches to strategic problems in the nuclear era appear to be similar: the military technologies are similar; both sides generally understand the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the other's weapon systems; and both sides have been engaged in protracted diplomatic and technical negotiations on strategic arms limitations, with certain mutually acceptable results. Yet, the two countries diverge sharply on many fundamental issues regarding the uses, limitations, and purposes of military power as well as the rules of the game that are to govern it. This divergence, often disregarded by Western technical experts, is of vital importance to our understanding of profound misperceptions along the whole range of strategic and political issues inherent in the superpower relationship.

Traditional Soviet and American approaches to the use of military force in pursuit of national objectives are fundamentally at odds. Lying at one end of the spectrum, the instrumental, strategic, and highly politicized Soviet approach contrasts sharply with the more emotional, apolitical, and moralizing American approach. One might suggest that Machiavelli and Clausewitz are the intellectual and spiritual models of the Soviets, while the American tradition has its roots in an early Puritanism and a more recent democratic liberalism.

The roots of modern American strategic theory and doctrine lie in the scientific spirit of the Enlightenment and in the optimistic tradition of democratic liberalism, which envisaged man's ability to control, manage, and order conflict by rational scientific and technological means. This tradition was reflected in the words of the English theorist W. Lloyd: "The general who knows these things can direct war enterprises with geometrical precision and lead to a continual war without ever getting into the necessity of giving battle."[1] More recent aspects of this tradition

*The author thanks Donna Beltz for invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this paper.

[1]Quoted in H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 99-100.

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are embodied in the positive and optimistic premises of systems analysis and crisis management and in the vast literature on deterrence.

The traditional American approach to the use of military force has been pugnacious, but not "cunning and premeditated; rather it is a romantic impulse that erects boldness and initiative into patriotic tenets, but only in response to provocation."[2] George Kennan saw this trait as wrathful righteousness: "Democracy fights in anger—it fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough to provoke it—to teach that power a lesson it will not forget."[3] Until very recently, American policymakers have "looked on war and peace as two distinctly separate states. War has been viewed not as a continuation of policy but as a failure of diplomacy. . . . The American response to war has been to view it as the use of force in a great moral crusade in which there is no room for the deliberate hobbling of American power."[4]

This American tradition was challenged by events in the post–World War II period, particularly by the dismal war in Korea. It was further challenged by the rise of modern deterrence strategists, who rarely if ever asked questions about ethical or normative values, being preoccupied instead with problems of efficiency and economy in the application of force toward a given end. Modern American strategists began to aspire to realpolitik, asserting the "principle that military power should be subordinated to national policy, and that the only legitimate purpose of military force is to serve the nation's political objectives."[5]

The challenge and eventual rejection of earlier American tradition was considered necessary for two reasons. First, although "the practical necessity of military power [is] obvious to Americans today," it is not sufficiently obvious because "military power does not automatically translate into national security."[6] Second, when military policy and strategy lack limited and attainable objectives and become, in effect, ends in themselves, they cease to be controllable and predictable instruments of national policy.

These challenges eventually resulted in a new American "tradition," a radically different approach to the uses of military power. The evolution of various theories, doctrines, methods, and models of conflict and warfare, under the general heading "deterrence," emptied American strategic thought of much of its political and ethical content, yielding

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[2]Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 34.

[3]Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (New York: Mentor, 1951), p. 59.

[4]Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), p. 19.

[5]Osgood, *Limited War*, p. 46.

[6]Ibid., p. 14.

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abstract metaphors, deductive theories, and conflict management techniques—a veritable science of warfare. Much of this activity, however, was focused on one type of war and on methods for its avoidance: namely, an all-out nuclear war between the two superpowers and their alliance systems.

Western perceptions of Soviet approaches to the use of force for political purposes are usually couched in terms of opportunism, deception, and flexibility: "The Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of a superior force. . . . Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power."[7] William Kaufmann saw the Soviet Union and its allies as "notorious practitioners of violence"; military means in Soviet hands, he added, "have been a highly flexible instrument of policy."[8] Robert Osgood maintains that the "communist approach to war and the use of military power is as notable for its fusing of power and policy as the American approach is notable for its dissociation of power and policy."[9]

If on the American side we witness a rejection of certain political and moral traditions, which are assumed to be unsuitable for this sinful world or at least unsuitable for a superpower, this was not the case on the Soviet side. In the Soviet Union there exists an unswerving, doctrinal, and political tradition that goes back to Clausewitz, via Engels and Lenin, and reaches into the present via Stalin and his successors.

The Soviet tradition has different origins. One of its key progenitors is Clausewitz, who "rejected both the optimism and dogmatism of the eighteenth century theory"[10] and held that war was neither a scientific game nor an international sport, but an act of violence: "We do not like to hear of generals who are victorious without the shedding of blood" because this leads to an underappreciation of the terrible nature of war and might lead to a condition whereby "we allow our swords to grow blunt . . . until someone steps in with a sharp sword and cuts our arms off our body."[11] Clausewitz was known, with good reason, as one of the "Mahdis of Mass" who gave theoretical justification to the "rage of numbers" and identified the "idea of war with that of utmost violence."[12]

In the Soviet Union, the spirit of Clausewitz lives on. His ideas permeate contemporary Soviet military theories and defense policies. Party leaders find the Clausewitz dictum that "war has its grammar but not

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[7]Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, p. 53.

[8]William W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 102.

[9]Osgood, *Limited War*, p. 46.

[10]Rothfels, "Clausewitz," p. 100.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 93.

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its own logic"[13] most useful in legitimating political primacy over military professionalism, since the logic of politics also governs war. The other famous Clausewitz dictum, that war is merely a continuation of politics by other means, has regained full acceptance; after a two-decade period of debate and vacillation, Clausewitz's ideas have again made war rational, thinkable, and winnable. Even some of Clausewitz's earlier works on the military art have been recently rediscovered by the Soviet military and used to rationalize and justify proposals for the offensive, mobile type of theater warfare, with or without the use of nuclear weapons.[14] In short, current Soviet military doctrine has fully regained its "object":

> Since war has its origins in a political object, we see that this first motive, which called it into existence, naturally remains the first and highest consideration to be regarded in its conduct. . . . Policy will therefore permeate the whole action of war and exercise a continuous influence upon it . . . for the political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought apart from the object.[15]

Accordingly, Clausewitz maintained that war can never be separated from politics and that, should such a separation "occur anywhere, all the threads of the different relations become in a certain sense broken and we have before us a senseless thing without an object."[16]

Clausewitz found avid readers and attentive students among the Marxists and the Bolsheviks. Engels, probably the most sophisticated student of military affairs among them, wrote to Karl Marx, "I am now reading Clausewitz *On War,*" which he found to be "a strange way of philosophizing, but very good on the subject." Engels went on to define the essential Marxist (and Soviet) approach to military power and war, as distilled from Clausewitz: "Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it may be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed towards it, and eventually it must take place all the same, and must be decisive."[17] A recent Soviet volume on military strategy brought this tradition into the contemporary realm: "In his remarks on Clausewitz' book *Vom Kriege,* V. I. Lenin stressed that 'politics is the guiding force, and war is only the tool and not vice versa.'"[18]

Another Soviet-Russian tradition is reflected in Tolstoy's *War and Peace.* Prince Andrey, on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, says: "War is not a courtesy but the most terrible thing in life; and we ought to

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[13]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 16.

[14]See V. Ye. Savkin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics,* trans. and ed. under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force (Washington: GPO, n.d.), pp. 22-23.

[15]Clausewitz, *On War,* p. 16.

[16]Ibid., p. 596.

[17]Quoted in Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy,* p. 158.

[18]Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy,* Rand edition (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1963), p. 98.

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understand that and not play at war. We ought to accept this terrible necessity sternly and seriously. It all lies in that: get rid of falsehood and let war be war, and not a game."[19] Leon Trotsky, the founder of the Red Army, aptly expressed another Soviet view on war: war "bases itself on many sciences, but war itself is no science, it is a practical art, a skill, a savage and bloody art."[20] He would approvingly quote the Clausewitz maxim that "in practical arts one should not drive the flowers and foliage of theory too high, one should rather keep them close to the soil of experience."[21] This sobering admonition by the great philosopher of war is particularly relevant to our study.

Problems of Conceptual Definition

To the Western strategic analyst, Soviet writers on strategic and military problems behave like scholastics, adhering to obscure formulations of questionable relevance to the serious study of war and strategy. To Western deterrence theorists, the public formulations of Soviet strategic and limited-warfare concepts and doctrines appear peculiarly simplistic, anecdotal, tautological, and "soft" in relation to the logically impeccable, tightly reasoned Western theories of deterrence and limited war. They find Soviet military writings to be excessively politicized and historical as well as subordinated to the given values and whims of political elites; their primitive and "unsophisticated" approaches exasperate Western analysts. That exasperation is reflected in the remarks of the American editors of *Soviet Military Strategy* by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii: "Nowhere in this book, as in most Soviet literature as well, are there to be found signs of serious professional interests in concepts like controlled response and restrained nuclear targeting, which have been widely discussed in the West." The editors seem discouraged by a persistent "theme of automacity [sic] of global nuclear war," which they interpret not only as serving to reinforce the credibility of Soviet nuclear retaliation "but also to discourage the United States and its allies from entertaining ideas that ground rules of some sort might be adopted for limiting the destructiveness of a war, should one occur."[22]

This Western exasperation with Soviet strategic analysis is reciprocated with equal force: Soviet military and political analysts dismiss much of Western strategic and limited-war theory as pretentious, pseudo-

[19]Quoted in Osgood, *Limited War*, p. 33.

[20]Quoted in Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 482.

[21]Ibid.

[22]See the introduction to Sokolovskii (fn. 18, above) by H. S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas W. Wolfe, pp. 44-45.

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scientific, and even metaphysical: "The idea of introducing rules and games and artificial restrictions by agreement seems illusory and untenable. It is difficult to visualize that a nuclear war, if unleashed, could be kept within the framework of rules and would not develop into an all-out war. In fact, such proposals are a demagogic trick designed to reassure public opinion."[23] The authoritative volume *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*[24] vigorously rejected as "a cynical and deliberate falsehood" the idea that "the prudence of the opponents will make it possible to coordinate their nuclear targets against which these weapons would be aimed." A distinguished Soviet military strategist, General N. Talenskii, expressed the Soviet position clearly: "When the security of a state is based on mutual deterrence with the aid of powerful nuclear weapons rockets, it is directly dependent on the goodwill and designs of the other side, which is a highly subjective and indefinite factor."[25]

Soviet analysts find Western strategic sophistries objectionable and unacceptable on several grounds:

(1) *The Apolitical Nature of Western Military Doctrines:* In effect, politics is subordinated to the more narrow technological and bureaucratic imperatives and to the abstract notions of game theory and formal logic. A recent Rand study assessed this problem quite realistically:

> American strategic thinking—born predominantly of civilian defense specialists bearing legal, technical and distinctly non-military intellectual outlooks—is deeply rooted in the proposition that nuclear war is unwinnable in any practical sense. . . . it has also produced an increasingly predominant belief that deterrence stability (hence U.S. security) is best served by a strategic environment of mutual vulnerability. The Soviets reject "mutual vulnerability" out of hand as an abdication of political responsibility.[26]

The study goes on to describe insistent Soviet disavowals of such Western strategic ideas as demonstration attacks, limited nuclear operations, and slow-motion counterforce duels, treating such American conceptualizations of strategic issues "with alternating bemusement, perplexity and sarcasm."[27] Marshal Grechko shares this Soviet view of "bourgeois military theorists who propagate quite a different viewpoint" from that of communist military analysts, and he is troubled by the fact that Western military theorists "regard war as a mere armed clash between the two sides. . . . in other words, they emasculate the political content of the concept of war."[28]

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[23]G. D. Arbatov, *Problemy mira i sotsializma,* no. 2, February 1974, p. 46.

[24]Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 100.

[25]Talenskii, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," in John Erickson, ed., *The Military Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1966), pp. 225-227.

[26]See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security,* Fall 1979, p. 27.

[27]Ibid., p. 31.

[28]A. A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).

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(2) *The Status Quo–Supportive Nature of Deterrence and Limited-War Theory and Its Corollaries:* A recent Western critical study of deterrence observed that "deterrence is a policy which, if it succeeds, can only frustrate an opponent who aspires to changing the international status-quo." Although the consequences of continuous frustration of expansionist and anti–status quo aspirations are not easily predictable, the study concluded, they are nevertheless "not necessarily benign."[29] Soviet analysts frequently attack what they perceive as this pernicious Western attempt to impose their own rules of the political and strategic game upon socialist countries and on countries in the Third World that are trying to free themselves from colonial or imperialistic shackles: "The development of a new international situation more favorable to the cause of peace in no way signifies an interruption of the strenuous and sharp struggle which Soviet policy is waging. There are no pauses in international relations just as there is no rest in the struggle which accompanies their development."[30]

Marshal of the Soviet Union N. I. Krylov claimed that "the imperialists are trying to lull the vigilance of the world's peoples by having recourse to propaganda devices to the effect that there will be no victors in a future nuclear war. These false affirmations contradict the objective laws of history."[31] General Bochkarev asserted that "Marxist-Leninists are not panicked in the face of the terrifying danger created by imperialism nor do they depict it as a prelude to the end of the world."[32] And General P. Zhilin has stated that détente and deterrence, implicit in peaceful coexistence, neither rule out war nor imply stable peace: "That is why all the talk about an end of the era of wars and the arrival of an era of universal peace is premature and dangerous."[33]

A recent Rand study has asserted that "the center of gravity of Soviet doctrinal discussions is decidedly hostile to this way of thinking," and that the Soviets pay "no homage whatsoever to the abstract concept of stability" assumed in the West under the concept of a "*mutual* assured destruction relationship."[34] Generally speaking, moreover, the concepts of "equivalence" and "balance" are seen as "unnatural" by the Soviets because they imply "the enshrinement of the status quo, something alien

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[29]Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 5.

[30]Editorial, *Kommunist,* June 1972.

[31]Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces N. I. Krylov, "The Instructive Lessons of History," *Sovietskaia Rossiia,* August 30, 1969.

[32]Quoted in Leon Gouré et al., eds., *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 61.

[33]Zhilin, "The Military Aspects of Detente," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 12, 1972, p. 25.

[34]Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1977), p. 18.

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to every known tenet of Soviet political, ideological and historical doctrine."[35]

(3) *The Interdependent, Controllable, Mutually Balanced, and Self-Constrained Nature of Western Doctrines of War:* Soviet analysts are particularly skeptical of Western claims with respect to the ability to control, limit, and "fine tune" the applications of force in war. They question claims to omniscience, omnipotence, and ubiquity of cool reason and rationality that are implicit or explicit in many Western studies on limited war. As the Rand study indicated, "If there is little convergence in Soviet and American writing on deterrence, there is even less complementarity in their statements on limited strategic war."[36]

Soviet analysts are particularly vehement in questioning and rejecting sweeping claims on limited war: "To lull the vigilance of the peoples, the U.S. militarists are discussing the possibility of limiting nuclear war." The Soviets deny the idea that prudent opponents will coordinate their nuclear strikes and thus limit the targets, thereby keeping material losses and human suffering at a minimum.[37] Soviet analysts find this idea unappealing, for they would have to "rely on the chance that the aggressors will be prudent and will impose certain limits on the use of nuclear weapons."[38]

In Western parlance, limited war presupposes certain kinds of cooperation, coordination, constraint, and self-denial by the belligerents. The United States has evolved several military doctrines premised on such cooperative and interdependent constraints, while the Soviet Union remains adamant in resisting such notions and prefers unilateral and independent modes of military initiative. The Soviets find curious and unrealistic the notion that limited war would remain contained, would resist escalatory pressures, and would terminate through "intrawar bargaining." A survey of Soviet writings on the controllability of escalation and the possibility of limitation in nuclear conflict indicates "no Soviet acceptance of restraint once that threshold has been crossed."[39] Hence, they have not come far from their earlier, rather dogmatic assertion, as expressed by Defense Minister Marshal Malinovskii, that "no matter where a tactical atomic weapon might be used against us, it would trigger a crushing counterblow."[40]

In the past, the Soviets have had particular difficulty formally

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[35]Lambeth, "Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," p. 28.
[36]Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*, p. 19.
[37]*Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, p. 99.
[38]Ibid., p. 100.
[39]Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1975).
[40]Quoted in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 123.

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accepting the idea of limited warfare, especially limited nuclear warfare. Soviet political leaders have gone on record as opposing this idea because of the generally unpredictable consequences of escalatory pressures. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and others have at various times reiterated the proposition that "global wars are known to have started from local wars" and that because of the "rapid development of military technology, it will be even more difficult to put any limits on armed conflict if this conflict starts in any single region."[41]

The unorthodox character of limited war is complicated by its implicit logic and rules: "While the enemy must be fixed and hit hard on the battlefield, and if possible deterred from expanding the scope and intensity of the conflict, he must also be allowed to extricate himself from his adventure without a serious loss of prestige or substance. The conditions of limited war require the maintenance of a delicate balance between firmness and tolerance."[42] This unorthodoxy and its peculiar characteristics have troubled Soviet military and political leaders, notably with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Stressing inherent contradictions in the logic and rules of limited war as depicted in Western strategic literature, the Soviet authors of the authoritative study *Soviet Military Strategy* assert: "By its character, a limited war contains two problems: on the one hand such a war must be conducted decisively and with the best methods using the necessary forces and means to achieve the set political and military goals; on the other hand, in a limited war, the armed forces must be used in such a way as to reduce the risk of a limited armed conflict escalating into a general war to a minimum."[43]

The Soviet strategists raised questions about fundamental Western assumptions concerning the conduct of limited war, arguing that "little is known about the effectiveness of this [nuclear] weapon on the battlefield, of the possible political, military and psychological consequences of its use." They also maintained that Western assertions about the control, effect, and consequences of battlefield tactical-nuclear weapons were based on questionable assumptions: "It is extremely difficult to foresee how an enemy will react to the very fact of the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, even on a limited scale." Moreover, the reactive options available to the other side are many, ranging from no retaliation at all, to a limited nuclear retaliatory strike, or even, through miscalculation, to a much greater response with "strategic and operations tactical means, thus unleashing an all-out nuclear war." The Soviet strategists also

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[41]*Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, p. 98; also see Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, chap. 10.

[42]Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy*, p. 127.

[43]V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy*, ed. and trans. by Harriet Fast Scott, 3rd ed. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 68.

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stressed the great difficulty of distinguishing between a tactical and a strategic weapon merely from its operational use, and the possible false signals of miscalculations in response. The problem of delivery for tactical-nuclear weapons complicates the limited-war calculus even more. The Sokolovskii volume concluded with a rather skeptical assessment of the chances of keeping limited war really limited and not having it explode into nuclear holocaust: "In spite of all these theories and concepts, one can state with assurance that the strategy of limited warfare based on the use of only tactical nuclear weapons will involve the dangers analogous to those connected with the strategy of 'massive retaliation.' "[44]

This Soviet concern about keeping limited war limited was also shared by many in the West. The problems of escalation control and threshold observance were widely discussed in the professional literature without ever quite resolving the issues or allaying the fears. Thomas C. Schelling represented a consensus when he described the Korean War as having set "patterns and precedents that have affected, and will affect the conduct of limited war and the planning for it";[45] but, he warned, it "may be only one possibility, one pattern, one species of a variegated genus of warlike reactions," no more a model "of what limited war really is than the first animal the Pilgrims saw reflected the wildlife of North America."[46] Schelling urged the consideration of certain restraints and thresholds that would provide limits in warfare. Among the limits and thresholds he discussed were "no nuclears," which is "simple and unambiguous," while "some nuclears would be more complicated." There is "a simplicity," he said, "a kind of virginity, about all-or-none distinctions that differences of degree do not have." Among the other ultimate thresholds he described were a direct battlefield confrontation between Soviet and American troops and observance of the national boundaries of the United States and the Soviet Union, thus keeping "the homelands of the two major adversaries inviolate."[47] Schelling saw these thresholds as finite steps in the enlargement of war or toward a change in participation: "They are conventional stopping places or dividing lines. They have a legalistic quality, and they depend on precedents and analogy."[48] Some of these thresholds have been held up as the "ultimate limit"—the last stopping place before all-out war—yet Schelling considered none of them to be "sacrosanct."[49]

The idea of limited war in the nuclear context began to gain acceptance and support in the West during the 1950s. Its proponents had

[44]Ibid., p. 69.
[45]Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 130.
[46]Ibid., p. 158.
[47]Ibid., p. 159.
[48]Ibid., p. 133.
[49]Ibid., p. 157.

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to overcome the resistance of the "don't rock the delicate balance-of-terror, nuclear-deterrence boat" thinking of that period. In the shadow of the bomb, under assumed conditions of a very unstable balance of terror, war—even limited war—was considered unthinkable, particularly if it were to involve a confrontation between the two major nuclear powers. The critics of limited war marshaled many strong arguments against it. It was likely to undermine the strategy of deterrence because making the use of force, particularly nuclear force, "thinkable" or acceptable would weaken the necessary self-restraint implicit in deterrence. Moreover, if it were assumed that force could be applied in controlled, managed, and revocable ways, leaders would be tempted to use it at an assumed low cost and risk. The critics argued that endowing the use of military force in the nuclear era with political utility would undermine deterrence and motivate some leaders to exploit it for specific instrumental purposes. They asserted that the calculus of limited war and its assumed logic presupposed rational and reasonable decisionmakers on both sides. This assumption was considered to be not only highly questionable but also very dangerous in the event of wartime escalatory pressures, which might very well lead to a catastrophic "explosion" rather than the desirable "expansion." In general, then, limited war was fraught with too many uncertainties and risks to be a viable policy premise.[50]

However, several developments in the 1950s suggested possible merits and utilities of limited war. First, the rigidities and low credibility of massive-retaliation doctrine created an enormous disparity between ends and means that would very likely paralyze the political will to act. This argued for greater flexibility and closer congruence between the threats perceived and the applied or implied use of retaliatory force. Second, the Korean War experience reinforced the argument for flexibility in order to avoid getting bogged down in ground warfare in remote and disadvantageous areas of the world. Third, it was argued that the availability of more options would relax the tense either/or confrontation in a crisis and thus enhance the stability of deterrence.

From the ensuing strategic debate in the United States emerged a sense of what limited war, with or without the use of nuclear weapons, implied as well as a rudimentary sense of its conceptual and theoretical aspects. The term "limited war" has become identified with several kinds of restraints and limitations upon the conduct of hostilities. Robert Osgood defined such war in general terms, as "a war fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's will to another's and by means involving far less than the total military resources of the

[50]Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, p. 64.

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belligerents, leaving the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact and leading to a bargained termination."[51]

It became apparent that unlike the sharp and satisfying definitions of strategic deterrence, limited-war theory confronted great difficulties precisely because the limitations are contingent upon judgments, defined by degrees, and seen from different perspectives. Nonetheless, there is general agreement in Western thought that the following list comprises the parameters of limited war:

1. *Wars That Are Limited in Geographic Scale, in Contrast to "World Wars":* The Korean, Vietnam, and Middle Eastern wars fall into this category. One problem here has to do with "coalition wars," which may be limited in one sense but may also be geographically dispersed.
2. *Wars That Are Limited in Their Objectives:* The objectives could be territorial or political, but fairly specific and perceived by all sides to be so.
3. *Wars Fought with Limited Means:* The belligerents deliberately "hobble" themselves by the quantity or quality of weapons and technology employed. The Korean War is an example; both sides had access to nuclear weapons but practiced restraint.
4. *Wars in Which the Belligerents Limit Themselves to Certain Targets, Deliberately Avoiding Other Available Targets.*

This description of limited war and its parameters is more a normative model—an ideal type, what ought be—than a reflection of historical reality. While some of the conflicts in recent decades fall within these parameters, others do not, and still others fit different conceptual or analytic rubrics. The Soviet and other communist typologies and categorizations of war, moreover, do not quite conform to those of the West.

The official Soviet position on types of warfare has not changed much in recent decades, although informally there have been some significant changes (to be described later in this paper). The formal Moscow view, reflected in a variety of authoritative statements and studies, may be summarized as follows:

I. *According to Their Sociopolitical Character:*
   1. Wars between opposing social systems
   2. Wars between imperialist and formerly colonial systems
   3. Civil wars between the proletarian masses and the bourgeoisie
   4. Wars between capitalist states

II. *According to Their Scale:*
   1. World wars between two opposing systems
   2. Local wars between two or more countries
   3. Wars of national liberation[52]

[51]Osgood, *Limited War*, p. 47.

[52]The Soviets, like other communists, also classify all wars as just or unjust wars. Unjust wars are those initiated by the capitalists against progressive countries and forces in the world; just wars are those conducted by progressive forces in revolutionary, national-liberation, and anti-imperialist struggles.

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In practice, the Soviets distinguish among three types of war: (1) *world war* between the two superpowers and their coalitions, devastating both countries through massive salvos of strategic-nuclear weapons in counterforce and countervalue targeting modes; (2) *limited wars* not involving the superpowers directly but fought with their indirect involvement, with or without nuclear weapons; and (3) *local wars,* or wars of national liberation in the Third World, that remain nonnuclear, conventional, and contained in scope, targets, weapons, and objectives.

It is clear by now that there are several fundamental disparities between Soviet and American approaches to strategy, foreign policy, and the uses of force in pursuit of the national interest. The main reason for the persistence of these conceptual, perceptual, and doctrinal disparities lies in the asymmetrical nature of the two belief systems and in cultural, historical, and political factors. We are dealing with two orthodoxies, mutually exclusive by their nature, each claiming a monopoly on "scientific" truth.

At the root of the problem lie different perceptions with respect to deterrence and to the uses of force in a nuclear context. Deterrence theory is a uniquely American construct, shaped by certain historical, political, institutional, and idiosyncratic influences and circumstances of the post–World War II period. Deterrence was conceived in its modern sense when it became possible to threaten vast damage and pain while leaving opposing military forces intact. The atomic bomb that ended World War II and the bipolar international system that emerged after the war provided the conditions for modern deterrence theory: "the former made deterrence necessary and the latter made it possible."[53]

The problem with U.S. deterrence theory has been an excessive reliance on deterrence threats and alliance commitments as the primary tool of foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, a tool that by the mid 1950s had become an inflexible response to almost any perceived communist encroachment. In effect, the specifically American nature of deterrence tended to "reinforce policy makers' tendency to rely too heavily on deterrence strategy and deterrence threats in lieu of the more flexible instruments of inter-nation influence associated with classical diplomacy."[54]

A fundamental flaw of deterrence was that it became theoretically most developed and practically best applied to acute bipolar conflicts where great values were at stake and where the potential for great

Though the Soviets have at all times been concerned with escalatory spirals and pressures in war, and have warned of the danger of even small and local crises getting out of control and exploding into total nuclear war, they have nevertheless retained the just (national liberation) war formula for ideological and political reasons.

[53]George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* p. 20.

[54]Ibid., p. 7.

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violence was high. At the same time, this led to a poverty of theoretical and doctrinal development with respect to conflict below the strategic and bipolar level, resulting in the forced application of strategic-deterrence doctrine to conflict at lower levels on the threat scale: "This attempt to extend the applications of flexible response into the lower portion of the spectrum is exactly analogous to the earlier attempt to extend, through massive retaliation, the applications of strategic deterrent forces into the next lower portion of the spectrum, to try to deter limited war."[55]

Military theory and doctrine remained rooted in the American tradition—as if trying to bend the laws of warfare in the nuclear era to conform to American *preferences,* namely: the massive use of strategic rather than conventional or tactical forces; the substitution of technology for manpower because of the high value of human life; the unhobbled use of military force in war; punitive warfare against a despised enemy, coupled with an insistence on "unconditional surrender"; primacy of military considerations once warfare begins; a clear resolution and conclusion of all wars; and avoidance of entangling ground warfare in "remote areas" of the world.[56] Because World War II and, to a lesser extent, World War I reinforced these American preferences (not necessarily realities), it seemed sensible to extend them into the postwar period, specifically to relations with the communist world. Thus, the classic American model of war and the strategies for dealing with it may be characterized as a direct confrontation between the two superpowers and their respective alliances, along a central confrontational axis in Europe, across NATO and Warsaw Pact territories, according to clearly demarcated rules, and with the communications and signaling characteristics so highly regarded by deterrence purists. This situation was perceived as a bipolar, either/or confrontation, which by the very nature of its terrifying threat and terrible consequences would militate against a suicidal initiation of hostilities by the communists and thus validate the logical-theoretical content and political utility of deterrence strategy. We might call this a "cowboy strategy," reflecting distinctly American preferences, styles, and values. It also reflected a set of very practical concerns and preferences, since this scenario was premised on U.S. advantage and Soviet disadvantage: we had the strategic and nuclear trump cards, and the Soviets did not.

The USSR, however, did not comply with American deterrence theories, preferences, or fantasies. Instead of confronting the United

[55]Ibid., p. 45.

[56]It is ironic that American preferences were largely unfulfilled and that U.S. troops in effect became bogged down in Asian lands (Korea and Vietnam) where strategic preponderance meant little in the conduct or outcome of either war.

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States and NATO directly and frontally in the European theater, the Soviets chose to probe, feign, and challenge the United States and its allies in areas remote from Europe. Moreover, the Soviet challenge was undertaken indirectly by proxies and allies. One might say that Soviet military and political behavior reflects a "commissar strategy," which is essentially nonconfrontational or, more properly, confrontation-avoiding under poor conditions of Soviet advantage and control. This strategy is largely manipulative, deceptive, theoretically inelegant, methodologically "unsophisticated," and shrouded in ambiguity. It is a strategy of confrontation *and* negotiation, one that rejects the stark American either/or deterrence (either stable peace or nuclear incineration) for Moscow's own neither/nor deliberativeness (accepting neither the imperatives of a perfectly stable peace and an atrophied international political process nor the alternative of nuclear suicide). The Soviets view strategic doctrine as a highly politicized means-ends *process;* this contrasts sharply with the American ends-means *teleology* of Armageddon avoidance.

In the end, deterrence strategy is logically and politically suitable to a conservative, status quo, balance-of-power state having no territorial designs but with widespread and vital international economic interests; a power enjoying strategic superiority and whose traditional values favor minimal involvement in remote areas; a power that has historically relied on technological and economic means for implementing its foreign policy. It is a policy for dealing with a troublesome and dangerous, but weaker, adversary by launching terrible threats of punishment in order to appeal to the bully's sense of survival.

Soviet strategy is suited to a quasi-revolutionary, expansionist power whose interests lie in changing the international status quo. It is an appropriate strategy for a power that emerged on the international scene after World War II as a strategic inferior and whose traditions favor the brute force of mass armies, guided primarily by defense continental strategies and possessing defensive coastal navies, a country having little experience in massive projection of its forces beyond the Eurasian land mass. It is the strategy of a country with universal ideological and global political interests and claims, but a country, also, that is not in a hurry, believing that history and time are on its side.

Deterrence may have been a suitable strategic theory and doctrine for the United States during its period of ascendancy in international affairs. America enjoyed clear strategic superiority and a supportive society whose internal goals were in harmony with the external policy goals of the state. It confronted a Soviet Union whose leadership was divided, whose allies were restless and unreliable, and whose military capabilities were both inadequate and inferior to those of the West.

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Times have changed. The Soviet Union is now a military power at least the equal of the United States and has moved from its continental, defensive military position to that of a global superpower. Soviet strategic doctrines have shown themselves to be more flexible and adaptable than those of the West. While the United States has remained largely committed to deterrence strategy and its variations—despite profound changes in international and regional politics—the USSR has shown an interest in experimenting with various strategic formulations in order to fit strategy to policy and to ever-changing political and technological circumstances. At present, Moscow's strategy is double-edged: (1) a strategic-nuclear force for the primary purpose of deterring and thus neutralizing the West and (2) flexible and powerful engagement in the vulnerable and vital areas of the Third World, using conventional general-purpose forces.

The United States remains fixated on "deterrence" and various assured-destruction scenarios. Recent efforts to provide flexible, rapid-deployment forces capable of hitting pressure points along the Soviets' southward expansionist trajectory are still too incomplete to evaluate properly. U.S. positions on theater-nuclear forces and doctrines in Europe are causing the NATO allies much discomfort.[57] The much-vaunted flexible-options policy (resting on such notions as control of escalation through threshold recognition and target distinctions, willingness to compete in pain endurance and risk taking, and war termination through intrawar bargaining) is not much of an improvement and falls short in political credibility.[58] The recent Presidential Directive 59 represents a shift away from the MAD doctrine of "city busting," but it still limits itself to a central war context. Thus, in the event of a central war, the United States would concentrate on "hard" targets rather than cities. PD 59, then, does not bear on limited wars as seen in the Soviet context and to be discussed in this paper. It deals essentially with collateral damage limitation in a central war: a concept that is still roundly rejected in Soviet military literature.

Recent Soviet expressions of interest in the feasibility of limited and local war, together with systematic preparations for such contingencies, may reflect Moscow's strategic-doctrinal maturity. The Soviets clearly understand that in the nuclear era, major powers need the security of a credible strategic-nuclear deterrent force before they can safely adopt limited-war doctrines and policies. The reason for this lies in the logic of deterrence and limited war. To remain limited, wars involving the major powers, whether directly or indirectly, need credible fallback

[57] See Uwe Nehrlich, "Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1980.

[58] Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture*.

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reserves: a strategic (assured-destruction) retaliatory threat that will both act to reduce escalatory pressures and provide boundaries. Espousal of limited war without such a credible retaliatory threat would leave the state open to manipulation and blackmail, a situation analogous to a strategic context in which one side lacks a credible, survivable second-strike capability. In recent years, the Soviets have fulfilled the necessary criteria: they have built a powerful and credible nuclear deterrent and a huge, modernized general-purpose force.[59]

Soviet Approaches to the Uses of Force: Continuity and Change

In 1970, I made the following statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

We would want first to examine certain entrenched Western beliefs and misapprehensions about the Soviet Union and U.S.-Soviet relations.

Among these beliefs are:

—that we can bleed them to death economically, by forcing them to keep up with us in an intensive arms race

—that we can still attain meaningful strategic superiority

—that we can expect an internal political and social upheaval in the Soviet Union or in the communist bloc.

I would suggest that such beliefs are unrealistic and to some extent wishful thinking. It may be more realistic to assume that:

—the Soviet Union is going to continue its arms program, if necessary to ensure strategic equality

—the Soviet Union is not seriously interested in first strike or surprise attacks on the United States

—the Soviet Union is interested in stabilizing the expensive arms race and would seek to avoid confrontations with the United States in areas of vital interests.

—*but that, the Soviet Union is also going to selectively probe in the soft areas of the world for opportunities and expansion, regardless of the SALT outcomes.*

Thus, while SALT is a desirable Soviet objective, it is not the one-and-all objective of Soviet policy. As a member of fact, one would argue, that Soviet interests in SALT, while presumably realistic and serious, are part of a larger policy for the seventies. The postulated objectives of the Soviet policy are:

—*hold* and stabilize their Western flank (NATO, U.S.) through SALT, European Security Conference, etc.

—*obtain* greater freedom to deal with China (and also prevent a two-front confrontation)

—*explore* opportunities south of Russia, via a capillary expansion in the regions of Middle East, Mediterranean, and North Africa.

Such a policy is seen by many Soviets as one of low risks, low costs, and potential high payoffs; while a continued confrontation and arms race with the West is seen as one of high costs, high risks and low payoffs.[60]

[59]See V. M. Bondarenko, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, December 1968.

[60]Submission by Roman Kolkowicz to Senator Gore, April 15, 1970.

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Nothing that has happened since would motivate me to change the foregoing assessment of the Soviet military and political calculus. In fact, the Soviets seem to have followed that projection closely. Moreover, there is little reason to think they will depart from that policy line significantly in the coming decade, since the "alignment of political forces around the world" reflects current Soviet perceptions and assessments.

When he was Soviet Minister of Defense, the late Marshal Grechko stated: "We have never concealed the basis of Soviet military doctrine. . . . the principles and details of the doctrine are clearly expressed in the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and in the state of our Armed Forces." In fact, he continued, they are "fully reflected in our manuals and regulations." Grechko also stressed the fact that Soviet doctrine, "particularly its military art, adapts itself to the times" and becomes "amended and developed according to the alignment of political forces in the world and the policy pursued by the State."[61] Even though they are somewhat self-serving, there is little reason to contest Marshal Grechko's statements. We will therefore examine the current realignment of political forces, the derivative opportunities and challenges to the Soviet state and its interests, and the adaptation of Soviet military doctrine to those changes. In brief, we shall explore the implications of the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity, the subsequent relaxation of strictures against the feasibility and utility of limited and local war (particularly in the regions south of Russia), and the modernization of and changes in Soviet doctrines on limited war.

In the mid 1960s, Thomas Wolfe observed that "the relatively meager treatment customarily given in Soviet literature to the question of conducting limited warfare is in marked contrast to the attention bestowed on general nuclear war."[62] Wolfe believed that, until the mid 1960s, this fact reflected a pre-eminent Soviet concern about the contingency they feared most (massive nuclear attack) and about the rapid or even automatic escalatory possibilities inherent in local or limited war. He found signs, however, that the Soviet doctrinal position on local and limited war was already undergoing some change. Although ambiguity and inconsistency still characterized Soviet treatment of the subject, and although no unifying doctrine of limited war had evolved, there was less rigidity with respect to the problem of escalation in local conflict.

Since the mid 1960s, the Soviet position has undergone substantial changes in doctrine, capabilities, and perceptions. Though still formally adhering to the earlier, ideologically correct position—which rejects the callous and deliberate use of military power, except in "just

[61]Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union*, pp. 273-274.
[62]Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, p. 118.

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wars"—Moscow has appraised the implications of the changed correlation of power in the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1960s and during the 1970s, Soviet analysts publicly began to consider the implications of the coming Soviet achievement of nuclear parity. A debate ensued, both in open and classified Soviet literature (recalling the strategic debates of the 1950s and 1960s), over the proper roles of nuclear and conventional forces in war. The voice of the more conservative advocacy was heard, but the authoritative and sophisticated position of the realists appears to have prevailed and set out the new Soviet position: "In our times conditions may arise when in individual instances combat operations may be carried out using conventional weapons. Under these conditions the role of the conventional means and the traditional services of the armed forces are greatly enhanced. It becomes necessary to train troops for various kinds of warfare." The author, a well-known military analyst, then proceeds to argue against those who would interpret such renewed emphasis on conventional forces and limited warfare as a "negation of the contemporary revolution in military affairs," that is, as negating or reducing the role of tactical- or even strategic-nuclear weapons. He dismisses those backward views ("one cannot agree with this opinion") and then lectures his more obtuse colleagues: "The point is that the new possibilities of waging armed struggle have arisen *not in spite of, but because of the nuclear missile weapons*. They do not diminish their combat effectiveness, and the main thing, they do not preclude the possible use of such weapons."[63]

The point is well taken. Soviet doctrine and policy in the past decade have followed this reasoning closely. In effect, it means a loosening of the strictures against theater warfare, with or without nuclear weapons, and the endowment of vital military and political roles to conventional forces, in consonance with the alignment of political forces in the world. This new emphasis on conventional forces and the possibility of limited and local war with those forces is evident, too, in the Soviet defense minister's recent statement that "there has been a great improvement in the fire, shock and maneuver capabilities of troops," making it possible to "assign them very decisive missions on the battlefield which they are capable of accomplishing without resorting to nuclear weapons."[64]

In the past decade, the USSR has been realigning its foreign policy and military doctrines in the triadic mode described above: their

[63]Lt. Colonel V. M. Bondarenko, quoted in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 55.

[64]Quoted in Joseph D. Douglass, *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive*, vol. 1 of *Studies in Communist Affairs* (prepared for the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Net Technical Assessment), p. 113.

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massive nuclear capabilities are to neutralize and stabilize their relations with the West; their theater forces, both nuclear and conventional, are to enhance deterrence but also to provide a war-fighting capability in Europe and Asia should deterrence fail; their conventional forces are to serve as the vital military and political element in Moscow's new expansionist policies in the Third World. This Soviet appreciation of realistic targets of opportunity in the Third World is reflected in many statements, including the following: "the outcome of the historic battle between socialism and capitalism largely depends on how the revolutionary movement will develop in the non-socialist world and what path the nations liberated from colonial oppression will follow."[65]

The new opportunities for socialist exploitation in the Third World endow Soviet conventional forces with several important roles, including the possibility of fighting local wars. The central role of these forces is admitted by the American author of a recent Pentagon study on Soviet theater-nuclear warfare. Douglass states that although the study "began as an analysis of the Soviet nuclear threat to NATO . . . it became apparent . . . that the real heart of the Soviet threat has been and still is, the ground forces, particularly the tank armies and combined arms armies."[66] Thus, even though in the European context Soviet doctrine envisages the use of nuclear weapons in theater warfare, "the heart of the Soviet concept is in reality not the initial nuclear barrage, but rather what might be called the exploitation forces." These are essentially conventional forces, trained and equipped to operate in a nuclear environment, but very much concerned with maintaining their "capability to fight" and not becoming "excessively dependent on nuclear weapons."

Turning to the Third World, Douglass finds that conventional forces and weapons, and their modes of employment in local wars, "appear to be regarded as a principal mechanism to be exploited by the Soviet Union in expanding their influence and hegemony." Since these areas appear to hold the greatest promise for Soviet exploitation, and since the Western strategic deterrence forces play a marginal role in such areas, the Soviets feel that their military doctrine for these areas is sound.

The use of conventional forces in support of Soviet expansionist pressures in the Third World makes good sense. Soviet exploratory policies and tactics remain prudent and cautious and are essentially rather nonprovocative and provocation avoiding. The various roles of Soviet conventional forces, as seen by Moscow, include the following: protector and patron of anti-Western regimes (Afghanistan, Syria, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, Angola, and Libya) as a means of building influence in

[65]Quoted in Gouré et al., eds. *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy*, p. 62.
[66]Douglass, *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive*, p. 46.

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those regions; supplier of expertise, training, weapons, and intelligence to Soviet clients and proxies. As was indicated by the head of the political organs of the Soviet military, "the Soviet Union's ability to give assistance to the working people waging a revolutionary, liberation struggle and the volume of this assistance have become greater still in the present conditions."[67]

In sum, Soviet limited-war and local-war doctrines, based on parity in strategic-nuclear capabilities, reflect the USSR's current and foreseeable political-military interests. This suggests that the Soviets will continue to improve, modernize, and enhance their strategic, theater, and local warfare capabilities. The new global mission of the Soviet military, premised on a strategic-nuclear shield of massive deterrence forces and a more flexible and politically viable conventional and theater-nuclear sword, was well described by Marshal Grechko: "At the present stage, the historic mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Motherland . . . but [includes support of] the national liberation struggle in whatever distant region of the planet it may appear."[68]

Conclusions and Projections

Soviet foreign policy objectives and military doctrine have converged. Since the mid 1960s, Soviet foreign policy has pursued three primary goals—(1) stabilized relations with the West, (2) containment and isolation of China, (3) exploration and expansion in the Third World, generally in the areas south of Russia—and Soviet military doctrine has become congruent with these objectives. The Soviet strategic-nuclear shield is to provide stable deterrence with the West; limited-war doctrines and forces, with or without nuclear weapons, are to provide additional deterrent and war-fighting capabilities on the primary, contiguous flanks of the Soviet Union (Europe and Asia); and the conventional, projective capabilities are to provide the cutting edge and the persuasive presence in support of expansionist and exploratory policies in the Third World. This triadic orientation of Soviet foreign and military policy makes large

[67]General A. A. Epishev, *Some Aspects of Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975). V. M. Kulish offers another view on the global mission of the Soviet armed forces: "Greatest importance is being attached to Soviet military presence in various regions throughout the world, reinforced by an adequate level of strategic mobility of its armed forces. . . . In those cases wherein support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their freedom and independence against forces of international reaction and imperialist interventions, the Soviet Union may require mobile and well-trained and well-equipped forces. . . . Expanding the scale of Soviet military presence and military assistance furnished by other socialist states [i.e., proxies] is being viewed today as a very important factor in international relations." (From *Voennaia sila i mezhdunarodnoe otnoshenia* [1972] quoted in Scott and Scott, eds., *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 57.)

[68]Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Problemy istorii KPSS*, May 1974.

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claims on Soviet resources, manpower, and managerial-political talent; however, the Soviets seem persuaded that their time has come and that the costs and risks entailed are tolerable when measured against prospective gains. Contemporary Soviet military thinking can be seen as based on a parry-and-thrust concept. Vast nuclear forces serve as the deterrent against Western strategic-nuclear forces, while general-purpose forces serve to probe and thrust into vulnerable and soft regions whose strategic, political, and economic value is of overriding importance to Moscow.

In order to explore the Third World for targets of opportunity, the Soviets first had to neutralize American strategic preponderance and create credible deterrent and war-fighting forces on their two most exposed and endangered flanks: NATO Europe and China. At great costs in manpower and weaponry, the Soviets have achieved these objectives and, in the process, have stirred up deep suspicions in the West and in China. The primary Soviet expansionary path, however, lies neither in Europe nor in China, but south of Russia, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, the Middle East, and Africa.

The Soviets are convinced that the political payoff will come from a prudent and preferably indirect use of their conventional forces in the Third World, rather than from their politically inert strategic-nuclear deterrent. This view has been expressed by one of the most influential Soviet analysts: "It has become clear that this [nuclear] might is becoming progressively less usable as a political weapon"; therefore, the "sphere of applicability" of such weapons "for rational political ends is inexorably shrinking."[69] This, of course, is not to denigrate the decisive "holding back" functions of the Soviet strategic-nuclear force, without which the conventional and theater forces would become meaningless. Having obtained strategic deterrence, though, the Soviets can press on with the tempting (and now less risky) game of southward expansion. The Soviets have turned out, after all, to be adept students of the West's deterrence strategists, who have been asserting for some time that the more stable the strategic deterrence, the greater the willingness and freedom to risk using lower-level forces for political ends.

The Soviets have rediscovered the wisdom and relevance of their long-dead revolutionary strategists, Marshals Tukhachevskii and Frunze, who preached a gospel of warfare that included these concepts: (1) highly mobile, deep-thrust, airborne-offensive operations, not along a broad straight-line front (à la Stalin) but at selected points along enemy lines; (2) the use of surprise, secrecy, deception, and pre-emption; (3) a vital role for armor, artillery, and mechanized infantry, which are indispensable for high mobility, surprise, troop dispersal, and target-

[69]G. A. Arbatov, in *World Marxist Review*, no. 2, February 1974, p. 56.

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denial (these last being particularly relevant in a nuclear battlefield environment). These aspects of revolutionary warfare are being updated and used in Soviet military training and doctrinal modifications.[70]

The dominant motive force of Soviet political and military action is dialectical: the compelling "push to the utmost" derived from Clausewitz is moderated by the restraining Leninist caveat regarding the avoidance of "adventurism." This Bolshevik yin-yang combination provided the parameters for the inherently aggressive and expansionistic tendencies during the long formative period of Soviet Russia, a period marked both by perceptions of outside threat and by military inferiority and insecurity. However, the powerful restraints of the Leninist admonition against adventurism (and the risk of losing it all through high risk and foolish gambles) are eroding. The Soviets feel less threatened and more powerful, and they sense that the Western capitalist countries are less than monolithically unified.

There is little doubt that the Soviets are committed to gradual, nonprovocative but sustained exploration of vulnerable areas in the Third World as targets of opportunity. They are building the forces, weapons, and technologies needed to project Soviet influence and power into these areas during this present decade. Their doctrines, operational and tactical guidelines, and training programs are in harmony with these objectives.

The Soviet Union has practiced confrontation avoidance whenever a direct clash with the other superpower seemed imminent. In the 1980s the situation will have changed drastically, since the Soviets are at least as powerful as the United States and since the theaters of the most likely confrontations are logistically accessible. Given the American traditions described above and given the newly acquired Soviet might, a confrontation between the two superpowers in Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, or Africa would have very ominous implications. In an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, the Soviets are not likely to blink first. It is not unreasonable to say that the superpowers are headed for a possible collision in the 1980s.

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[70]See Savkin, *Basic Principles,* pp. 22-23. It is interesting to compare contemporary Soviet views on the vital importance of nonstrategic forces with Soviet views in the early 1960s. Announcing the new Soviet military doctrine in January 1960, Khrushchev rationalized massive reductions of Soviet conventional forces as follows: "Our state has at its disposal powerful rocket equipment. The military air force and navy have lost their previous importance in view of the modern development of military equipment. . . . In our time the defense potential of the country is determined, not by the number of our soldiers under arms and the number of persons in naval uniform . . ." (Quoted in Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967], p. 151.) Note, also, Khrushchev's candid outburst, printed in Pravda on September 22, 1964, just about one week prior to his ouster: "When I went out onto the training field and saw the tanks attacking and how the antitank artillery hit these tanks, I became ill. After all, we are spending a lot of money to build tanks. And if—God forbid, as they say—a war breaks out, these tanks will burn before they reach the line indicated by the command."

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SOVIET THEATER-NUCLEAR FORCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO DEFENSE*

by Robert Kennedy

Since World War II, Western defense policies have focused on efforts designed to offset the preponderance of Soviet conventional power on the European continent. To this end, NATO has generally relied on U.S. strategic and theater-nuclear superiority to balance the military equation in Europe. In a landmark speech, however, delivered at the London International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977, Helmut Schmidt, mindful of improving Soviet strategic and theater-nuclear capabilities, expressed his concern over the changing strategic conditions that now confront the alliance. According to Schmidt, SALT had codified the Soviet-American strategic-nuclear balance, thus neutralizing the strategic-nuclear capabilities of the superpowers. As a result, he cautioned, the significance of the East-West balance of tactical-nuclear and conventional weapons had been magnified.

The West German chancellor went on to suggest that while the Soviets had apparently accepted parity at the strategic level, they had given no clear indication of a willingness to accept the principle of parity for Europe. In fact, he argued, "the Warsaw Pact has, if anything, increased the disparities in both conventional and tactical nuclear forces."[1] Since European and American defense specialists have long been aware of what has generally been perceived as a clear Soviet conventional advantage, Schmidt's remarks focused public attention on a series of issues that were already commanding high-level NATO interest; he thus sparked an intensification of the debate over the nature of the Soviet theater-nuclear buildup, over the implications of that buildup for deterrence and defense, and over appropriate NATO responses.

Soviet Theater-Nuclear Force Improvements

During the last decade, NATO has signaled a willingness to reduce the number of nuclear weapon systems and warheads in the European theater and, indeed, during talks on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR), offered an option that included a

*The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and should not be construed to be an official position, policy, or decision of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

[1]Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival*, January-February 1978, pp. 3-4.

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reduction in theater-nuclear forces and weapons. In contrast, the Soviet Union has been methodically improving its theater-nuclear forces at all levels.

Tactical/Battlefield Systems

At the tactical, or battlefield, level, NATO once possessed an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapon systems and warheads. In some quarters, that superiority has been considered one of the main pillars in the deterrence of the overwhelmingly superior Soviet conventional forces. Today, the Warsaw Pact has over 600 Frog and Scud-A missiles, more than 400 of which are thought to have a nuclear mission. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact is now replacing the older Frog rockets with the SS-21. While few data are available on the SS-21, it is reported to have a considerably greater range than the Frog and is presumed to have incorporated improvements in reaction time, reliability, accuracy, and handling characteristics.[2]

The Soviet Union is also now deploying dual-capable 203-mm and 240-mm artillery.[3] According to the U.S. secretary of defense, Soviet nuclear-capable artillery are currently deployed only within the USSR.[4] However, Soviet nuclear artillery could easily be moved to support nuclear operations against NATO.

While NATO still retains a relative overall advantage in short-range systems and warheads, because of its substantial deployment of nuclear artillery, the gap between NATO and Warsaw Pact battlefield capabilities has narrowed considerably over the past decade and a half, and the overwhelming superiority once enjoyed by NATO has disappeared. (See Table I.)

Battlefield Support Systems

The Soviet Union has also been upgrading its medium-range battlefield support systems. To date, the Soviets have deployed approximately 515 battlefield support missiles and over 1,500 tactical aircraft

[2]Both the Frog and Scud-A were reported to have poor reaction times, low reliability, poor operational accuracy, and a primitive manual interface with Soviet targeting and command-and-control systems. See John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman, *Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 300.

[3]There is some difference of opinion on the exact caliber of the "203-mm" gun. The U.S. secretary of defense, in his FY 1981 annual report on defense posture, refers to a 203-mm weapon, as did the International Institute for Strategic Studies in *The Military Balance, 1979-80*. On the other hand, *Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1979-80* notes that the exact caliber of the weapon known as the 203-mm M-1955 field howitzer became known after the Israelis captured some in 1973; it was then established to be 180 mm. *The Military Balance, 1980-81* now also lists the caliber as 180 mm.

[4]Harold Brown, secretary of defense, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington: January 29, 1980), p. 92.

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TABLE I

TACTICAL/BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR SYSTEMS*

	No. Deployed	*PNM*	*Rx*	*WHt*	*WHa*
Warsaw Pact					
Artillery					
203 mm	. . .	150	16	300	270
240 mm	. . .	150	. . .	300	270
TOTAL		300		600	540
Tactical missiles					
Frog/SS-21	375	250	40/60	250	200
Scud-A	251	168	45	168	134
TOTAL	626	418		418	334
NATO					
Artillery					
155 mm	1,081	540	10	1,081	973
203 mm	319	160	11	319	287
TOTAL	1,400	700		1,400	1,260
Tactical missiles					
Lance	90	90	60	90	81
Honest John	91	91	20	91	64
Pluton	30	30	65	30	24
TOTAL	211	211		211	169

*Tactical/battlefield nuclear systems are those having a range ≤ 100 nm. Warsaw Pact systems are all systems in Eastern Europe, including those in the western military districts of the Soviet Union; NATO systems are all systems assigned or earmarked for the European theater. With respect to Warsaw Pact artillery, the secretary of defense has indicated that some of the 203-mm and 240-mm pieces now deployed by the USSR have been adapted to fire nuclear projectiles. Air Vice-Marshal Menaul has estimated that the Soviet Union now has 150 203-mm guns/howitzers with a nuclear capability. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets have deployed at least as many 240-mm guns/howitzers. PNM = probable number having a nuclear mission; Rx = approximate maximum range in nautical miles; WHt = total warheads estimated to be available in peacetime; WHa = warheads assumed to be available for delivery on wartime targets given probable systems-in-commission. For artillery and Lance missiles, the general wartime availability factor is assessed at 0.9; for Honest John, the factor has been assessed at 0.7. All other systems are assessed at 0.8.

SOURCES: *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981; The Military Balance, 1980-1981;* Air Vice-Marshal Stewart W. B. Menaul, "The Shifting Theater Nuclear Balance in Europe," *Strategic Review,* Fall 1978, pp. 34-45.

(of which nearly 380 are likely to have a nuclear mission). They are capable, also, of delivering over 860 nuclear weapons with such systems. Moreover, they are now replacing their liquid-propelled Scud-B and

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SS-12 Scaleboard missiles with SS-23s and SS-22s and are rapidly improving the nuclear strike capabilities of their tactical-air systems. The addition of the Fitter Cs and Ds and later versions of the Mig-21 aircraft, which have improved avionics and generally greater ranges than the older Soviet fighters, suggests an improved capacity for low-altitude penetration and attack.

In comparison, NATO fields 180 Pershing-I missiles, approximately 255 medium-range battlefield support aircraft (of which only about 90 are likely to be reserved for nuclear missions), and some 290 nuclear warheads to support these systems. Such a comparison suggests a stark imbalance in medium-range systems in favor of the Warsaw Pact. (See Table II.) On the other hand, some of NATO's battlefield-support requirements can be covered by tactical-air assets drawn from systems that, because of their range, are considered Eurostrategic. (See Table III.) However, tactical-air assets so employed would reduce the number of nuclear strikes likely to be available against Eurostrategic targets.

Eurostrategic Systems

Perhaps most significant, especially for America's European allies, is the slow but methodical change in the balance of nuclear capabilities that is taking place at the Eurostrategic level. In the mid and late 1960s it was generally assumed that the West had a clear advantage in those systems that recently have come to be called Eurostrategic. U.S. Polaris submarines committed to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe); NATO medium-range strike aircraft deployed on the continent or stationed offshore on carriers; the British bomber and Polaris submarine fleets; the French Mirage-IVA strike aircraft and their expanding ballistic missile submarine fleet—all were considered more than an adequate match for the medium bombers and the 750 or so MRBMs and IRBMs that had been deployed by the Soviets to support long-range nuclear operations in Europe.

During the last decade and a half, however, the Soviets have made a determined effort to offset Western capabilities. With the introduction of the Fencer and Flogger aircraft, the Soviet Union has substantially improved the range, payload, avionics, and electronic-countermeasure capabilities of its European nuclear-strike air arm. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in early 1974 described the Fencer as "the first modern Soviet fighter to be developed specifically as a fighter-bomber." Its two-man crew (pilot and weapons system operator) suggests an increased ability to conduct night-time, all-weather, low-altitude precision nuclear missions into the heart of Western Europe. *Jane's* places the Fencer, which entered squadron

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TABLE II

MEDIUM-RANGE BATTLEFIELD SUPPORT SYSTEMS*

	No. Deployed	*PNM*	*Rx*	*WHt*	*WHa*
Warsaw Pact					
Missiles					
SCUD-B/SSX-23 }	506	506	160	506	455
SS-12/SS-22 }			490		
SS-N-4	9	9	200	9	6
TOTAL	515	515		515	461
Tactical aircraft					
Su-7 (Fitter-A)	239	60	390	60	48
Su-17 (Fitter-C/D)	480	120	390	240	192
Su-20 (Fitter-C)	35	9	390	18	14
MiG-21 (Fishbed J, K, L, N)	750	188	260	188	150
TOTAL	1,504	377		506	404
NATO					
Missiles					
Pershing-I	180	180	390	180	162
TOTAL	180	180	390	180	162
Tactical aircraft					
Jaguar	219	73	465	73	58
Etendard	36	18	390	36	29
TOTAL	255	91		109	87

*Medium-range battlefield support systems are those systems having a range of 101-500 nm. (See Table I for definitions of PNM, Rx, WHt, and WHa.) A general availability factor of 0.9 was used to determine WHa for all battlefield-support missile systems except the SS-N-4 (Sark), for which a factor of 0.7 was used. The factor used for tactical aircraft was 0.8. It was assumed that one-fourth of all Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft, one-third of the Jaguars, and one-half of the Etendards would be retained in a nuclear role. It was also assumed that two warheads would be available for all Fitter-C/D and Etendard aircraft (one warhead for each of those that remain). The range estimates (Rx) for tactical aircraft are the greater of the ranges indicated in the source documents, assuming a hi-lo-hi combat-mission profile. The Fitter-C/D range was adjusted for a lighter bomb load than indicated in *Jane's* and for the addition of external fuel tanks.

SOURCES: *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981; The Military Balance, 1980-1981; Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1979-1980.*

service in 1974, in the same class as the U.S. Air Force's F-111. Today the Soviets have over 1,200 Fencer and Flogger-B/D aircraft deployed in the European theater.

Coupled with continuing improvements in their high-performance fighter aircraft, the Soviet Union has also begun deploying

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TABLE III

EUROSTRATEGIC SYSTEMS*

	No. Deployed	PNM	Rx	WHt	WHa
Warsaw Pact					
Mid-range missiles (MR/SLBMs)					
SS-4 (Sandal)	380	380	1,000	380	342
SS-N-5 (Serb)	60	60	600	60	42
TOTAL	440	440		440	384
Intermediate-range missiles (IR/SLBMs)					
SS-5 (Skean)	54	54	2,200	54	49
SS-20	120	120	2,700	360	324
TOTAL	174	174		414	373
Aircraft					
SU-19 (Fencer)	278	70	500+	140	112
MiG-23/27 (Flogger-B/D)	975	244	520	244	195
TU-16 (Badger)	238	116	1,800	464	372
TU-22 (Blinder-B)	94	47	1,750+	94	75
TU-26 (Backfire-B)	54	27	2,500+	108	82
TOTAL	1,639	504		1,050	836
NATO					
Mid-range missiles (MR/SLBMs)	0	0	0	0	0
Intermediate-range missiles (IR/SLBMs)					
SSBS-S-2/3	18	18	1,600	18	16
Polaris	64	64	2,500	48	43
MSBS-M2/M20	80	80	2,000	64	58
Poseidon	40	40	2,400	400	360
TOTAL	202	202		530	477
Aircraft					
Vulcan-B2	56	56	2,000	112	90
Buccaneer	60	30	1,000	60	48
Mirage-IVA	33	33	1,000	33	26
FB-III	170	85	1,000+	170	136
F-4	499	166	600	166	133
Mirage-IIIE	105	30	650	30	24
F-104	318	106	500+	106	85
A-6	20	10	1,000+	20	16
A-7	40	20	1,000+	40	32
TOTAL	1,301	536		737	590
Aggregate Eurostrategic Capabilities					
Warsaw Pact	2,253	1,118	. . .	1,904	1,593
NATO	1,503	738	. . .	1,267	1,067

*Eurostrategic systems are those systems having a maximum range of 501-4,000+ nm; MR/SLBMs are those systems having a maximum range of 1,500-4,000+ nm. (See Table I for definitions of PNM, Rx, WHt, and WHa.) A general availability factor of 0.9 was used to determine the warheads available (WHa) for Eurostrategic missions for ground-launched missiles; 0.7 for Soviet SSBNs; 0.9 for NATO SSBNs; and 0.8 for all aircraft. The ranges (Rx) listed for aircraft are the greater of the ranges listed in the source documents, assuming a hi-lo-hi combat-mission profile. It is assumed that 60 SS-20 missile launchers are deployed in the European theater, with one reload available per launcher and three MIRVs per missile. It is also assumed that two British Polaris and three French submarines are on patrol during peacetime and that one additional submarine (each) could be readied by the British and French in a crisis.

SOURCES: *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981; The Military Balance, 1980-1981; Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1979-1980; Jane's Weapon Systems, 1979-1980.*

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a new generation of variable-geometry supersonic bombers known in the West by the NATO code name "Backfire." Manufactured by Tupolev, the Backfire is reported to have a maximum speed at high altitude of Mach 2.5 and an "on the deck," supersonic penetration capability. It can carry a full range of free-fall/gravity weapons as well as the most technically advanced air-to-surface nuclear cruise missiles in the Soviet inventory.[5] To date, the Soviets have deployed only some 54 Backfire bombers to the European theater, but they are reported to be producing the Backfire at a rate of 30 per year and are expected to deploy as many as 300 aircraft.

Of the new systems currently being deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe, however, none has created as much concern and controversy as the SS-20 IRBM. The SS-20 is a solid-fuel, two-stage, MIRVed mobile missile that is currently replacing or supplementing the older, less accurate, and less reliable SS-4s and SS-5s. One expert, formerly a senior Department of Defense civilian official, now writing under the name Justin Galen, has noted that the reliability, accuracy, reload, and retargeting capability of the SS-20 should permit its effective use "in first-strike, launch-on-warning, or second-strike attacks." Furthermore, he contends that with the deployment of the SS-20, the Soviet Union "could probably launch a reliable mass strike . . . against virtually every NATO air base, weapons storage site, C^3 (command, control, and communications) site, and fixed missile site with negligible warning."[6] A more pointed illustration of the concern raised by the SS-20 is to be found in remarks made by the French strategist Pierre Gallois. Gallois has suggested that with the addition of the SS-20 the Soviet Union can now destroy NATO's entire inventory of nuclear weapons in ten minutes.[7]

As a result of such improvements, the Soviet Union today fields a formidable array of Eurostrategic weapons: over 600 MR/IRBMs and SLBMs, about 500 nuclear-capable aircraft, and over 1,900 warheads to support theaterwide nuclear operations. In comparison, the West (including French theater forces) has deployed approximately 200 IR/SLBMs, 540 tactical strike aircraft, and 1,270 warheads to support theater-level nuclear operations. (See Table III.)

Summary

The inherent "softness" of the data available on Soviet and Western nuclear capabilities prohibits a precise calculation of the

[5]See John W. R. Taylor, ed., *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1978-79* (London: MacDonald and Jane's Publishers Limited, 1978), pp. 201-202.

[6]Justin Galen, "The Nuclear Balance, Part One: Recent Force Trends and Improvements," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1977, p. 30.

[7]See Joseph Fitchett, "NATO Arms Talks Test U.S.-Europe Ties," *International Herald Tribune*, April 30, 1979.

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balance: we are captives of the many assumptions that have been made. Nevertheless, given the data at hand, the composite of theater-nuclear capabilities now available to the Soviet Union suggests that the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance of nuclear forces has shifted from one that favored the West to one that now *appears* to favor the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. While the West may retain an advantage at the tactical/battlefield level, the Soviets are certainly ahead in medium-range systems and now seem to have an aggregate numerical advantage in Eurostrategic systems. Moreover, with the addition of Fencer, Flogger, and Backfire aircraft as well as SS-20 IRBMs, the technological superiority that was once thought to belong to NATO is now being seriously challenged.

This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union has yet achieved any meaningful overall theater-nuclear superiority, quantitative or qualitative. However, the data do support the contention that a kind of rough parity exists at the theater-nuclear level. Furthermore, trends suggest that the USSR has not decided to limit or reduce its efforts in the field of theater-nuclear forces. On the contrary, the continued improvement of Soviet theater-nuclear capabilities portends an increased nuclear threat to the West.

Soviet Doctrine

The Emphasis on Surprise and Offense

Soviet theater-nuclear force improvements complement and are complemented by Soviet doctrine. Since the Khrushchev period, Soviet military writers have rejected the idea of adopting a strategic defense during the early phases of a conflict, as had been done under Stalin during World War II.[8] Today, Soviet doctrine focuses on surprise and rapid offensive warfare. In this regard, Soviet writers contend that the Soviet emphasis on offensive warfare has nothing in common with the "aggressive and predatory content" of Western military doctrine.[9] Nevertheless, Moscow has increasingly emphasized that strategic and tactical surprise and rapid offensive combat operations are vital prescriptions for success should conflict occur.

While Soviet military writings do not support the notion that the USSR would launch a "bolt out of the blue,"[10] surprise is viewed

[8]See Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1949-1970*. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 199.

[9]See, for example, Lt. Colonel L. Korzun, "Defense in Modern Combat," *Krasnaia zvezda* [Red Star], August 22, 1964.

[10] See Joseph D. Douglass, *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), pp. 3-4.

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as one of the most important principles of the military art. Colonel Vasiliy Ye. Savkin, in one of the early and basic books of the Officers Library series, published by the Military Publishing House in Moscow and recommended for all officers and students in higher military schools, has written: "The first law of war is that the course and outcome of war . . . depends primarily on the correlation of available, strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning of the war. . . . the beginning of a war can have a decisive effect on the outcome."[11] Further: "From this law come a number of the most important principles of military art, including the principle of surprise. . . .[12] Surprise has been a most important principle of military art since olden times."[13] As a result, "The desire for surprise has begun to permeate all decisions for the conduct of operations and battles."[14] In another major work in the same series, Colonel A. A. Sidorenko has contended that the history of conflict itself has emphasized the value of surprise. He notes: "Extremely often the absence of surprise turned out to be the reason for the failure of an operation at its very beginning."[15]

Equally stressed by Soviet military theorists is the importance of rapid offensive combat operations. Indeed, Soviet military science considers the offensive as the foremost type of military combat action. Savkin writes: "the offensive is the basic form of combat actions, since only by a decisive offensive conducted at a high tempo and to a great depth is total defeat of the enemy achieved."[16] Similarly, Sidorenko, in his seminal work on offensive warfare, stressed the need for "swift development of the breakthrough," the value of a rapid "offensive in depth," the importance of night operations in "striving to attain surprise and continuity in the offensive," the contribution of airborne and amphibious forces to increased attack rates and, ultimately, to "the successful conduct of offensive operations," and in general the importance of maneuver and shock action on the modern battlefield.[17] Likewise, Division Commander Colonel Lobachev has argued that "a high tempo is not a goal in itself, but a means to achieving victory in combat. The speed of movement of the attackers denies the enemy the opportunity to freely maneuver with his forces and equipment, to utilize the reserve . . . and it neutralizes many of the strengths of the enemy defense."[18]

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[11]V. Ye. Savkin, *Operational Art and Tactics* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1972), p. 89.
[12]Ibid., p. 90.
[13]Ibid., p. 230.
[14]Ibid., p. 234.
[15]Sidorenko, *The Offensive* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1970), p. 30.
[16]Savkin, *Operational Art*, p. 248.
[17]Sidorenko, *The Offensive*, pp. 11-39.
[18]Lobachev, "A High Tempo of Attack—The Indispensable Condition for Victory," *Voyenni vestnik* [Military Herald], February 1977, p. 44, as quoted in Colonel Frederick C. Turner, *Comments on FM 100-5 from a Soviet Point of View* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1978), p. 19.

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The Role of Nuclear Weapons

From the Soviet perspective, nuclear weapons enhance the importance of surprise and rapid offensive operations, which in turn synergistically enhance the value of nuclear weapons in securing victory. Describing the relationship between nuclear warfare and Soviet doctrine and defense planning, Soviet writers have proclaimed the nuclear weapon to be the "most important element of the battlefield" and "the basic means of destruction." They suggest that "the side which employs nuclear weapons with surprise can predetermine the outcome of battle in his favor." The late minister of defense, Marshal Andrey Antonovich Grechko, has written: "Nuclear missiles will be the decisive means of armed conflict."[19] Likewise, Major-General V. V. Voznenko has concluded that "decisive victory in an offensive is achieved by using the results of nuclear strikes."[20]

With respect to the synergistic relationship between nuclear weapons and rapid offensive warfare, Soviet writers contend that the combat qualities of shock forces permit exploitation of "the results of the employment of nuclear and other means of mass destruction [read: chemical] most effectively, overcoming the enemy's defense at a high rate, breaking through into his deep rear swiftly, advancing over any terrain including that contaminated with radioactive substances, and inflicting powerful blows on the enemy."[21] They maintain that "nuclear weapons create an opportunity to quickly alter . . . the balance of forces of the sides" and that "the high maneuverability and dynamism of warfare . . . [are] a result of equipping the troops with nuclear weapons and their complete motorization." Nuclear weapons, they believe, "make it possible in the shortest period of time to cause great losses to the defending side, and to create breaches in its battle formations." Moreover, "nuclear strikes can destroy the strongest centers and strong points in the enemy defense, his reserves, means of mass destruction, and other important objectives." Consequently, Soviet military writers have concluded that through "the stunning effect of surprise attacks by nuclear and conventional weapons and decisive offensive operations by troops, the enemy's capabilities are sharply lowered . . . the correlation of forces changes immediately. . . . He may panic and his morale will be crushed."[22]

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[19]Grechko, *On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism* (Moscow: 1971), trans. by the Joint Publications Research Service, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va. (1972), p. 33.

[20]See Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, ed., *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1973), p. 144.

[21]For example, see Sidorenko, *The Offensive*, p. 46.

[22]Ibid., pp. 40-70, 109-124; Savkin, *Operational Art*, pp. 232-233; Lomov, pp. 40-41, 143-156.

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Thus, while there are many reasons for the Soviet Union to avoid conflict in Europe, especially nuclear conflict, Soviet doctrine and methodically built forces suggest that (1) they believe that *if* war occurs in Europe, it is likely to involve the use of nuclear weapons, (2) they intend to be prepared for such a war should it occur, and (3) they believe that, in conjunction with surprise and rapid offensive maneuver, the coordinated use of nuclear weapons will have a decisive effect on the outcome.

Implications for NATO Defense

A Devalued Deterrent

To be sure, as Klaas de Vries, chairman of the Dutch Defense Committee, has argued,[23] Soviet theater-nuclear force improvements have not neutralized the ability of the West to deter conflict in Europe. Moscow is likely to harbor few illusions about the destructive potential of the West's theater- and strategic-nuclear arsenal—which by any standards remains formidable. Thus, despite their conventional superiority and growing nuclear capabilities, the Soviets are not likely to set out deliberately on a course they believe might well lead to a nuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, in a broader sense, improvements in Soviet theater-nuclear weapons have resulted in a depreciation of the deterrent effect of the West's nuclear arsenal. From a Western perspective, the deterrence once provided by NATO's nuclear superiority was never limited to the notion of deterring the deliberate initiation of conflict. Rather, an effective deterrent was also seen as one that served to limit Soviet policy options during crises or approaches to conflict, thus reducing the potential for a slow slide into nuclear war precipitated by mutual miscalculation. In theory, while Soviet leaders could be expected to test Western resolve in any number of ways, ultimately they would be deterred not only from a deliberate initiation of conflict, but also from other actions that might lead to conflict and an ensuing escalation to levels at which they might be at a clear relative disadvantage.

Today, in an age of strategic parity, the attainment by the USSR of a rough equivalence at the theater-nuclear level is likely to provide Moscow with increased room for political maneuver in times of peace or crisis. According to Thomas W. Wolfe, civilian and military elements of the Soviet leadership elite appear to share similar attitudes toward military

[23]Klaas G. de Vries, "Responding to the SS-20: An Alternative Approach," *Survival*, November-December 1979, p. 253.

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power, ascribing to it a more positive value than is generally the case in the West. For the Soviets, military strength pays dividends beyond deterrence. Wolfe notes that among the values ascribed to military power are its utility for gaining political objectives, for supporting an ambitious foreign policy, and for opening up opportunities to advance communism in the world.[24] While Soviet leaders are basically conservative in outlook and well aware of the probable consequences of conflict in Europe, they are also keenly aware of West European concerns about the potentially devastating effect of a nuclear war in Europe. In light of such concerns, Soviet leaders today may well believe that "sober" assessments in the West of the present nuclear balance in Europe actually reduce the risk that war might erupt in a crisis. If so, Soviet leaders are likely to feel more confident that they can successfully engage in political coercion, crisis bargaining, and bluff in support of political objectives on the continent of Europe. Unfortunately, such confidence could lead to more strident Soviet behavior, a concomitant potential for miscalculation, and ultimately to the very conflict that all seek to avoid.

A Decline in Western Self-Confidence

Perhaps as significant as the potential for Soviet miscalculation during a crisis is the debilitating effect that an awareness of such potential is likely to have on West European elites during peacetime. In 1960, in an attempt to answer what he considered to be the fundamental question confronting the Atlantic Alliance as it fashioned defense policies and strategies in an age of nuclear weapons—namely, Can the West defend Europe without destroying it?—Liddell Hart concluded: "The answer—if we are honest, and brave enough to face hard facts—can only be that, in the present conditions, effective defense is not possible. For defense in a real sense of the word, as defined in dictionaries, means to "preserve, protect, keep safe, by resisting attack." At present if nuclear weapons . . . are actually used no country can hope to keep safe, or even to avoid fatal destruction."[25]

The continued Soviet buildup of theater-nuclear weapons—and Moscow's development of a doctrine that emphasizes the integrated use of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons in Europe—underscores this dilemma. As a result, a growing number of European elites are understandably uncomfortable with the current situation, are uncertain about the nature of security provided through the NATO link, are un-

[24]Wolfe, *The Military Dimension in the Making of Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1977), p. 38. Also see Dimitri K. Simés, "Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Winter 1980-1981, pp. 93-94, and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The Present as Prologue: Europe and Theater Nuclear Modernization," ibid., Spring 1981, pp. 158-159.

[25]Hart, *Deterrent or Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 47.

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happy with the inability of the United States to provide a "quick fix" (even though the complexities of the environment may not admit to quick fixes), and may well be willing to seek accommodation (although they certainly would not call it that) with the Soviet Union. In some respects, such reactions are understandable. The Europeans, after all, will be the first casualties in any armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, as a way of forcing an exploration of alternatives for improving Western security, such reactions can even be beneficial. The dividing point, however, between the constructive exploration of alternatives, on the one hand, and condescension, on the other—a point where great subtleties of political maneuver have on occasion been very effectively exploited—could well be difficult to define clearly. As a result, the hazards to the continued cohesion of NATO are great. Indeed, the long-term, subtly coercive effect of the failure of what François de Rose called the "balance of imbalances" could well be the West's most significant challenge.[26]

Increased Vulnerabilities

In 1971 Marshal Grechko detailed Soviet targeting priorities for their longer-range theater-nuclear forces. At the top of the list were U.S. Pershing missile bases, nuclear-capable NATO air force units, tanker bases, British and French nuclear submarines, tactical-nuclear-weapons storage sites, and U.S. aircraft carriers. These targets were followed by major ports, military bases and barracks, nuclear reactors, command-and-control centers, and the transportation and supply net.[27] Thus, the West's nuclear forces and critical command, control, and supply nodes have been the chief candidates for Soviet attack for over a decade. However, the addition of the SS-20 IRBM and the continued deployment of new-generation tactical fighters and bombers, such as the Fencer and Backfire, have significantly increased Western vulnerability.

The high accuracy of the SS-20 has reduced the number of warheads required to ensure the destruction of a specific target, and the MIRVed warhead has substantially increased the potential number of targets that can be struck by a single missile. Whereas in the past it would have been necessary for the Soviet Union to launch two, perhaps three, of their SS-4 or SS-5 missiles in order to have a high confidence of

[26] De Rose notes that before the recent round of Soviet theater-nuclear force improvements, there was a "balance of imbalances" where Soviet superiority in conventional forces was counterbalanced by American superiority in theater-nuclear weapons. He further contends that the years to come will be marked by Soviet superiority in both fields. See "SALT and Western Security in Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 1067.

[27] Grechko, *On Guard for Peace* as cited by Hubertus Hoffman, "SS-20 Multiplies USSR's Nuclear Superiority," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, December 1978–January 1979, p. 44.

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destroying a single target—thus rapidly exhausting their capabilities—today it is theoretically possible for the Soviets to destroy with slightly over 100 SS-20 missiles the same number of targets that would have once required their entire force of SS-4s and SS-5s to destroy. Likewise, older-generation Soviet aircraft frequently lacked the avionics, electronic countermeasures, range, and payload characteristics that make the new fighter-bombers and Backfire aircraft a serious threat to NATO's deep rear.

Planning for the Wrong War

Despite dramatic improvements in Soviet theater-nuclear capabilities and the corresponding development of a doctrine that focuses on the integrated use of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons in the event of war in Europe, the U.S. bias for conventional forces and conventional planning, which began during the Kennedy administration, persists. That bias grew out of an increasing concern among Europeans[28] as well as Americans over the effects of a possible two-sided nuclear exchange in Europe, made possible by the deployment in the late 1950s and early 1960s of a sizable Soviet theater-nuclear force. In light of Soviet deployments, the utility of a defense based on a near-spasmodic nuclear response to a major Warsaw Pact conventional aggression—the defense that seemed to have characterized the era of "massive retaliation"—was seriously questioned. Capturing the essence of NATO alliance concerns at the time, General André Beaufre wrote: "as the Soviet nuclear threat developed, it became increasingly difficult to believe that recourse to a 'nuclear exchange' would be made for any reason other than the defense of absolutely vital objectives. It seemed wise, therefore, to anticipate a more or less extended period of resistance before unleashing 'massive retaliation.' "[29]

In response to such concerns, the Kennedy administration began to refocus its efforts on improving conventional defense capabilities. The doctrine that issued from a number of studies and pronouncements became known as the doctrine of "flexible response." In theory, old trip-wire forces would be replaced by forces more adequately prepared to meet a Soviet conventional thrust; this would give pause to the Soviets and permit them to reflect on the consequences of pursuing a conflict that might well escalate to levels where they would be at a clear

[28]Europeans had been sensitized to the potential impact on Western Europe of a defense based on the use of nuclear weapons by the SHAPE war game "Carte Blanche," which had been held in Western Germany, the Lowlands, and northeastern France in 1955. In that exercise, the simulated use of 355 atomic bombs resulted in an estimated 5.2 million prompt casualties, not to mention the residual casualties resulting from the impact of devastation and the long-term effects of nuclear radiation.

[29]Beaufre, *NATO and Europe* (New York: Knopf, 1966), pp. 57-58.

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disadvantage. Thus, Soviet conventional capabilities would be partially offset by an improved NATO conventional-force posture. Through conventional-force improvements, moreover, the use of nuclear weapons might be forestalled, thus raising the nuclear threshold.

The practical effect of this shift to a conventional-emphasis strategy, however, was that it all but eliminated serious thinking about the conduct of operations on a nuclear battlefield or about the psychological effect, on friend and foe alike, of being fully prepared for such conflict. According to a study by John P. Rose, 50 per cent of the instruction and training at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) in the mid 1950s was devoted to theater-nuclear conflict. In 1957-1958, 614 regular-course curriculum hours focused on the nuclear battlefield. Moreover, the weight of military writing during the period indicated a clear emphasis on theater-nuclear operations. In the eight-year period immediately preceding the Kennedy administration's emphasis on conventional defense, the Army's *Military Review* published 155 articles dealing with theater-nuclear warfare. During the eight-year period from 1962 to 1969, in contrast, only 26 articles were published on the subject by *Military Review,* and by the late 1960s C&GSC instruction on nuclear conflict had dropped to sixteen hours.[30]

The continued improvement in Soviet strategic and theater-nuclear capabilities over the last decade and a half has significantly altered the military environment on the European continent. No longer can the United States and its NATO allies rely on an unquestioned Western nuclear superiority to deter all uses of nuclear weapons by the Soviets. As a result, the assumption that several hundred allied and Warsaw Pact divisions might engage in a conflict in Europe, neither side resorting to nuclear weapons, is simply unrealistic. Yet, the U.S. emphasis on conventional forces and planning for conventional conflict continues.

In part, this no doubt results from recognition of a clear imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapon systems and force structures, together with a perceived need in some quarters to improve conventional capabilities as Soviet strategic- and theater-nuclear capabilities have improved in order to provide a balance at all potential levels of conflict. In part, the emphasis on conventional forces and planning may reflect the difficulty of planning for a nuclear war: no previous conflict serves as a guide to requirements. In part, this emphasis may reflect a hope that the conventional nuclear "firebreak" will not be crossed. Almost certainly, the bias reflects a strong reluctance to broach a subject that has become extremely sensitive politically in Western

[30]Rose, "U.S. Army Doctrinal Developments: The Nuclear Battlefield, 1945-1977" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1977), chap. 4, as quoted in William Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), pp. 5-6.

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Europe. On this last point, Robert M. Lawrence has written that "one possible kind of war . . . has been virtually impossible to discuss publicly in any reasoned and coherent manner. This is tactical nuclear war, the use of nuclear weapons for limited tactical military purposes, a subject that has taken on an almost leprous appearance and seems essentially unable to stir intellectual curiosity, let alone serious consideration by students, pundits, or policy makers."[31] Likewise, noted General Maxwell D. Taylor: "The thought of using any kind of nuclear weapons is so repugnant to civil authorities as to preclude virtually any serious discussion of the possibilities or conditions under which these weapons might be used."[32]

As a result of this reluctance to face the possibility—indeed, given improved Soviet capabilities and the implications of Soviet doctrine, the probability—that a war in Europe would involve the use of nuclear weapons, U.S./NATO defense posture has failed to adapt to the changing political-military environment in Europe. That posture was chosen at a time when NATO had a huge preponderance in nuclear weaponry. That proponderance has evaporated. Yet, when you strip the rhetoric from policy pronouncements and carefully examine NATO forces, doctrine, and training, you are forced to conclude that there is "little more than confusion concerning the employment of tactical nuclear weapons."[33]

Today, strategic- and theater-nuclear parity makes it essential for the United States and its NATO allies to be fully prepared for the full spectrum of possible conflict should war occur in Europe. Given Soviet capabilities and a Soviet doctrine that focuses on the intensive, coordinated use of nuclear as well as conventional and chemical munitions, what is now necessary is this: (1) a thorough review of alliance forces, doctrine, and posture toward the end of improving NATO's ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against a combined conventional, chemical, and nuclear offensive; (2) the development of a NATO deterrent and defense strategy that will increase the probability of deterring a Soviet nuclear pre-emption during a crisis.

In Response

With respect to improving NATO's deterrent and defense posture, the following broad courses of action appear promising. First, NATO should shift the emphasis of its nuclear capabilities from short-range, battlefield systems to long-range, Eurostrategic systems. Today,

[31] Lawrence, "On Tactical Nuclear War," *Revue militaire générale*, January 1971, p. 46.
[32] Taylor, *Precarious Security* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 14.
[33] Van Cleave and Cohen, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons*, p. 9.

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NATO has a clear advantage in nuclear deployments only at the battlefield level. Moreoever, NATO's long-standing advantage in short-range systems—coupled with a frequent American emphasis on the need to be prepared to halt the forward advance of Soviet ground forces[34] as well as to threaten escalation if deterrence is to be effective—has suggested a Western emphasis on battlefield systems. Planned improvements in NATO's Eurostrategic capabilities are a step in the right direction—not simply as a response to Soviet deployment of the SS-20, but because of the value of such long-range systems themselves. The addition of 572 cruise missiles and Pershing-IIs will enhance deterrence, reduce overall vulnerability, and thus increase Western self-confidence.

Deterrence depends on the adversary believing that the potential benefits of conflict are outweighed by the costs. Current battlefield systems, if used, would clearly reduce the probability of success for a Soviet combined-arms offensive in Central Europe. The effects of their use, however, threaten the destruction of Western Europe. This has an adverse psychological impact on Western Europe in peacetime and raises questions as to whether the alliance would ever authorize the release of such weapons in Europe, until perhaps it was already too late.

Acquisition, deployment, and employment policies that emphasize the use of long-range nuclear systems—designed to attack Soviet forces, staging areas, command-and-control networks, and lines of communication in the western districts of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe—would place the Soviet Union and its East European allies on notice: should the Soviets initiate a conflict in Europe, Warsaw Pact territories will not be spared from destruction; NATO does not intend to limit the conflict to Western Europe but intends to take the conflict directly to the enemy. Thus, the credibility of the West's nuclear deterrent would be enhanced; it is simply more credible to threaten to attack Soviet forces in the western military districts of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe than it is to threaten to destroy Western Europe in order to save it from Soviet aggression. Such an approach, moreover, would further enhance deterrence by (1) increasing the calculable costs of aggression to the Soviets, (2) increasing the reluctance of the Soviet Union's East European allies to participate in conflict preparations during a crisis, and (3) reducing the Soviet planner's confidence that a well-integrated, coordinated Warsaw Pact attack could be orchestrated without providing the kind of advanced warning to NATO that might seriously reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet forces during the early, critical stages of conflict.

Emphasis on long-range systems might also be psychologically encouraging to the nations of Western Europe. Not only would the in-

[34]See, for example, Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 219.

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herent mobility of the Pershing-II and the cruise missile reduce the overall vulnerability of Western nuclear forces, but an emphasis on such long-range forces capable of striking deep into Warsaw Pact territory, including the Soviet Union, is likely to enhance—not diminish—the linkage between theater-nuclear conflict in Europe and the U.S. strategic-nuclear deterrent. One might reason that a Western focus on battlefield systems suggests a willingness to engage in a war limited to Central Europe or perhaps even to Western Europe. On the other hand, emphasis on the use of Eurostrategic systems might well suggest to many Europeans an early U.S. intent to take whatever measures are necessary to thwart a Soviet takeover of Western Europe, including nuclear strikes deep into the Soviet Union.

Despite such potential advantages, however, movement in the direction of an increased emphasis on Eurostrategic systems by the NATO alliance may be difficult to achieve. While Europeans of many persuasions have expressed serous concern over the USSR's growing long-range, theater-nuclear capabilities,[35] there has been less than wholehearted support for NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy the cruise missile and Pershing-II. Belgium and the Netherlands offered only conditional approval. Moreover, despite West German approval, left-wing members of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democratic Party are increasingly critical of the program as are some members of Schmidt's coalition partner, the Free Democrats.[36]

One big concern of many who oppose the decision to improve NATO's Eurostrategic capabilities has been the impact of that decision on the arms race and on détente. Emphasis on Eurostrategic systems, however, need not result in a spiraling nuclear arms race in Europe, for NATO need not increase the absolute numbers of its nuclear weapons or systems. Rather, as NATO modernizes its forces, it might allocate a proportionately larger share of its resources to forces having a deep nuclear-interdiction capability. No dramatic new programs need be approved. Moreover, efforts to cap the numbers of nuclear systems and warheads available to both sides should continue; if undertaken in conjunction with programs to achieve parity at all levels, including the conventional level, such efforts could well contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

Second, while reducing the relative emphasis of battlefield nuclear capabilities, NATO should modernize those systems so that it is better able to meet the political as well as the military requirements for

[35] See U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Western Security Issues: European Perspectives, Hearing* before the subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, 96th Congress, 1st Session, September 12, 1979.

[36] For a summary of the issues surrounding the European debate on theater-nuclear modernization, see Kelleher, "The Present as Prologue," pp. 150-168.

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TABLE IV

RADIUS OF BATTLEFIELD-WEAPON EFFECTS
(meters)

Yield	*Tank-Crew Incapacitation from Radiation*	*Unprotected Casualties*	*Urban Destruction from Blast*
1-kt Enhanced radiation	700	1,000	400
10-kt Fission	700	1,200	1,200

SOURCE: S. T. Cohen and Brig.-General Edwin F. Black, "The Neutron Bomb and the Defense of NATO," *Military Review*, May 1978, p. 59.

deterrence or defense against a combined Soviet conventional, chemical, and nuclear thrust. Current battlefield weapons, if used in Western Europe, would result in high levels of collateral damage. Hence, they exacerbate the Western dilemma of how to save Europe without destroying it. On the other hand, while the West has no control over the size of the warheads likely to be employed by the Soviet Union or over Soviet targeting policy, it could, through the introduction of reduced-blast, enhanced-radiation (RB/ER) weapons, reduce the absolute levels of collateral damage likely to be sustained because of allied use of nuclear weapons.

The controversy surrounding the planned introduction of the RB/ER weapon (the so-called neutron bomb) in the late 1970s makes it politically difficult for the United States or its West European allies to open debate on the subject. Indeed, the support that existed in West Germany prior to the Carter decision to defer production seems to have disappeared.[37] Nevertheless, the facts remain and, I believe, should be confronted directly. A 1-kiloton RB/ER weapon produces essentially the same desired military effects as a 10-kiloton standard-fission weapon. Use of the "neutron bomb," however, could significantly reduce the number of unintended casualties and collateral damage outside the immediate target area. (See Table IV.) While no possible use of nuclear weapons in Europe can be comforting, RB/ER weapons are clearly preferable under certain circumstances to the battlefield weapons now available.

Current modernization programs for battlefield systems include warhead improvements that offer the option of incorporating RB/ER features in a relatively short period of time.[38] Failure to make

[37] In response to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's February 1981 announcement that he favored production and deployment of the enhanced-radiation weapon, Kurt Becker, a spokesman for the West German government, was quick to indicate that the basis for West German support of such a move no longer existed.

[38] See Brown, *DOD Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 146.

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the RB/ER features an integral part of NATO's arsenal, however, places an increased emphasis on the need for adequate warning and increases the burden on NATO decisionmakers during a crisis by forcing them to decide on incorporation of the RB/ER feature at the very time they are seeking to reduce tensions and avoid conflict.[39]

Finally, NATO must give greater attention to nuclear planning for conflict in Europe. Given Soviet theater-nuclear force improvements and doctrine, NATO must be prepared to conduct operations not only on a strictly conventional battlefield, but also in a fully integrated conventional-chemical-nuclear environment. Training, doctrine, force structures and dispositions; approaches to the pre-positioning of equipment; time phasing for reinforcing combat troops, support forces, and equipment—all these must now be tailored for effective operations in a nuclear or a conventional environment. This is so not because nuclear warfare is preferred by the West, but because nuclear warfare may be initiated by the East. Nor would such a posture run counter to NATO's primary goal of deterring conflict. Indeed, it would contribute to deterrence: present force posture invites the Soviets to use nuclear weapons. As a result of nearly twenty years of conventional-emphasis planning, NATO is highly vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack. Speaking about Soviet incentives for early use of nuclear weapons, Jeffrey Record has argued: "it would appear as if the Alliance has set out deliberately to tailor and deploy its forces so as to provide every conceivable incentive for the Soviet Union to strike first with nuclear weapons."[40] What is necessary, then, is (1) an extension of current U.S./NATO efforts designed to reduce the vulnerabilities that have crept into our force posture, often as a result of our emphasis on planning for conventional conflict, and (2) a marked effort to train, equip, and deploy forces that are fully prepared to meet and defeat a Soviet conventional-chemical-nuclear offensive. Not only would such a posture enhance deterrence, it would also provide for an effective defense across the entire spectrum of conflict should deterrence fail.

[39]For further discussion of my views on the pros and cons of the RB/ER debate see Kennedy, "New Weapons Technologies: Implications for Defense Policy," *Parameters*, June 1979, pp. 67-68.

[40]Record, "Theater Nuclear Weapons: Begging the Soviet Union to Preempt," *Survival*, September-October 1977, p. 208.

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AMERICAN SEAPOWER AT RISK: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOVIET NAVAL PLANNING

by Gordon H. McCormick and Mark E. Miller

Over the past three decades, we have witnessed a notable expansion of Soviet maritime capabilities. During this period, the Soviet Union has evolved from a minor naval power to one that is increasingly capable of challenging U.S. supremacy on the high seas. As Western defense planners have come to recognize, the rapid Soviet naval buildup after the Second World War, coupled with significant reductions in the size of the U.S. surface fleet, has led to a discernible shift in the balance of power at sea.

One aspect of Soviet naval development that requires attention is Moscow's growing capacity to employ nuclear weapons in the maritime theater. For some time now, Soviet military planners have considered nuclear munitions to be a fundamental component of a larger war-fighting capability. In line with this, the Soviets have promulgated and refined a clear doctrine of nuclear combat that seeks to harness atomic power to Soviet offensive operations, both on land and at sea. Guided by these doctrinal requirements, nuclear munitions have become an essential component of the Soviet naval arsenal. As evidenced by Soviet military literature and naval exercises, nuclear weapons have been closely integrated with a general strategy of sea denial and with a set of battle tactics predicated on winning at sea with less.

The question of Soviet nuclear initiatives at sea is a very important one, indeed. Yet, it has received only limited attention in U.S. war plans. Although U.S. defense planners admit to the possibility that a land conflict might escalate beyond the nuclear threshold, U.S. planning for sea warfare is based on the implicit premise that future naval conflict will remain conventional in scope; the nuclear dimension of Soviet maritime strategy has been effectively ignored.[1] In light of Soviet preparations for

[1] Although the recent literature on the Soviet navy is voluminous, concern about the nuclear dimension of Soviet maritime strategy is all but nonexistent. While it is difficult to deal with this subject

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this contingency — not to mention the divergent requirements for successful prosecution of a nuclear versus a conventional war at sea — continued inattention to the possibility that a Soviet naval campaign might be waged with nuclear munitions promises only untoward consequences for the West.

Victory at Sea

Historically, Soviet naval strategy and force requirements have arisen from markedly different conditions than those underlying U.S. naval posture. As a continental power whose principal interests have traditionally centered on those territories lying contiguous to its borders, the USSR is faced with military problems that, in the past, have called predominantly for the application of ground as opposed to naval forces. In this regard, it has been a long-standing tenet of Soviet maritime strategy that the wartime employment of naval forces should remain subordinate to land-warfare considerations. In contrast to Anglo-American naval doctrine — which, in the tradition of Corbett and Mahan, has stipulated that fleets be employed in an extended and aggressive manner for the purpose of contesting for command of the sea — Soviet naval war plans have typically envisioned close deployments for purposes of direct continental defense and support.

While Soviet naval planners have retained a continental orientation, the way in which they have envisioned naval support of land operations has changed significantly over the past three decades. Bound by tradition and commanding limited resources, the missions of the early postwar Soviet navy were largely confined to securing the seaward flanks and rear areas of the ground forces. While wartime deployments were certainly envisioned beyond the coastal area, the degree to which Soviet forces could effectively operate in the open sea was closely circumscribed by limitations in fleet capability. Although appropriate for the purpose of engaging a continental adversary, such as Germany, the limited reach of the early postwar Soviet navy was inadequate against a maritime power such as the United States. The preponderance of U.S. naval power, as well

at the unclassified level, the fact that Soviet maritime forces are capable of waging a nuclear war at sea is seldom even acknowledged. Among the few studies to deal with this problem are *The Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine for Theater Nuclear Warfare* (McLean, Va.: BDM Corporation, 1977) and Captain Linton F. Brooks, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1980.

In regard to what passes for U.S. naval planning for nuclear warfare, it should be pointed out that, over the years, the Navy has developed a small array of nuclear weapons for use at sea. Defenders of the Navy's position on the nuclear question incorrectly point to this fact in support of their argument that tactical-nuclear conflict has always been seriously considered in U.S. naval war plans. These individuals suffer from the common fallacy that possessing a weapon is equivalent to having a strategy for its employment. The fact remains that U.S. naval posture is predicated on the assumption of conventional war. To assume otherwise would demand important changes in U.S. fleet design and operating concepts.

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as the growing range and destructiveness of naval ordnance, demanded that the Soviet Union expand the range, endurance, and combat qualities of its maritime forces. In an effort to meet these requirements, Soviet blue-water forces have grown steadily in the intervening years. Soviet interest in establishing an open-ocean capability has manifested itself through longer and more extended deployments, high-visibility global exercises, and a growing interest in establishing foreign bases for fleet replenishment and repair. While support for the land theater remains the overriding Soviet naval objective, naval efforts in behalf of land operations will now increasingly take the form of "independent" antifleet action on the high seas.[2]

At the present time, Soviet requirements for victory at sea are defined principally around two defense zones: the inner or "precoastal" zone of the Soviet littoral and the outer or "remote offshore" zone, lying beyond the littoral region.[3] In the European theater, the inner defense perimeter largely corresponds to the Barents, Baltic, and Black seas. While deep-sea control is not a Soviet objective, doctrine does require that control be established over these key maritime areas. In the Soviet view, the prerequisite for strategic sea denial is the creation and maintenance of "favorable operating conditions" for the fleet. This requirement, in turn, establishes the need for control over those waters deemed essential for the subsequent forward deployment of Soviet forces. Beyond the obvious threat posed to Soviet ground operations, failure to command any of these staging or transit zones at the outset of hostilities would have the likely effect of sealing off some percentage of Soviet naval assets from participation in the conflict. If control is not established, a successful breakout at some later time is considered improbable.

Most important, however, control over the inner defense zone is designed to provide a sanctuary for the ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) force, a high percentage of which will be operating in these waters in wartime. Soviet writings on contemporary naval warfare commonly note that, with the outbreak of war, the West intends to destroy promptly all Soviet submarines at sea and maintains for this purpose "increasing surveillance" of each boat from the moment it leaves its home base. Moreover, the West is said to have adopted an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) strategy directed principally at the Soviet SSBN fleet. Despite repeated reference to the difficulties inherent in locating, identifying, and tracking a nuclear submarine, Soviet commentators regard Western ASW capabilities as formidable. Thus, they deem it essential to provide the

[2] Captain First Rank N. V'yunenko, "Naval Support of Ground Forces," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 7, July 1963, pp. 62-63.

[3] For a discussion of the Soviet concept of zonal or area defense, see Robert Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1960) and Michael K. MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 1979, pp. 170-173.

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SSBN fleet with a secure haven for wartime operations. As Western ASW capabilities have grown in sophistication, this mission has been accorded increasing importance.[4]

While the security of the precoastal zone and the defense of the SSBN force remain the chief concerns of the Soviet navy, Soviet naval planners anticipate that the critical fleet engagements of an East-West conflict will take place within the remote offshore defense zone, which in the European theater roughly corresponds to the Norwegian, North, and Eastern Mediterranean seas. At present, the larger Soviet objective in these waters is to deny their control to the West. The reasons for this are twofold. First, disruption of allied sea-control efforts in these areas — the main axes of advance both for the Soviet and Western navies — is considered essential if Soviet forces are to conduct maritime operations in scale throughout the war. Failure to deny command of these areas to the West would not only preclude any large deployment of Soviet forces to the North Atlantic and Western Mediterranean, it would also seriously jeopardize Soviet control over precoastal regions. Second, and of equal importance, is the fact that denial of the outer defense zone to the West promises to have an important impact on the course of the land campaign, both directly (by minimizing the Western naval threat to advancing Soviet ground forces) and indirectly (by opening the way for a Soviet campaign against Western SSBN forces and NATO's sea communications). If in times of war the Soviet navy is successful in denying these areas to the West, it will have realized a key objective and will have instrumentally furthered Soviet efforts on the ground. In the above respects, then, while command of the remote offshore zone is generally considered to be infeasible (given the initial strength of Western naval power), the disruption of allied operations in these waters is essential to the integrity of Soviet continental strategy, both on land and at sea.

In brief, although Moscow's operational objectives have expanded, the overriding purpose of the Soviet navy in a European conflict has remained essentially unchanged since World War II — namely, to

[4]The importance of the SSBN-support mission has also grown in accordance with increasing Soviet interest in protracted nuclear war. While acknowledging the probable decisiveness of the initial period of conflict, Soviet war plans have long considered the possibility that a strategic engagement with the United States might drag on over a period of weeks or months. Although Soviet strategic capabilities have been principally designed around the demands of a swift, decisive campaign, where the course of the war would be determined in a matter of days, in recent years the Soviets have sought to hedge against uncertainty by developing the means to wage and survive an extended engagement. SSBNs withheld from the initial exchange and deployed in defended sanctuaries of the Soviet littoral are likely to constitute the principal component of the Soviet secure-reserve force. The importance of ensuring the survival of these assets is thus evident. The role of the SSBN in Soviet reserve-force planning is discussed in Roger Barnett, "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy," a paper presented at the USAF Conference on Soviet Military-Political Affairs, Reston, Virginia, September 25-27, 1980. For a general discussion of Soviet thinking on protracted nuclear war, see Richard S. Soll, "The Soviet Union and Protracted Nuclear War," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1980.

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facilitate victory on the continent. The paradox faced by Soviet naval planners, though, is that the increasing range and destructive power of modern weaponry has made the realization of this goal at once more difficult and yet more feasible. On the one hand, enemy naval groups must now be engaged at distances far from the central land theater, often beyond the quick-reaction range of land-based air cover. Failure to draw down substantial Western naval forces early in the war will have important consequences on the ground campaign and, should the conflict escalate, on the Soviet Union's larger strategic position. At the same time, however, the "military-technical revolution" in naval warfare has notably improved the expected effectiveness of Soviet maritime forces by enhancing their ability to strike suddenly with a devastating salvo from widely dispersed formations. Nowhere is this more evident than in Soviet preparations for naval nuclear war.

Nuclear Weapons and the Naval Campaign

Soviet naval planners have long prepared for a nuclear war at sea. In stark contrast to U.S. naval doctrine and force structure, which are designed almost exclusively for conventional operations, considerations of nuclear war at sea have had a notable impact on Soviet naval force design and operating concepts. The importance accorded nuclear weapons in Soviet maritime strategy can be ascribed to two planning factors: the need to anticipate theaterwide escalation beyond the nuclear threshold and the need to devise a means of winning at sea from a position of relative inferiority.

First, despite a recent emphasis on conventional force development at sea and on the ground, Soviet general doctrine for theater warfare has not lost its nuclear orientation. Although recognizing that hostilities with the West might begin with a conventional phase, the Soviets anticipate escalation to nuclear war. Particularly in Europe, Soviet views on the likelihood of an East-West conflict remaining conventional are extremely pessimistic. Ironically, it is the very ability of the Soviet armed forces to conduct a successful nonnuclear campaign that is at the heart of this skepticism. Given the magnitude of the consequences, the Soviet Union has consistently held to the view that neither protagonist could afford to accept the defeat of its European-theater force and the loss of vital territories without first employing every means in their defense. It follows that NATO, if it should find itself unable to blunt a Soviet conventional offensive, will have no recourse but to resort to the nuclear option in a final attempt to halt the Soviet advance. Doctrine suggests that, in light of this possibility, the Soviet armed forces, both at sea and on the ground, must be capable of converting to nuclear operations without

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warning. Given NATO's vulnerability, a conventional conflict in Europe could escalate to nuclear war at a moment's notice, and Soviet land and naval units must not be caught unaware or unprepared.

The second, and perhaps more significant, factor influencing Soviet preparations for naval nuclear war has been the need to meet the special problem of engaging and defeating an adversary that possesses general superiority at sea. Although strategic sea denial is certainly a less demanding wartime goal than deep-sea control, Soviet naval planners continue to face the difficulty of matching ends with means. Despite an impressive building program, the Soviet fleet remains a fragile force. While programs are under way to upgrade combat endurance, the Soviet navy is largely composed of small, lightly protected, and generally expendable combatants. The net result is that Soviet maritime forces, although closely supported by an impressive land-based air capability, generally lack the staying power required to prosecute a naval war of attrition successfully.[5] Soviet naval planners recognize that they must win the campaign at sea quickly, or they are not likely to win at all. In an effort to compensate for its shortcomings and provide the edge necessary to win at sea with the outbreak of war, the Soviet navy has turned to nuclear weapons. The timely use of nuclear munitions against an unprepared opponent promises to deliver decisive results. Following Soviet naval doctrine in general, employment of these weapons is designed to allow an otherwise inferior force to win with less.[6]

In line with these planning requirements, Soviet maritime forces have been configured for nuclear operations since the late 1950s. During this time, the use of nuclear weapons at sea has been widely discussed in the Soviet navy's professional literature and has been manifest in Soviet naval exercises. In contrast to NATO employment policy, which views nuclear weapons as a "last gasp" substitute for conventional operations, the evidence suggests that the Soviet navy has made nuclear weapons a *primary* capability in its inventory. From the Soviet perspec-

[5] It would seem that the Soviet Union is aware of this deficiency and has begun to build warships of greater endurance in an effort to rectify the problem. The Soviet navy's new 22,000-ton battle cruiser/command ship *Kirov*, the lead ship of an expected class of five, is an example of this "new look." By their nature, however, fleets are slow to change. The lead time associated with designing, constructing, and finally deploying a new class of warships is long. Thus, although recent Soviet naval developments almost certainly portend a new approach to fleet design, the plan will evolve slowly. With this in mind, it is fair to say that the Soviet navy will retain much of its present character for years to come despite its present building program. An insightful discussion of current Soviet naval force structure and associated tactical doctrine can be found in Norman Friedman, "U.S. vs. Soviet Style in Fleet Design," in Paul J. Murphy, ed., *Naval Power in Soviet Policy* (Washington: GPO, Studies in Communist Affairs, 1978), vol. 2. For a discussion of recent developments and possible future directions in the Soviet navy, see Michael McGwire, "A New Trend in Soviet Naval Developments," *International Defense Review*, no. 5, 1980.

[6] An elaboration on this aspect of Soviet naval doctrine can be found in Gordon H. McCormick and Daniel Gouré, "Soviet Concepts for Naval Warfare," a paper presented at the USAF Conference on Soviet Military-Political Affairs, Reston, Virginia, September 25-27, 1980.

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tive, modern naval warfare reduces to a matter of killing quickly or quickly being killed. Admiral Gorshkov has repeatedly expressed this concept as the "struggle for the first salvo." It should not be surprising that, in an effort to maximize the lethality of the first salvo, and quickly seize the initiative at sea, the Soviets might well use nuclear weapons in the opening attack. Over the past decade, with advances in missile technologies and the general development of the Soviet fleet, the ability to employ nuclear weapons in the maritime theater has been expanded and refined, until today it might be considered the type of combat for which the Soviet navy is best prepared.[7]

In preparing for a nuclear war at sea, Soviet planners have sought to exploit the fundamental weakness of the U.S. Navy—an extreme concentration of combat power. The standard configuration of U.S. forces operating on the high seas is that of the carrier battle group, comprising an attack carrier and supporting escorts. Given the relatively low number of major U.S. combatants, each battle group is an important percentage of the Navy's aggregate capability. At the same time, offensive force capabilities within the battle group itself have been increasingly concentrated in the large attack carrier, while the remainder of the surface fleet has gradually assumed the mission of carrier support and defense. Although the offense-defense division of labor is not an absolute one, this condition has evolved to the point where, in the absence of carrier aviation, the U.S. Navy would be hard pressed to perform its essential wartime functions. With this in mind, the Soviets have made the U.S. fleet carrier the principal surface target of their maritime forces.

Although still capable of conducting a conventional sea war, U.S. surface forces stand singularly vulnerable to nuclear attack.[8] Given the permeability of fleet air defenses, the wartime success of the carrier group is predicated on its ability to absorb some small number of hits without breaking off operations for any extended period of time. While this might be expected in a conventional engagement, it will not be the case under conditions of nuclear attack. Despite the carrier's ability to withstand conventional fire, one nuclear hit will prove quite sufficient to end its operating life. Since the surface navy is generally not hardened against nuclear effects, the same result can be expected from detonations in its near vicinity. Indeed, because of the relatively tight tactical formation of the battle group, the Navy faces the prospect of suffering multiple kills from a single detonation. Aware of these potential payoffs, Gorshkov, discussing the wartime employment of Soviet naval aviation, has noted

[7] See *Boyevoi put' sovetskogo voyenno-morskogo flota* [The Combat Path of the Soviet Navy] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974), p. 493.

[8] U.S. naval vulnerability to nuclear attack is discussed in Gordon H. McCormick, *Problems of Sea Control in Theater Nuclear War* (Arlington, Va.: System Planning Corporation, April 1980).

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pointedly that increases in the range of air-to-surface missiles, coupled with recent improvements in the means of overcoming fleet air defenses, "have made aviation nuclear-missile strikes on sea targets practically irresistible."[9]

Soviet naval doctrine also directs that nuclear weapons be employed in the ASW campaign, both against the enemy's SSBN fleet and against attack submarines attempting to penetrate Soviet SSBN operating areas. Of particular concern in this regard is the strategic ASW effort against Western ballistic-missile submarines, a problem that, perhaps more than any other facing Soviet naval planners, resists a nonnuclear solution. As noted, the elimination of enemy SSBNs will be a mission of great importance from the outset of any war with the West. As currently deployed, U.S., British, and French SSBNs pose a serious threat to Soviet theater objectives and, in the event of escalation, to the very survival of the Soviet state. Although the anti-SSBN mission has grown in importance as a larger percentage of U.S. strategic forces have been put to sea, the difficulties involved in prosecuting this mission have increased dramatically with advances in submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) range. As with Moscow's naval planning generally, the Soviet navy, in an attempt to compensate for its limited capabilities in the area of blue-water ASW, has again turned to the nuclear solution. What Soviet ASW forces cannot target selectively with conventional means, they are prepared to strike indiscriminately with nuclear munitions. The use of large nuclear weapons by aircraft and dispersed surface ships and submarines, together with area-sanitization strikes by the Strategic Rocket Forces, is probably the favored tactic in this regard.[10]

A similar, if less severe, problem is posed by the West's hunter-killer submarines, which will be operating against Soviet SSBN havens in the event of war. In light of growing Soviet interest in the possibility of protracted confict, and the fact that the Soviets have invested such an important part of their strategic reserve in the SSBN fleet, its defense may well be the most important mission of the Soviet navy. Although the SSBN-support mission is inherently more tractable than that of seeking out and destroying the enemy's SSBNs, which will most certainly be operating in the open sea, Soviet conventional ASW capabilities may again prove to be wanting. Despite the enormous resources the Soviets are investing

[9] S. G. Gorshkov, *Morskaya moshch gosudarstva* [Sea Power of the State], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979), p. 345. See, also, Admiral N. M. Kharlomov, "Tendencies in the Development of Naval Fleets," *Morskoi Sbornik*, no. 1, January 1966, p. 34.

[10] Of special interest here is the possible Soviet use of SLBMs against naval targets. For recent discussions on this subject, see Commander Richard T. Ackley, "The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1978, and Lieutenant Commander Carl H. Clawson, Jr., "The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs—Round Two," ibid., March 1980. See, also, Norman Polmar, "Thinking About Soviet ASW," ibid., May 1976, p. 126.

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to bolster their capabilities in this area, the problem of *reliably* detecting, tracking, and killing a submarine continues to elude them. Consequently, and because of the importance of the pro-SSBN mission in Soviet strategy, it is quite possible that the Soviet navy will employ nuclear weapons against Western attack submarines should these pose a serious challenge to the security of its SSBN sanctuaries. Nuclear weapons are once again regarded by the Soviet navy as the surest means of carrying out a vital mission, and the doctrinal evidence suggests that Moscow will not be reluctant to exercise this option if it is deemed to be critical to the survival of a secure reserve force.

Nuclear Weapons and Fleet Tactics

In the absence of material superiority at sea, the Soviets have sought to design a navy and associated battle doctrine capable of defeating the West by means of the inventive employment of limited assets. Surprise, concentration, and the use of combined forces are central to this goal. When attacking enemy fleet groups, the Soviet navy will seek to employ air, surface, and submarine forces in unison and without warning in an effort to saturate and confuse the target's air defenses and thus ensure penetration. As suggested, these tactics will be directed primarily against capital warships in an attempt to benefit from the economies associated with their destruction. In the words of one Soviet flag officer, Soviet tactical doctrine for naval engagement calls for "heterogeneous forces to attack the enemy from different directions using different weapons and, at the same time, to prevent his evading the blows. As a result the enemy sustains heavy losses with minimum losses to the attacker." Because of the rather unfavorable overall balance at sea, he continued, "it is most important that the results of such a pressure exceed the sum of the blows [attacks] delivered by separate ships, aircraft or groups engaged in battle."[11]

These are the necessary tactics of an otherwise inferior force. To implement such a plan successfully, however, is not without its special difficulties. Notable among these is the problem of coordinating an attack that will use a diverse group of platforms moving toward their intended target from different points and at varying speeds.[12] If the Soviets are to maximize their chances of saturating enemy fleet defenses, close synchronization will be essential. Should the attacking force launch out of sequence, saturation will not be realized. Likewise, if Soviet forces are

[11] Rear Admiral G. Kostev, "Naval Forces' Cooperation," *Soviet Military Review*, no. 8, 1980, p. 39.

[12] Soviet naval command and control problems are well illustrated by Norman Friedman in "C³ War at Sea," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1977.

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decoyed into firing against false targets, the attack will fail. This problem becomes potentially severe in light of the limited or nonexistent reload capability of most Soviet combatants. For Soviet forces to concentrate effectively against the enemy, they must empty their batteries in the first salvo. Piecemeal attacks run the risk of being defeated in sequence and in detail. By focusing their efforts on the first salvo, Soviet forces, while increasing their chances for initial success, will also have effectively disarmed themselves in firing. In the event that initial efforts go unrewarded, there will probably be no second chance.

Difficulties will also be faced should the Soviets attempt to strike with surprise in the opening salvo of a future sea war, an option that is given much attention in their naval literature. Beyond the standard coordination problem, the central difficulty in designing a surprise attack is to ensure that sufficient forces arrive in the battle area without alerting the intended target. The expected value of attacking with surprise must thus be weighed against the fact that in order to achieve surprise, it may be necessary to strike with a force mix that would be less than optimal under "normal" wartime conditions. In planning a surprise strike against U.S. forces operating in the waters surrounding Europe, the Soviet Union would face this problem. The source of the difficulty is that while Soviet naval vessels regularly sail within close proximity of U.S. combatants, air support for any proposed attack would be required to fly some distance to arrive in the battle area. Any such movement of aircraft could serve to forewarn U.S. forces of Soviet intentions, thus eliminating the element of surprise. In planning an attack, then, the Soviet Union could be faced with the choice of risking the loss of surprise, in an effort to achieve local force preponderance with land-based aircraft, or maximizing the chances of surprise by striking U.S. forces with those naval units regularly deployed in the vicinity of the fleet.

Although the difficulties associated with employing a combined force en masse and with surprise could serve to limit the potential effectiveness of the Soviet navy under conditions of conventional war, this will not necessarily be the case in a nuclear environment. Unlike the U.S. surface fleet, which in certain respects stands singularly vulnerable to nuclear attack, the use of nuclear weapons at sea serves only to underwrite Soviet naval capabilities by minimizing the uncertainty surrounding Soviet tactics for fleet engagement. To an important degree, firepower and tactics are substitutes. Superiority in one category may well compensate for inferiority in the other. Thus, in using nuclear weapons against heavily defended targets, the Soviets will have provided themselves with a large margin for error in the manner in which they go about employing their forces. Should close coordination between attacking units break down, as it is often wont to do in the fog of battle, formidable results might still be

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expected owing to the sheer firepower provided by nuclear munitions. Similarly, under conditions of nuclear war at sea, Soviet commanders are not likely to face the choice of striking with surprise or possibly sacrificing surprise in an attempt to achieve local superiority. The unexpected use of nuclear weapons by even a relatively small group of Soviet combatants will provide them with both.

In contrast to NATO employment concepts, Soviet doctrine recognizes no value in selectively employing nuclear weapons as a means of signaling resolve or as a way of limiting the ultimate scope of their use within a theater. To do so would serve only to alert one's opponent and eliminate the advantage inherent in striking with surprise. In the event nuclear weapons are to be used at sea, doctrine calls for their extensive and intensive employment, the object being to maximize their initial effectiveness and perhaps preclude a response in kind. In line with this objective, the Soviets emphasize the need to "anticipate" any NATO use of nuclear weapons and to strike pre-emptively in an effort to destroy the balance of the opponent's nuclear-capable forces before they can be employed. As indicated recently by Professor, Rear-Admiral N. Pavlovich, "forestalling the enemy has always been one of the most important elements in facilitating achievement of the effectiveness of strikes and the seizure of the initiative." In light of the increasing destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the speed with which weapons can today be delivered against their targets, "the importance of pre-emptive attack has grown in recent years, since the beginning period of the war" could well prove to be decisive in determining victory or defeat.[13]

Should the Soviets choose to go nuclear at sea, it is probable that conventional and nuclear weapons will be used in combination. Rather than view conventional and nuclear weapons as potential war-fighting alternatives, where nuclear munitions are considered to be a hedge against failure of the conventional campaign, the Soviets have traditionally considered them to be complementary. Conventional and nuclear weapons, jointly employed and properly integrated, are clearly thought to be mutually supportive. Ultimately, however, the need to employ conventional and nuclear munitions simultaneously will likely be made urgent by the mixed weapon loadouts and the limited or non-existent reload capability of most Soviet combatants. While details of the conventional-nuclear weapons mix on Soviet warships are fragmentary, it is known that major combatants carry some combination of nuclear and nonnuclear munitions. At the present time, the warheads on these weapons are not interchangeable aboard ship. Therefore, should the Soviets

[13] "Basic Factors in the Development of the Art of Naval Warfare," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* [Military Historical Journal], no. 12, December 1974, p. 12.

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choose to withhold shipborne nuclear munitions, this will have the effect of partially disarming nuclear-capable combatants. This problem is further complicated by the generally limited ability of Soviet units to reload surface-to-surface weapons. The net result is that without the employment of available nuclear munitions, Soviet strike capabilities at sea will be seriously circumscribed.

While admitting to the superiority of nuclear weapons as a means of naval combat, the Soviet navy in the last fifteen years has sought to enhance its conventional capabilities at sea. During this period, Gorshkov and other naval leaders have continually stressed the need for a "balanced" navy, capable of successfully waging not only a nuclear war but "any possible war." In this vein, it has been stated that nuclear munitions "cannot completely replace" surface vessels and aircraft armed with conventional weapons. Although this might be seen by some as a Soviet attempt to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in naval warfare, in the view of the authors these moves should be considered in the same light as Soviet efforts to upgrade conventional capabilities on the ground. Rather than replacing atomic weapons as a means of waging a naval campaign, these efforts can better be seen as an attempt to redress the earlier capabilities imbalance resulting from an excessively high priority accorded nuclear operations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In this regard, the expansion of Soviet naval general-purpose forces is motivated partly by the desire to provide the political leadership with the broadest array of military options, partly by the need to augment the Soviet ability to intervene in local conflicts, and partly by a recognition of the fact that nuclear weapons are simply unsuitable for some purposes. In the end, however, the Soviets evidently consider the exclusive use of conventional weapons to be appropriate only in "small wars," where the vital interests of neither superpower are at risk. Under conditions where the central interests of the United States and the USSR lie in jeopardy, Soviet military theoreticians posit a high probability, if not the inevitability, of escalation at sea. With this in mind, Soviet naval forces remain indoctrinated, trained, and exercised primarily for nuclear warfare.

Questions of Timing and Escalation

It is clear that the U.S. Navy has been remiss in preparing for the day when the Soviet Union might employ nuclear weapons in a future naval war. Although the problem of tactical-nuclear weapons in land warfare has received close attention for many years, consideration of their use at sea is notable only for its absence. In light of the potential consequences, the lack of interest in maritime nuclear war is difficult to explain. Although conclusions as to the level of damage the Soviets might inflict

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upon U.S. naval forces are importantly a function of the scenario and circumstances one chooses to adopt (and thus impossible to determine a priori), it is not too much to state that the ability of the Navy to prosecute its missions successfully in a nuclear environment stands in serious doubt.[14] Because of the importance of assured maritime access in U.S. strategic planning, this will, in turn, have unfortunate consequences for any general U.S. war effort.

Assuming that U.S. naval planners have not simply ignored the problem of nuclear war at sea, one can plausibly explain their neglect by reference to the conventional wisdom that Soviet war plans strictly subordinate the naval engagement to the interests of the land campaign. From this premise, most observers go on to assume that the use of nuclear weapons at sea would be conditioned by their first-use on land. Since NATO anticipates that the initial phase of a Soviet theater offensive on the ground will be conventional in scope, it is apparently expected that Western naval forces will be given an opportunity to decide the outcome of the naval war with conventional means or, failing that, to pre-empt the Soviet navy's use of nuclear weapons. While this argument is certainly comforting, there is much to suggest that it may not prove accurate. From the point of view of Soviet general doctrine and the strategic problem facing the Soviet leadership in a European war, there are some compelling reasons to believe that nuclear weapons will be employed very early in a future sea war, before they are used on land.

First, although in a broad sense it is true that the Soviets have gone to sea principally to attain their objectives on land, it does not follow that the course of the land campaign will necessarily dictate the tactics and weapons employed by the Soviet fleet. Soviet strategy allows for, indeed requires, the use of different "forms and methods" of armed struggle in various theaters, in conformity with the special operating conditions faced by Soviet forces.[15] As we have shown above, the military problem facing the Soviet high command on land and sea is, in fact, quite different. On the ground, of course, the conventional balance decidedly favors the Soviet Union. In recognition of this asymmetry, Western theater doctrine clearly holds open the possibility that NATO will be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a land campaign, should conventional means prove insufficient to blunt a Soviet advance. At sea, the opposite situation prevails. Indeed, the case can be made that in a conventional conflict Moscow would at present find itself at a greater disadvantage in the maritime theater than that faced by NATO on the ground. Given this situation, and in light of NATO's own rationale for the first-use of nuclear weapons, it

[14] See McCormick, *Problems of Sea Control*, pp. 24-29.

[15] Colonel V. Ye. Savkin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* (Washington: GPO, 1976), pp. 52-152.

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is difficult to conclude that the Soviet navy will not consider using nuclear munitions quite early in a European war if, by doing so, they provide themselves with the means to achieve a swift and decisive victory at sea.

Second, victory at sea is important for Soviet success on the ground, and critical to a favorable war outcome should a European-theater conflict escalate to a strategic exchange. As noted, Soviet European naval strategy is predicated on securing control of "precoastal" areas and denying the enemy access to the Norwegian, North, and Eastern Mediterranean seas. Beyond the opportunity costs incurred, failure to accomplish these objectives early in a future East-West war could serve to compromise the land campaign, by opening the way for Western flanking operations by sea, and could endanger the Soviet Union's larger strategic position by placing at risk Soviet SSBNs concentrated in the vicinity of the Kola Peninsula. In defense of these objectives, the Soviet navy anticipates waging a climactic engagement for the "remote offshore" zone at the very onset of war. The point that warrants repeating is that they cannot afford to lose this battle. Because of the limited combat endurance of the Soviet fleet, it is improbable that having once forfeited control of these areas to the West, Soviet maritime forces will succeed in realizing their objectives at some later time. With this in mind, it seems unlikely that the West will be given an opportunity to bring its greater conventional naval power to bear before the Soviets escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. In light of the importance of the maritime theater in Soviet war plans and the Soviet inability to prosecute successfully a protracted naval campaign, it would seem more likely that the Soviet navy will attempt to win quickly with the "minimum expenditure of forces and means" by exercising the nuclear option very early in a future European war.

Finally, there are a number of important constraints inhibiting the early use of nuclear weapons on land that appear to be less binding in the maritime theater. Foremost among these is the specter of general war. Strategic parity notwithstanding, the Soviet Union has yet to accept the notion that a nuclear war on the continent can be reliably prevented from escalating to a central conflict.[16] In the Soviet view, however, this problem is not similarly confronted at sea. The source of this distinction lies in the Soviet concept of escalation, which views the escalatory process primarily as a function of target location rather than of the "military-technical" designation of a weapon system. Specifically, the theater use of nuclear weapons is generally not considered sufficient to alter the essential nature of the conflict or its political goals. A *qualitative* change in the character of a theater war would seem to occur only when the

[16] See, for example, Major General V. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 5, May 1969, p. 61.

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homeland of either superpower is subjected to attack. At such time, the conflict can be expected to escalate to central war. In this view, a nuclear strike against targets in the western USSR, even if conducted solely by NATO theater forces in or around Europe, could well precipitate general war by compelling the Soviet Union to retaliate against the continental United States.[17] In the same way, however, the Soviet Union would not regard the use of nuclear weapons at sea to be similarly provocative. If the employment of nuclear weapons per se is not considered to be a significant step toward general escalation and if one assumes the Soviets project their own keen sense of self-preservation onto U.S. decisionmakers, then open-ocean nuclear operations against Western naval forces will not be regarded as appreciably increasing the risk of central war, insofar as the homelands of the two superpowers will remain unaffected.

Related to this is the problem of collateral damage, which serves as an important constraint on both sides to the use of nuclear weapons on land, but will have little or no effect on the decision to use nuclear weapons at sea. Soviet interest in minimizing collateral damage stems not from a benign concern about civilian casualties, but from a realistic appreciation of the close link between the level of collateral destruction and the probability of punitive escalation. No matter how selectively the Soviets attempt to target Western Europe, destruction to the civilian sector will be extraordinarily high in any land war employing nuclear weapons. The Soviets are aware that as collateral destruction rises, the likelihood of retaliation against targets in the Soviet Union will grow accordingly. As noted, such a response could very well precipitate further escalation, an outcome that the Soviet Union would clearly prefer to avoid. A similar constraint, however, is not faced at sea, where collateral damage from the use of nuclear weapons will be minimal or nonexistent. For this reason, as well, should the Soviets employ nuclear weapons at sea while conducting a conventional campaign on the ground, they would do so in the belief that the risk of further escalation had not risen significantly. The same constraint that had inhibited the early Soviet use of nuclear weapons on land—namely, the fear of widespread collateral destruction and the attendant risk of escalation—would now bind the West from responding with nuclear ground attack of its own.

In summary, it is the lower probability of general escalation at sea, coupled with the significant advantages accruing to the Soviet Union from the unexpected use of nuclear weapons against forward-deployed naval forces, that has persuaded the authors that a future European war

[17] See A. M. Mil'shtein and L. S. Semeiko, "The Problem of the Inadmissability of Nuclear Conflict (On New Approaches of the USA)," *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* [USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology], no. 11, November 1974, pp. 4-11. See, also, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, ed. and trans. by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 13.

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may well begin with a nuclear blitz in the maritime theater, without a concurrent nuclear strike on land. The object of this strategy would be to neutralize Western naval forces at the outset of hostilities, by exploiting their high vulnerability to nuclear attack and delimiting the range of feasible options open to the West in response. When considering this possibility, it is well to remember that there are two ways for the Soviets to win militarily in Europe. Geography has provided them with the choice of engaging and defeating NATO on land, the war at sea being a secondary campaign, or focusing their efforts on the maritime theater, thereby bounding their military problem on the Continent. While the Soviets have traditionally shown a preference for the former approach, the latter strategy offers the promise of high return at relatively low risk. More important, in preparing for a nuclear war at sea, the Soviet navy is developing the means to implement such a strategy should it so choose. In this regard, although winning the war in Europe by insulating the continent may not be the strategy with which the Soviets enter the conflict, it is a potential result of a successful *nuclear* surprise attack at sea.

Although different in some of the particulars, such a strategy is not without historical precedent. It will be recalled that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was predicated on the assumption that if the American battle fleet could be eliminated at the outbreak of war, Japan would be given the opportunity to attain and consolidate its objectives in Asia before the United States could mount an effective response. Tokyo hoped that the United States, faced with the destruction of its Pacific fleet, would acquiesce in Japanese hegemony in the Far East and seek an early end to the war. The important point here is not that Japan miscalculated and was ultimately defeated, but that the U.S. fleet's high vulnerability to surprise attack invited the miscalculation and helped precipitate the conflict. While the vulnerability of the Pacific fleet in 1941 was owing to its being bottled up at a single anchorage, today's Navy stands vulnerable because it has concentrated such a high percentage of its strike assets aboard such a very small number of warships, warships that are at present almost impossible to defend against nuclear attack. While the loss even of capital combatants is naturally to be anticipated in any major ocean war, the expected survivability of forward-deployed naval forces under conditions of nuclear war at sea is incomparably low. Given this unhappy state of affairs, it is possible that, in the opening phase of a future European war, the United States could find itself effectively isolated from the Continent and unable to determine the course of events in other distant strategic areas.

In the end, the available evidence offers no hint as to the circumstances under which the Soviet navy would confine itself to the use of conventional weapons in a European war. By contrast, there is much

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to suggest that nuclear munitions will be employed at sea very early in such a conflict, if not from the outset. In the Soviet view, the unexpected use of nuclear weapons against naval targets maximizes the lethality of the first salvo, minimizes the uncertainties associated with the "fog of war," and, above all, promises to be the most effective means of shifting the correlation of naval power dramatically in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet style of sea warfare is utilitarian and unadorned: if the means to achieve victory are at hand, they must be employed massively and without warning, for delay can serve no useful purpose. In assessing the nature of the Soviet naval challenge, U.S. defense planners would thus be well served to heed Lenin's admonition that "one must conduct war properly or not at all." With this in mind, it is only prudent that the U.S. Navy anticipate the possibility that the Soviet Union, in an effort to win at sea from a position of general inferiority, will employ nuclear weapons against Western naval groups very early in a future European conflict.

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CONTREPOINT

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE

Directeur: Yvan Blot

SOMMAIRE

15 Avril 1981 — No. 37

Daryush Shayegan: *Pourquoi le colloque de Cordoue?*
Pierre Solié: *Physique et psychanalyse*

Cyrille Henkine: *L'émigration russe et le KGB*
Michel Schneider: *Le terrorisme face aux médias*
Suzanne Labin: *Les maîtres occultes des terroristes*

Emmanuel Ransford: *Contre la dénatalité (II)*

Dossier: La Tradition Republicaine

Yvan Blot; Pierre Charpy; Pierre Chatenet;
Julien Freund; Pierre Saulière

Contrepointes

Ricardo Paseyro: *Un étrange duo*
David Mata: *Lire Ortega y Gasset*
Olivier Adam: *Art, civilisation, technique*

Chroniques

Georges Elgozy: *Vive l'Opéra*
Jacques Richard: *La grande pitié des cinémas de France*

Notes de Lecture

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PROBLEMS OF ALBANIAN NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA*

by Pedro Ramet

Despite Yugoslavia's recurrent problems with ethnocentric chauvinism and separatism, and despite the deep scars of World War II — a time when the country's major nationalities went to war with one another — Yugoslav spokesmen recently expressed confidence that the federal government had in fact largely succeeded in pacifying and diminishing ethnic friction. In a bold articulation of this claim, Edvard Kardelj, long-time chief ideologue of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), wrote in 1975 that "in Yugoslavia we have in large part resolved the national question in the classical sense of that concept."[1] The explanation for this, Dusan Icevic suggested, was that socialism laid down the "objective preconditions" for the equality of nationalities.[2] Even Kosovo, long recognized as a sore point in Yugoslav policy, was said to be enjoying increased harmony. A high-ranking Kosovan Serb went so far as to claim in 1978 that "interethnic relations [in Kosovo today] are stable as never before."[3]

The convenient fiction of ethnic harmony crumbled in April 1981 when large-scale anti-Yugoslav demonstrations spread from the University of Pristina through most of the predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo. Belgrade declared a state of emergency, sending in the Yugoslav National Army, backed up by security-service detachments from other federal units. After three days, the demonstrations were suppressed for the most part, but riots, boycotts of classes, dissemination of secessionist literature, and repeated acts of arson and sabotage continued

* This article is derived from research conducted while the author was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Belgrade, during the 1979–1980 academic year.

For another view of the situation in Yugoslavia, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein's essay in this issue's "Reflections on the Quarter"—Ed.

[1] Edvard Kardelj, *Socijalisticko samoupravljanje u nasem ustavnom sistemu* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1975), excerpted in *Nacionalno pitanje u djelima klasika marksizma i u dokumentima i praksi kpj/skj* (Zagreb: Center Drustvenih Djelatnosti SSOH, 1978), p. 408.

[2] Dusan Icevic, *Nacija i samoupravljanje* (Titograd: NIP Pobjeda, 1976), excerpted in *Nacionalno pitanje*, p. 396.

[3] Dusan Ristic, "Kosovo i Savez Komunista Kosova izmedju dva kongresa i dve konferencije," *Obelezja*, March-April 1978, pp. 25-26.

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through spring and into early summer.[4] Trains were derailed, and unexplained fires inflicted varying degrees of damage to the power station in Kosovo Polje, the furniture factory in Urosevac, and numerous other installations and buildings. Meanwhile, there were repeated reports of Kosovan Albanians singing nationalistically antagonistic songs.[5] Even in midsummer a state of siege prevailed, with 30,000 troops and police — all non-Serbs — patrolling the province as an occupation force, and with all incoming and outgoing traffic scrupulously checked. Outsiders were generally barred from entering the province. Most disconcerting of all was the threat that the eruptions in Kosovo might incite nationalist fever in other parts of the polyglot country, undermining Yugoslavia's stability and calling into question its institutional foundations.

Nationalism as a Problem

Most modern European states rely to a great extent on the sentiment of national community — or nationalism as collective affect — to bear them through crises and provide the necessary slack or freedom to make unpopular decisions. Emotional devotion to the nation is manipulated to reinforce political loyalty and to buttress political and social order. In multiethnic states, however, nationalism can constitute a threat rather than a resource and must be either redefined or suppressed. Yugoslavia's population (40 per cent Serbian, 22 per cent Croatian, 8 per cent Muslim, 8 per cent Slovenian, 7 per cent Albanian, 6 per cent Macedonian, and 9 per cent others) does not even recognize a Yugoslav nationality. After an abortive campaign in the 1950s to foster a sense of "integral Yugoslavism" as the prelude to the creation of a Yugoslav nationality, Belgrade has had to content itself with making appeals to a much poorer surrogate, Yugoslav socialist patriotism, defined as "the consciousness, feeling and love of the socialist self-managing community."[6] In a country in which just over 1 per cent of the population identified themselves as "Yugoslavs" in the most recent census, the nationalism of the different groups, capable of festering into separatism, has remained the primary source of group and individual identity.

At the beginning of the 1970s, various observers[7] speculated that spiraling Croatian nationalist demands might lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia altogether, and Milovan Djilas, one-time vice president of

[4] See *NIN*, April 17, 1981; also, Tanjug Domestic Service, June 3, 1981, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 4, 1981.

[5] See *Borba*, June 7, 1981, Tanjug, June 6, 1981, and *Vjesnik*, June 11, 1981, all trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *East Europe Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs*, June 24, 1981. Also see *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 20, 1981.

[6] Milan M. Miladinovic, "Pojam i sustina jugoslovenskog patriotizma danas," *Obelezja*, November-December 1977, p. 1153.

[7] See, for example, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Yugoslav Succession Crisis in Perspective," *World Affairs*, Fall 1972.

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Yugoslavia, forecast that by the year 2024, the country will have broken up into four ministates: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia.[8]

While Croatian nationalism and its political consequences represented the principal threat to the integrity and stability of the Yugoslav federation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, by the late 1970s Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo had become new loci of ethnocentric malaise; and, indeed, both the Muslim question and the persistent separatist sentiment among Yugoslavia's Albanians have since been increasingly prominent on the political agenda.[9] Today, rising nationalism among the Albanians in Kosovo is probably the most critical source of disequilibrium in the country. While Yugoslav hard-liners had attempted to link the Croatian nationalist movement with the rising middle class, and thus to stigmatize it as "unproletarian,"[10] such a label is thoroughly inapplicable to the situation in Kosovo, where nationalist discontent is in good measure a product of perceived economic deprivation.

Roots of Resentment in Kosovo

More than a third of the 3.5 million or more of the world's Albanians live in Yugoslavia. Most of these (1.2 million) live in Kosovo, with another 300,000 in western Macedonia (near lakes Prespa and Ohrid and in the valley of the Crni Drim), and an additional 40-50,000 in Montenegro (near Ulcinj, along the Albanian frontier).[11] During World War II, the Kosovo region was attached to Albania, and for several years after the war Albanian guerrilla groups held out in Kosovo, desperately resisting reincorporation into Yugloslavia. The amount of latent tension between Serbs and Albanians in the 1950s and early 1960s is uncertain; on the surface was a general calm, even with the periodic rumors of repression and even massacre of Albanians by the Yugoslav secret police. The marked deterioration in Serb-Albanian relations is usually traced to 1966, when revelations of Serbian dominance of the governmental, party, and security apparatus in Kosovo inflamed resentment among the Kosovan Albanians.

That the province should so long have remained relatively tranquil must be attributed, on the one hand, to Kosovo's educational and

[8] Milovan Djilas, cited in "A World Atlas for 2024," *Saturday Review*, August 24, 1974, and excerpted in *Croatia Press*, September-December 1974, p. 10.

[9] Two recent studies of Yugoslavia's Muslims are: K. F. Cviic, "Yugoslavia's Moslem Problem," *The World Today*, March 1980, and Zachary Irwin, "Religion in a Multi-Confessional Society: The Special Case of Yugoslavia's Moslems," a paper presented at the International Studies Association/South meeting, University of Georgia, Athens, October 4-6, 1979.

[10] Cf. Dusan Dragosavac: "Diverse nationalistic forces, whether hegemonistic or separatist, have at base the same goal—to assure material privileges." ("O nekim aspektima medjunacionalnih odnosa," in *Udruzeni rad i medjunacionalni odnosi* [Belgrade: Komunist, 1978], p. 125.)

[11] *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), June 20, 1980, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, August 13, 1980; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 9, 1981.

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economic backwardness and, on the other, to Kosovo's lack of integration into the Yugoslav mainstream. As late as 1971, 36 per cent of Kosovo's Albanians were officially illiterate; since the statistics fail to distinguish between formal and working literacy, however, the actual level of illiteracy among the Albanians is in fact much worse.[12] The situation is aggravated by a patriarchal proclivity in Albanian families to keep their female children out of school — a practice that makes combating illiteracy and improving the educational system that much more difficult.[13] Even in 1974-75, 564 Kosovan towns and villages lacked elementary schools, and many were hampered by the lack of good roads to bus children.

George Orwell observed in *The Road to Wigan Pier:* "Talking once with a miner I asked him when the housing shortage first became acute in his district; he answered, 'When we were told about it.'"[14] Similarly, it was not until the revelations by the League of Communists of Serbia in 1966 of gross, systematic discrimination against the Albanians (perpetrated by the Serb-dominated secret police under Aleksandar Rankovic) that the Albanians began to demonstrate a visible rancor vis-à-vis the status quo. Hence — ironic as it may seem — "escalation of group tensions may be a sign of integration" of new groups into the political life of the community.[15]

As Rankovic's power base eroded and the truth of his practices in Kosovo came to light, the demand for reform became irresistible. The Serbian party central committee unburdened itself of the frank, if timidly worded, admission that even "in the new socialist socio-economic and democratic relations there are things in inter-ethnic relations which must be further changed and developed in order to realize full nationality equality and the brotherhood and unity of the nations of Yugoslavia."[16] The session did not restrain itself to this tepid formulation, issuing a condemnation of "certain sections of the State Security Apparatus" (that is, Rankovic's domain) for discriminatory and illegal practices "entirely contrary to the LCY program and the Yugoslav constitution" — especially concerning the Albanians. The subsequent meeting of the central committee of the LCY, convening in July 1966 to review conditions in Kosovo, amplified this judgment and warned of Serbian nationalism within the ranks of the League of Communists itself. The consensus was that Greater Serbian nationalism was stimulating Greater Albanian separatism and

[12] Hivzi Islami, "Kretanje nepismenosti u Albanaca u Jugoslaviji," *Sociologija*, vol. 20, nos. 2-3, 1978, pp. 315-316.

[13] Ibid., p. 320. See, also, Milenko Karan, "Zene Kosova izmedju obicajnih pravila, savremenih prilika i samoupravnih zahteva," *Zena*, vol. 34, no. 6, 1975.

[14] Quoted in Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 92.

[15] Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 20.

[16] "Sesta sednica CK SK Srbije" (1966), in *Zadaci SK Srbije u razvoju medjunacionalnih odnosa i borbi protiv nacionalizma* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1978), p. 113.

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therefore had to be expunged.[17] It is significant that Albanian separatism was identified as a problem at that time, even if Kosovo had not yet been shaken by ethnic riots.

The Kosovan branch of the LCY reached similar conclusions that year. Excoriating "Greater Serbian chauvinistic tendencies," the provincial committee warned that "every nationalism . . . represents a menace to LCY policy. . . . Communists must be alert to the man, and active in the struggle against all nationalist deviations."[18] By then Rankovic had slipped from power, and command of the security forces in Kosovo had been turned over to Albanian cadres. The Albanians were also granted permission to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the death of the Albanian national hero, Skanderbeg.[19] But Serbs were still far more likely than Albanians to find employment in the party-government apparatus; the tenth session of the League of Communists of Kosovo (1967) paid particular attention to the ethnic imbalances in employment in the province.

These developments enraged Jovan Marjanovic and Dobrica Cosic, members of the central committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. They blasted what they perceived as the open promotion of Albanian nationalism and irredentism in Kosovo and lamented that Serbs had now become the victims of reverse discrimination as far as employment in Kosovo was concerned. Despite the opposition of Serbs like Marjanovic and Cosic, however, the tide was turning. In February 1968, the Albanians convicted in the Prizren trial of 1956 were rehabilitated on the ground that the security apparatus under Rankovic had rigged the proceedings, fabricating evidence and bribing witnesses.[20] On the urging of Kosovan Albanians Mahmut Bakali and Salih Nusi, the LCY agreed in spring 1968 to substitute the neutral term "Albanian" for the term "Siptar," which the Albanians considered a pejorative term but which had been standard usage in official as well as unofficial business. When the League of Communists of Serbia met in early November 1968 (just before the Kosovo riots), it was finally proposed that the designations of the party organizations of the autonomous provinces be changed: henceforth, the "League of Communists of Serbia for Vojvodina" would be simply the "League of Communists of Vojvodina," and the "League of Communists of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija" would be the "League of Communists for Kosovo-Metohija." In the same month, the League of Communists of Serbia authorized the provincial party organizations to pass their own statutes. The Albanian component was immediately

[17] See documents in *Nacionalno pitanje u djelima klasika marksizma i u dokumentima i praksi kpj/skj*, pp. 500-503.

[18] Excerpts from "Sedma sednica pokrajinskog komiteta SKJ na Kosovu i Metohiji" (1966), in *Zadaci SK Srbije*, p. 114.

[19] R. V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, October 1971), p. 27.

[20] Radio Belgrade, February 10, 1968.

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strengthened in the Kosovan party organization (although it must be admitted that Albanians and Hungarians were still significantly underrepresented in the respective party organizations of Kosovo and Vojvodina). That the Albanians should have become restless precisely at this point, when the slow beginnings of reform had become unmistakable, merely confirms Machiavelli's and Crane Brinton's proposition that repression becomes intolerable once reform has begun.

The 1968 Kosovo Riots

Signs of steady deterioration in Serbian-Albanian relations appeared through 1967, however, including sporadic eruptions of interethnic violence,[21] and by October 1968 reports surfaced of anti-Serbian demonstrations in Suva Reka, Prizren, and Pec. Participants were said to number only a "couple of hundred," and officials tried to peg the blame on "foreign [that is, Albanian] intelligence services."[22] Officials failed to assuage Albanian discontent, and tension mounted. On November 27, 1968, "Kosmet" exploded in violence just before Albanian National Independence Day, Kosovan Liberation Day, and the anniversary of the Proclamation of the Yugoslav federal state (all celebrated, by an ironic twist of fate, on November 29).[23] "Hundreds of demonstrators . . . smashed windows and overturned cars" in Pristina, and the anti-Serb demonstrations quickly spread to other towns in Kosovo,[24] leaving thirty-seven injured (among them, thirteen police) and one dead. There were reports that some demanded annexation to Albania and that riotous crowds could be heard chanting "Long live Enver Hoxha!"[25] The protesters drew up a list of demands, which included (1) dropping "Metohija" (a Serbian word) from the official name of the region, (2) Kosovo's redesignation as a republic, (3) the extension of the right of self-determination to Kosovo (a right of a republic in the Yugoslav federation, but not of an autonomous province, and (4) the establishment of an independent university in Pristina. By early December, the disturbances had spread to the Macedonian cities of Gostivar and Tetovo, both with large Albanian populations. Haberl reports that the children of Kosovo's political leaders took part in the Kosovo riots but adds that this allegation was firmly denied by all concerned.[26]

The LCY responded swiftly and decisively. The "ringleaders"

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[21] Radio Belgrade, February 12, 1968.

[22] *Borba*, October 28, 1968.

[23] See *Politika*, December 2, 1968, and *Vjesnik*, December 1, 1968.

[24] *New York Times*, November 28, 1968.

[25] Enver Hoxha has been the ruler of Albania since World War II. See the report by Dusan Mugosa in *Deveti kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (Beograd, 11-13 iii, 1969)—Stenografske beleske* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1970), vol. 3, p. 367.

[26] Othmar Nikola Haberl, *Parteiorganisation und nationale Frage in Jugoslavien* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1976), p. 73.

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of the apparently well-organized demonstrations received jail terms of up to five years, while those held chiefly accountable for the unrest in Macedonia received sentences of up to seven years. Another forty-four persons in Kosovo received jail terms of up to thirty days. By mid-February, moreover, thirty-seven LCY members had been expelled from the party for participation in or support of the demonstrations.

The federal government was not prepared to partition Serbia; on the other hand, ameliorative measures had to be taken as well. The demand for republican status was flatly turned down;[27] however, both Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted some of the prerogatives of republics and the modifier "socialist" was appended to their official designations (hence, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo). In December, in another concession to the Albanians, Kosovo-Metohija was redesignated simply Kosovo, dropping the purely Serbian "Metohija," and the Kosovars were given permission to fly Albania's flag alongside Yugoslavia's. Furthermore, while jailing thirty of the leading Albanian agitators for extended periods, Belgrade took steps to improve the economic situation in Kosovo and to promote more Albanians to positions of authority. Finally, there followed the creation of an independent University of Pristina in 1969, and the rapid Albanianization of both faculty and student body of what had hitherto been a branch of the University of Belgrade.

While these measures soothed discontent and eased Albanian minority relations with the federal regime, Serb/Albanian relations within Kosovo remained tense. For the Serbs, the threat in Kosovo has been particularly poignant, for the region contains many shrines of the medieval Serbian kingdom. Most importantly, it was at Kosovo polje (the Field of the Blackbirds) that the Serbian army was crushed by the Turks in 1389, and the battlefield has since retained great symbolic value for the Serbs. The region, however, is now overwhelmingly inhabited by Albanians, who have by far the highest birthrate of all of Yugoslavia's peoples. As a result of the turmoil, moreover, Albanian and Serbian neighbors became openly hostile and the university polarized along ethnic lines; the upshot—revealed in March 1969—was that thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins streamed out of Kosovo, most of them professionals and specialists.[28] Even the dead were not immune to ethnic hatred, as Albanians broke up Serbian and Montenegrin gravestones in Kosovo. Meanwhile, relations between Albanians and Macedonians remained tense as the first of some 100 accused instigators was sentenced to seven years of hard labor in March 1969. The spectacle of throngs of students singing songs glorifying Albania and Enver Hoxha had made an impres-

[27] This decision was reached only in February 1969. (*The Economist* [London], May 2, 1970.)

[28] Louis Zanga, "Jugoslawische Nationalitätenpolitik im Fall Kosovo," *Osteuropa*, July 1975, p. 515.

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sion on Yugoslav authorities, who were determined to suppress the secessionist current.[29]

The Kosovo question remains unresolved. It is worth noting, though, that recurrent problems with Albanian nationalism have manifested some of the same characteristics that marked the Croatian crisis of 1971. First, instances of anomic and collective violence were manifested in the demonstrations of 1968, the mutual incitement of the two national groups, and the Serbian/Montenegrin exodus itself. Second, there were repeated instances of nationalistically motivated conspiracy: in December 1971, for instance, the president of the Serbian and Montenegrin bar in Kosovo, Slobodan Subotic, was arrested for circulating inflammatory nationalistic leaflets with the aim of subverting indigenous control,[30] while in 1975 four Yugoslav citizens of Albanian nationality were imprisoned for plotting the secession of Kosovo and its attachment to Albania.[31] Third, conflict in Kosovo, as in Croatia, has been transmuted to the elite level: thus, when the League of Communists of Kosovo met in June 1971, Serbs and Montenegrins exchanged broadsides with Albanian delegates over questions of rights for the Serbian minority in Kosovo and alleged separatist plots.[32] Finally, the Kosovo case exemplifies conflict accommodation as practiced in communist Yugoslavia: jail the troublemakers but grant their nonthreatening demands.

Albanian gains in Kosovo, though modest, nonetheless excited a Serbian backlash. Serbs became paranoid at Albanian inroads, dreaded the transfer of any property from Serb to Albanian, and agitatedly spoke of "losing" Kosovo. Shortly after the 1971 census, a number of periodicals began to call into question the validity of the Kosovo count and to spread the idea that the Albanian Kosovans had exerted pressure on the indigenous Slavs to declare themselves Albanian. Stane Stanic, writing in Belgrade's weekly, *NIN*, in August 1971, followed this tack, adding that the Albanians were also exerting unrelenting pressure on Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants to leave Kosovo. Stanic concluded that the census results were unreliable and that the Slavic proportion had been seriously underestimated.[33] Again, as the Albanian component of the central committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo edged upward from 61.7 per cent in 1973 to 62.5 per cent in 1974, and as the Albanians registered small gains in governmental employment, Serbian nationalists began to

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[29] Tanjug, March 16, 1969, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), March 20, 1969; Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 236; Fred Singleton, "The Roots of Discord in Yugoslavia," *The World Today*, April 1972, p. 180.

[30] Singleton, "Roots of Discord," p. 179; Rusko Matulic, "Repression of Dissent in Yugoslavia," *Review of the Study Centre for Jugoslav Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1977, p. 220.

[31] *New York Times*, January 16, 1975.

[32] Zanga, "Jugoslawische Nationalitätenpolitik," p. 514.

[33] Summarized in Bruno Busic, "Cudne kosovske brojidbe," *Hrvatski tjednik*, September 3, 1971.

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clamor that the status quo in Kosovan employment and political representation was entirely satisfactory, setting themselves against any further changes in the ethnic structure of the civil service in Kosovo. Yet the Albanians had already tallied some 73.7 per cent of the province's population by 1971—they now account for 77.5 per cent—and were demanding that they be accorded proportionate representation.[34]

Nebi Gasi, chairman of Kosovo's Committee for Interethnic Relations, told a Belgrade audience in 1977 that while eight out of every hundred Albanians in Kosovo had jobs in the social sector, seventeen out of every hundred Serbs and twenty out of every hundred Montenegrins in Kosovo were employed in the social sector. This reflected the fact that of the 128,000 Kosovars employed in the social sector at the end of 1974, 58.2 per cent were Albanians, 31 per cent were Serbs, 5.7 per cent Montenegrins, and 5 per cent members of other nationality groups.[35] It should scarcely come as a surprise, then, that "sociologists have likened the position of Albanians in this multinational society to that of blacks in the United States."[36]

Underground Separatist Organizations

Accordingly, interethnic tension has remained high in Kosovo over the years, and distrust between the Slavs and the local Albanians runs deep. Indeed, the heavily Albanianized security forces enjoyed only a brief respite of sorts between 1969 and 1973, when Albanian irredentists launched their first large-scale propaganda offensive since the demonstrations of November 1968. Yugoslav security forces discovered evidence of an underground separatist organization known as the Revolutionary Movement of United Albania, led by Adem Demachi, but were unable to uproot it. This group, together with the so-called Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians of Yugoslavia, which may have enjoyed Albanian support, undertook what the regime labeled "serious propaganda actions" in 1973-1975, calling for the secession of Kosovo and those parts of Macedonia and Montenegro inhabited by Albanians, and the creation of a Greater Albania that would be specifically anti-Serb in orientation. It appears that this 'Marxist-Leninist' party was uncovered by Yugoslav security in early 1975. Another underground group, similar in nature, was discovered shortly thereafter. Five more groups, operating in Pristina and Urosevac, were discovered in the course of 1979 and 1980, while Yugo-

[34] "Sednica Predsednistva CK SK Srbije" (May 17, 1976), in *Zadaci SK Srbije*, p. 165; Ivan Stojanovic, "Problemi zaposljavanja i medjunacionalni odnosi," *Gledista*, July and August 1974, p. 747; *Oslobodjenje*, May 14, 1981.

[35] *Bilten pokrajinskog zavoda za statistiku SAPK* (1975), cited in Nebi Gasi, "Nacionalna ravnopravnost na Kosovu i politika zaposljavanja," in *Udruzeni rad*, p. 158.

[36] *New York Times*, January 16, 1975.

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slav security organs turned up still another such group early in 1981, which, according to Franjo Herljevic, minister of the interior, had been operating in conjunction with the pro-Albanian 'Red Front' organization.[37]

There were reports of student demonstrations in Pristina in the mid 1970s, in which more than 1,000 ethnic Albanians were said to have been arrested, and a 1974 conference of the central committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo warned that "communists must wage a concrete and decisive campaign against particularistic-separatist Albanian nationalism."[38] In 1976 thirty-one Albanians were tried in connection with separatist activities from 1973 to 1975 and were sentenced to prison terms of up to fifteen years;[39] another fifty Kosovan Albanians were tried and sentenced early in 1980 for subversive activity.[40] In fact, between 1974 and the beginning of 1981, the state security service had arrested more than 600 Kosovars for irredentist and nationalist activity.[41]

In addition to organized and semiorganized activity, there were repeated outbreaks of anomic violence in Kosovo during the 1970s. In late 1976 and again in the spring of 1978, the province was shaken by massive prison riots, when Albanian prisoners, claiming that their Serbian guards were racially prejudiced and guilty of brutally manhandling their Albanian inmates, created a makeshift barricade using parts of the deteriorating prison itself. In late 1979 an angry crowd wrecked a police station in Novi Pazar in Kosovo.[42]

At the same time, organized Albanian irredentism was spreading to neighboring Macedonia. Between 1978 and 1981 Yugoslav security organs reportedly uncovered and suppressed two illegal Albanian irredentist organizations operating in Macedonia. The alleged ringleaders of the first of these organizations—Muharem Saljani, Gani Sulaj, and Adzija Malici—were convicted of treasonous activities over the 1977-1980 period by the High Court in Skopje at its July 3, 1980 session, and

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[37] Tanjug, May 5, 7, and 12, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 6, 8, and 14, 1981, respectively; *The Times* (London), May 13, 1981.

[38] Ristic, "Kosovo," p. 24; "Jedanaesta pokrajinska konferencija SK Kosova" (1974), in *Zadaci SK Srbije*, p. 161; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 7, 1981. See, also, *Yugoslav Information Bulletin* (Belgrade), January 1975, pp. 21-22.

[39] *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (see fn. 11, above).

[40] "Albanische Irredenta in Kosovo?," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, April 1980, p. 84.

[41] Tanjug, May 12, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 14, 1981.

[42] Private interviews in Belgrade, 1980; *Mladost* (Belgrade), August 22, 1980, p. 6. Large numbers of Albanians are reportedly also imprisoned in the prison at Nis, in southern Serbia. "In this fortress prison," Croatian writer and former prison inmate Marko Vidovic wrote of one particular occasion, "the prisoners were kept in the most terrible isolation. Even the windows were removed so that they almost froze to death in their cells. . . . A unit of Pandours [Croatian police] armed with heavy sticks moved into the cell bloc. They went from cell to cell and tortured one Albanian after the other. That night, two Albanians—Rifat Farnol and Nusret Bihorac—went insane because of the beatings." (Marko Vidovic, *Sakrivena strana mjeseca* [Barcelona: 1977], quoted in *Der Spiegel*, May 22, 1978, p. 182, and trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, June 22, 1978.

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sentenced to jail terms of three to six years.[43] The assumed leaders of the second organization, a more or less formal revolutionary party known as the National Party of Labor, said to have been active between June 1979 and February 1981, were put on trial in Skopje in May 1981. The five accused were convicted of having carried out subversive activities in Gostivar and surrounding villages. Rahim Neziri and Zaim Beciri, the alleged chairman and deputy chairman of the party, received prison sentences of thirteen and thirteen-and-a-half years, respectively, while the other three accused — Saban Limani, Esad Abduraman, and Daim Sabani — received sentences of seven to ten years.[44]

Officials have alternated between affirmations of confidence and expressions of alarm. Mahmut Bakali, then president of the central committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, told *Borba*, for instance, that nationalist agitation had found little support among either the youth or the working people of Kosovo, while *Politika* added, a bit disingenuously, that "the very fact that the efforts of enemies have not found wide support among the Albanian masses shows that the devotion of the Albanians to Tito's Yugoslavia is durable and indestructible. There has not been a single meeting at which it has not been insisted that these provocateurs be roundly condemned."[45] Such statements are balanced by calls for vigilance, reminders of the threat of nationalist propaganda, and frequent exhortations "to maintain an open front against every kind of nationalism."[46]

The 1981 Kosovo Riots

Given the history of festering discontent, and a telltale eruption of ethnic turmoil in Kosovo in May 1980,[47] it is no surprise that state security organs were in a perpetual state of alert during the months following Tito's demise. Officials claim that subversive irredentist groups had in fact planned major demonstrations for November 1980 but that effective measures by the security apparatus thwarted these plans.[48] The LCY was thus well aware that trouble was brewing in Kosovo. On November 1, 1980, Mahmut Bakali, then Kosovan party chief, told party stalwarts that

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[43] *Vjesnik*, April 5, 1980; *Borba*, April 4, 1980; *Oslobodjenje*, July 8, 1980; Tanjug, May 12, 1981, trans. in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 14, 1981.

[44] Tanjug, May 18, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 19, 1981; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 19, 1981; Tanjug, May 20, 1981, trans. in FBIS *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 21, 1981.

[45] *Politika*, March 30, 1980.

[46] *Borba*, March 5, 1980.

[47] Louis Zanga, "Why New Unrest in Kosovo?," Radio Free Europe Research, *RAD Background Report*, March 23, 1981, p. 2.

[48] Franjo Herljevic, minister of the interior, in an interview recorded by Tanjug, May 12, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 14, 1981.

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the efforts of revanchists to agitate demanded constant rebuttal, and in February, on the eve of a new eruption of ethnically inspired tumult, both *Komunist* and *Politika* warned of simmering discontent in the province, the latter adding that "antisocialist forces" continued to organize hostile provocations in various parts of Kosovo.[49] Few observers, however, were prepared for the vehemence of the riots that shook the province in March and April 1981. In fact, when some 2,000 Albanian students at the University of Pristina went on a rampage March 11, officials initially denied any ethnic link and claimed that the riot had been sparked by dissatisfaction with bad cooking in the university cafeteria. The mere fact that the riots lasted two days, injuring thirteen (including one policeman), suggested that more than bad food was involved.[50] Indeed, a closer investigation reveals that the provincial committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo had been scheduled to discuss the province's abysmal economic problems on March 13, and that the local press had been running a series of consternating articles on that theme in anticipation of the committee meeting. The press reports no doubt exacerbated the already waxing resentment among the university students in Pristina and may be said to have catalyzed the March riots. Despite the involvement of some 2,000 students, the first wave of riots attracted surprisingly little attention.

Further demonstrations by Prizren students on March 25 and by Pristina students on March 26 produced thirty-five injuries (twenty-three demonstrators and twelve police) and resulted in twenty-one arrests, while demonstrations followed in Obilic on March 31.[51] Subsequently, on April 1, violent riots again broke out at the University of Pristina (whose full-time student body numbers 37,000). Beginning with marauding protesters smashing factory equipment and shop windows and setting trucks on fire, tensions quickly escalated into open street battles, in which some rioters used kindergarten children as shields against police.[52] Miners from the nearby coal mine and workers from the electric power station in the neighboring town of Obilic joined the students as the disorder spread to Podujevo, Leposlavic, Vuciturn, Vitana, and Glogovac. By April 3, the strife had spread to Kosovoska Mitrovica and Urosevac, and Viktor Meier reported that hardly any municipality in Kosovo abstained from the violence. Many of the demonstrators—said to have numbered between 10,000 and 20,000—were armed, and in the ensuing clashes with the

[49] Tanjug, November 1, 1980, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), November 3, 1980; *Politika*, February 12, 1981; *Komunist*, February 20, 1981.

[50] *Financial Times* (London), March 13, 1981; *The Times* (London), March 14, 1981; *New York Times*, April 7, 1981.

[51] Radio Tirana, in Serbo-Croatian, April 3, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 7, 1981; Radio Belgrade, April 24, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 27, 1981; Radio Pristina, April 25, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 27, 1981.

[52] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 4, 1981; *Los Angeles Times*, April 4, 1981.

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riot police, at least thirty to forty people were killed, according to informed sources, and about 1,000 persons injured, many of them by firearms.[53] The revolutionary overtones of the Albanian riots were unmistakable. Rioters alternately demanded either republican status for Kosovo or outright secession. In the official viewpoint, both amounted to the same thing. "The formation of a republic of Kosovo in Yugoslavia would essentially mean Yugoslavia's disintegration," Stane Dolanc, a ranking member of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, told foreign correspondents. "A republic of Kosovo within the framework of Yugoslavia is impossible. I can speak about that completely openly."[54] The Yugoslav regime rushed in tanks and armored personnel carriers, imposed a curfew throughout the province, cut off telephone connections with the rest of Yugoslavia, and established control points on all roads into Pristina. Commandos and soldiers armed with machine guns were moved in to patrol the streets, while helicopters hovered overhead. Some two dozen ringleaders were jailed, and a state of emergency was declared.[55] On April 5, Pristina's factories were reopened, though a ban on public meetings remained in effect. Only on April 8 did the Yugoslav authorities finally lift the nighttime curfew.[56] While leading party officials condemned the "counterrevolutionary, irredentist and nationalist" forces said to have been behind the riots,[57] "Belgrade citizens spoke in hushed tones about 'the riots' which were the most violent that anyone could recall in recent history."[58]

Pacification attempts failed, as Kosovan Albanians continued to scrawl anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav graffiti on public walls, distribute insurrectionary pamphlets, and disrupt instruction in schools.[59] Further strife flared up in Istok the night of April 30 and at the University of Pristina on May 12.[60] The schools, closed once and then reopened two weeks later, eventually closed for a second time, and the school year was declared over. *Borba* openly asked what sense it made to have encouraged the University of Pristina's expansion when it was inconceivable that its graduates would find jobs commensurate with their training and ambitions.

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[53] *The Times* (London), April 4, 1981; Radio Belgrade, April 3, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 3, 1981; Hamburg DPA, April 3, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 6, 1981; *New York Times*, April 7, 1981; Radio Belgrade, April 24, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 27, 1981; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 27, 1981.

[54] *Vjesnik*, April 7, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 13, 1981.

[55] Ibid.; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 4, 1981; Radio Tirana, April 6, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 7, 1981; *Los Angeles Times*, April 4 and 19, 1981; *Financial Times*, May 21, 1981.

[56] *Los Angeles Times*, April 6 and 9, 1981.

[57] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 7, 1981.

[58] *New York Times*, April 6, 1981.

[59] Tanjug, May 7, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 11, 1981.

[60] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 14, 1981; *Vjesnik —Sedam dana*, June 6, 1981, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, July 1, 1981.

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In the meantime, the unrest spread to Montenegro, with *Borba* reporting the perpetration of "incidents" by the local Albanian minority in the capital city of Titograd, and the scrawling of anti-Tito slogans on shop windows; as late as June 8, the presidium of the central committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro was still preoccupied with the repercussions of the Kosovo riots among Albanians living in Montenegro.[61]

In Macedonia, which had endured prolonged Albanian unrest thirteen years ago, there were initially no hints of turmoil, although officials charged that Albanian nationalists, including Muslim clergy of Albanian extraction, had pressured Macedonian gypsies and Turks, as well as Muslim Macedonians, to declare themselves Albanian during the census earlier this year.[62] The apparent calm notwithstanding, the Macedonian security apparatus was put on high alert. By the end of May, reports surfaced that local Albanians were distributing insurrectionary and irredentist literature, writing revolutionary slogans in public places, and engaging in various acts of desecration. These activities, which were especially serious in the Ohrid and Tetovo districts, prompted Yugoslav authorities to tighten security in the Tetovo area in early July. As of mid July, however, manifestations of Albanian nationalism in the Tetovo region were said to be escalating.

Even Serbia has seen problems, with Albanian nationalists allegedly stirring up trouble in the communes of Bujanovac, Presevo, and Medvedja in southern Serbia. In the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana, police were able to abort a demonstration of Albanians only at the last minute.[63]

The LCY quickly put twenty-two Kosovars in prison for having organized the April 1-3 riots. Mahmut Bakali resigned his post as provincial party chief, admitting to the sterility of past policy in Kosovo and confessing to have attempted to sweep problems under the carpet. But the ranks of the party were already infected by the nationalist germ, and by early June nearly 450 League of Communists of Kosovo members had been expelled from the party, at least some of them for having participated in the riots, while several basic organizations of the League of Communists of Kosovo were dissolved outright.[64] Even the party-controlled press suddenly became unreliable. The April 1 issue of *Fjalja*, an

[61] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 12, 1981; *Oslobodjenje*, June 9, 1981.

[62] Tanjug, June 26 and July 14, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 30 and July 15, 1981, respectively. The nationalists were said to have threatened the latter group that "they would be forbidden to practice their faith . . . if they declared themselves as Muslim Macedonians."

[63] Radio Belgrade, June 5, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 9, 1981; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 26, 1981.

[64] *Vjesnik*, April 7, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 13, 1981; Tanjug, April 17, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 20, 1981; *Christian Science Monitor*, May 7, 1981; *Borba*, May 10, 1981; Tanjug, May 14 and June 3, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 15 and June 4, 1981, respectively.

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Albanian-language periodical, was suppressed by Yugoslav authorities for publishing nationalistically provocative material, while *Obelezja,* the Kosovan Serbo-Croatian theoretical journal, was said to be treading a fine line.

The 1981 riots were, in a sense, a rude awakening insofar as they signified the repudiation of more than ten years of intense effort to accelerate development in the backward region of Kosovo. The riots asserted the primacy of ethnic community as well: the demonstrators and their sympathizers implied that they would rather live under an Albanian despot than remain part of Yugoslavia, however more open the latter might be. Clearly it was this separatist dimension that troubled Belgrade the most, as well as the possible impact this latest outbreak might have on other discontented nationalities in the multiethnic country. Rumors circulated that at least some of these Albanian separatist groups had formed guerrilla units in the back country of Kosovo—an allegation quickly denied by Yugoslav authorities.[65] Certainly, the formation of an organized guerrilla movement in a multiethnic context would mark a decisive turning point for the state.

Backlash and Proliferation

The incipient revolt in Kosovo has driven additional Kosovan Montenegrins and Serbs out of Kosovo, sparked a nationalist backlash among Macedonians and Serbs, and triggered the proliferation of nationalist excesses throughout the other seven federal units.

The 1981 census had already shown an absolute decline in the Serbian and Montenegrin populations of Kosovo. Serbs numbered 18,172 fewer in 1981 than in 1971, while the number of Montenegrins decreased by 4,680. As a result of the latest turmoil, in which Albanian residents frequently "targeted" local Slavs, there has been a renewed exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Most flee to Serbia, often to Belgrade, bearing tales of Albanian excesses.

The exodus reinforces a Serbian nationalist backlash, aggravating a problem to which the party has had to devote increased attention in recent years. It was just three years ago, at the fifteenth session of the central committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (April 19, 1978), that various speakers had inveighed against a renascence of Serbian ethnocentric chauvinism. Mirko Popovic specifically noted then that Serbian chauvinism had become more serious "in the last year or two." Popovic charged that the Greater Serbian nationalists were exploiting every friction to further their own chauvinistic purposes.[66] Incensed by the

[65] Radio Budapest, April 15, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 17, 1981.
[66] Radio Belgrade, April 19, 1978, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 21, 1978.

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anti-Serbian edge to the latest Albanian riots, Serbs now openly speak of the "good old days" when Rankovic was in charge of the security apparatus and claim that it is time to put the Albanians of Kosovo in their place once and for all. Indeed, Rankovic has overnight become a hero of Serbs. Serbs and Macedonians have been boycotting Albanian shops and bakeries, sometimes cutting sales by as much as 85 per cent.[67] There have even been demands by Serbs that the Autonomous Province of Kosovo be abolished altogether—an alternative that party officials quickly labeled unacceptable. A similar syndrome has been developing in Macedonia, where Macedonians have been ostracizing Albanian neighbors, acquaintances, and former friends.

The Albanians of Kosovo have met with considerable sympathy among the Hungarians of Vojvodina. In a poignant expression of that sympathy, a large Hungarian crowd, which shortly after the riots had been giving *pro forma* applause to folk-dance troupes from various Yugoslav republics, cheered and clapped boisterously when the Albanian dance troupe from Kosovo performed. The message was not lost on the Serbs. Shortly thereafter, *Borba* lashed out at "bourgeois-liberalist . . . Hungarian nationalism, that engages in tactical games and calculates and waits to see whether another nationalism that is rising might perhaps benefit it in some way."[68]

Likewise, in Bosnia, where Muslim nationalism has intensified since the early 1970s, an increase in nationalist incidents followed the Kosovo riots. Bosnia has recently been rife with rumors about surgeons deliberately mishandling operations on members of certain ethnic groups (presumably Muslims), and various groups were said to be singing nationalistic songs and displaying national symbols without the socialist red star. These incidents were followed by arrests of alleged nationalists and chauvinists in Banja Luka, Gorazde, Tuzla, Doboj, and other towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, amid reports of melees and disruptions of various sorts. The presidium of the central committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina met on June 5, warning that nationalists and separatists (Croatian nationalists) in Bosnia were trying to exploit the unrest in Kosovo to further their own aims.[69] Bosnia's heterogeneous population, in fact, is a ready breeding ground for ethnic hatred, and, as a leading Bosnian party official recently admitted, Bosnian "communists . . . are continually waging a struggle with nationalism."[70]

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[67] AP report, June 5, 1981, in Radio Free Europe telex.

[68] *Borba*, May 21, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 4, 1981.

[69] *Borba*, May 15, 1981; *Oslobodjenje*, May 13 and June 6, 1981. It is perhaps worth recalling that thirteen party members in Bosnia were ejected from the League of Communists for ethnocentric intolerance and nationalistic chauvinism in 1979. (*Oslobodjenje*, August 7, 1980.)

[70] Nikola Stojanovic, president of the central committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as reported in Tanjug, May 5, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), May 8, 1981.

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Finally, in Croatia, whose population still remembers — with mixed feelings and often with bitterness — the purge of the nationalist leadership in 1971, Croatian separatists may be all too ready to exploit Kosovan tensions for their own ends.

Conclusion

The latest Albanian riots in Kosovo sent tremors through the party hierarchy. At first the Yugoslav regime awkwardly tried to downplay the riots — even as of this writing the regime refuses to admit to more than nine dead — and even attempted to persuade the public that the riots amounted to no more than the "dirty work" of traitors, whose actions were "unanimously condemned" even by the local Albanians.[71] This transparent façade could not be maintained for long, however, and admission of the scale of the violence led immediately to criticism of the entire LCY policy vis-à-vis Kosovo up to that time. The principal difficulty has been that aside from removing some of the officials who had compromised themselves during the turbulent episode in the spring, the LCY has no new ideas to bring to bear. If the present policy is a failure, then it would appear that the regime can only fall back on naked force. Indeed, police groups have attempted to exploit the crisis in order to push through certain repressive measures and tighten political screws.[72]

The prolonged disquiet in Kosovo also confirms the conclusion that the regime is presented with a dilemma that is soluble only by force, thereby disproving the regime's claim to have found a unique formula for interethnic harmony — a claim upon which, ultimately, the legitimacy of the LCY power monopoly rests. If the bubble of legitimacy is burst, there may be little — now that Tito is gone — to keep the party afloat save force. In this way as well, the crisis would appear to play into the hands of regime hard-liners.

There is another way in which the Kosovo crisis is working against party liberals. Insofar as the central party leadership is discovering that directives issued to the Kosovan party are not being carried out, the conclusion can readily be drawn that the party is itself in revolt and that the devolution favored by liberals as a means of appeasement can be turned around and exploited as a tool of rebellion. *Jedinstvo*, the Serbo-Croatian party daily of Kosovo, commented in June 1981 that three months after the wave of insurrection and disorder began in Kosovo, the League of Communists organizations in Kosovo were still dragging their feet as far as purges of wayward elements were concerned. *Jedinstvo* continued:

[71] Tanjug, April 10, 1981, in FBIS *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 13, 1981.
[72] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 24 and 30, 1981.

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Owing to opportunist behavior among communists and their inconsistency and wavering in numerous basic organizations of the League of Communists, action has been [confined] to a formal declaration "for or against the hostile demonstrations" [for?]. So far there has been no concrete effort to point out the causes and exponents of the counterrevolution, as if this were a matter of something or someone that did not exist.

Tanjug Domestic Service added:

The way things are now, it is obvious that there is a gap between what was agreed on and what is being done. . . . It is obvious that the search for the consequences is a superficial one and that the causes of all that happened are not being eradicated and exposed.[73]

The conclusion is inescapable that much of the Kosovan party apparatus is either implicated in the unrest or sympathetic to the growing secessionist movement. In some cases, the Kosovan party may be more wary of the local constituency than of party superiors in Belgrade. *Borba* charged that not only the Kosovan party organization but also the provincial police and even the security apparatus were "permeated with 'Albanian counterrevolutionaries and irredentists.' "[74]

Kosovan resistance has been a source of consternation to the party hierarchy in neighboring Macedonia, producing complaints there that the League of Communists of Kosovo is not taking enough action. Boro Denkov, a high-ranking official in the Macedonian party, deplored the fact that in Kosovo there is plenty of talk of suppressing the revolutionary element but that only a few token heads have rolled.[75] Kosovo's potential for unrest threatens the entire party system, and especially the political status quo in Macedonia.

Thus, the Kosovo crisis has not only thrown the Yugoslav political system off balance but has also dramatically strengthened the political position of those who fear that devolution and liberalization have gone too far and who favor a more literal application of the principle of democratic centralism.[76] Such a policy shift, however, could be untenable or, at the least, highly destabilizing.

While the crisis has called into question some fundamental assumptions of the system and thus shown itself to be destabilizing in the domestic arena, it also has undermined confidence in the stability of the region. Albania has openly endorsed the rioters' demands, savagely castigating Belgrade for a policy of repression and genocide. Yugoslavia has

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[73] Tanjug, June 23, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 24, 1981.

[74] As reported in *Die Welt*, July 2, 1981. Only a few top functionaries in Kosovo have actually resigned and the party's provincial committee and communal committees, as of early July, had managed to avoid any serious discussion of resignations or ejections. (*Ilustrovana politika* [Belgrade], July 7, 1981.)

[75] Tanjug, June 25, 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), June 30, 1981.

[76] For a more detailed discussion of the struggle between liberals and hard-livers in the post-Tito party, see Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia's Debate Over Democratization," *Survey*, Summer 1980.

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responded in kind, breaking off ties between the University of Pristina and the University of Tirana in Albania, as well as other cultural links between the countries. Yugoslavia has attacked Albanian Stalinism in a series of articles as the source of feudal despotism and needless indigence.[77] Relations between Albania and Greece are also on edge, because of the implication, trumpeted by Belgrade, that Tirana's craving for Albanian-populated Kosovo may inspire claims against certain minority-populated parts of Greece. Moreover, the crisis comes at a time when the spurious post-Tito rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has dissolved, with the Yugoslavs once more hurling darts at the Bulgarians and the latter replying with historical expostulations on the "true" (Bulgarian) nature of Macedonia. Since the Yugoslavs claim that Bulgaria is no more than a Soviet surrogate, some worry that the Soviets may have played a role in fomenting the riots, which even if unsubstantiated, does not heighten Yugoslav security.

Finally, the Kosovo crisis constitutes an indictment of Yugoslav Marxism itself. The LCY, operating on the Marxist-Leninist premise that nationalism under socialism is merely an epiphenomenon of economic inequalities, has been pumping large amounts of money into Kosovo via the special Federal Development Fund. Despite incontestable economic gains in absolute terms, though, Kosovo has slipped even farther behind — relative to the other Yugoslav federal units — and today tallies a per capita social product no greater than 28.8 per cent of the Yugoslav average.[78] Thus, the policy of leveling out economic inequalities has been, as far as Kosovo is concerned, a complete failure. The policy has also failed in a much more critical sense: insofar as Albanian nationalism is not merely politicized resentment at economic inequality, the LCY policy has been misguided. Kosovo would be far worse off economically as part of Albania; if nothing else, Belgrade has succeeded in making that clear to all concerned. Yet Albanian separatism continues to fester among the Kosovars.

It could be argued that prompt concession of the nationalists' minimum demand — the creation of an Albanian Socialist Republic within the Yugoslav federation, to include not only all of Kosovo but also the areas of Montenegro and Macedonia inhabited by Albanians — could avert further turmoil and defuse backing for the maximum demand: secession of Kosovo and parts of Montenegro and Macedonia, with their annexation to Albania. It may already be too late to consider merely the

[77] While it is hard to imagine what Albania would gain by associating itself with forces undermining Yugoslavia's stability, and inconceivable that Albania could in fact digest Kosovo if it tried — since the Kosovars would certainly buckle at Tirana-style Stalinism — Enver Hoxha was posing as protector of Yugoslavia's Albanian minority even before the latest riots; the "Belgrade-Tirana Axis" described in Soviet literature was thus never particularly sturdy. See *The Guardian*, March 31, 1980.

[78] *Borba*, February 26, 1980.

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minimum demands, given the violence and depth of the spreading ethnocentrism. The disclosure by Franjo Herljevic in June of yet another clandestine organization—bearing the overtly secessionist name of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo and Other Albanian Regions—likewise confirms the bleak prospects for a conciliatory policy.[79]

It has been suggested that Albanian, Croatian, and Muslim nationalism have each proved destabilizing to the Yugoslav system. Albanian nationalism, however, differs in one fundamental respect from both Croatian and Muslim nationalism: Kosovo geographically borders an independent Albania that, for all its despotic backwardness, exerts an undiminished attraction on Kosovo's Albanians. It is this presence that makes the question of Albanian nationalism the most trying and intractable problem on Belgrade's agenda.

[79] Ibid., June 10, 1981.

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THE FRAGMENTATION OF ARAB POLITICS: INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION*

by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

Inter-Arab relations have always been characterized by an extraordinarily high level of volatility, involving numerous actors, multiple issues, and continually shifting coalitions. Even by these standards, however, the year 1980 witnessed among Arab League members an exceptional amount of conflict and tension over "all-Arab" as well as "local" issues; the resulting fragmentation culminated in November 1980 in the unprecedented absence from an Arab summit conference (the periodic repository of Arab consensus) of nearly one-third of the league's members.

The most striking feature of the new contours in inter-Arab relations created by this fragmentation is the extent to which the all-Arab consensus against Egypt—the central characteristic of inter-Arab affairs from November 1977 to December 1979—has been superseded by more pressing concerns. The Iran-Iraq War and the Syrian-Jordanian military confrontation reinforced and highlighted this feature; they did not, however, create it. If one is to periodize inter-Arab relations, the current phase can be said to have already been touched off in late December 1979 by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Conveniently for the analyst, a number of Arab and Islamic conferences during the current period of inter-Arab affairs provide benchmarks by which to evaluate the dynamics of Arab politics. (The proliferation of meetings and conferences during the year are themselves indications of the ferment characterizing regional affairs. In addition, the fact that some of these meetings took place in an Islamic, and not strictly Arab, context testifies to the growing role of the Islamic factor in Middle Eastern political dynamics.) Accordingly, this article will focus on the most important of these meetings: the extraordinary foreign ministers' session of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), held in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad on January 27–29, 1980, the first expression of this new period in inter-Arab affairs, and the Eleventh Arab Summit

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Conference, held in Jordan's capital, Amman, on November 25–27, 1980, the consummation of these new trends. Other relevant conferences between these two meetings will also be touched on, together with the most recent attempt, at the January 1981 Ta'if Islamic summit, to soften the lines of confrontation laid bare at Amman. Before addressing the current phase, however, a few remarks regarding the previous period in inter-Arab affairs are in order.

The Sadat Initiative and the Arab Response: November 1977–December 1979

The period from November 1977 to December 1979 marked a distinctive phase in inter-Arab relations, centering on the efforts by various Arab states to formulate a collective response to President Sadat's peace initiative. The opposition in the Arab world to Egyptian policies was nearly universal, with a broad Arab consensus against Egypt manifesting itself at three crucial junctures during this period: (1) Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, (2) the Camp David Accords of September 1978, and (3) the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, concluded in March 1979. The all-Arab consensus in opposition to Sadat floundered, however, because of the lack of agreement on how to respond appropriately to the Egyptian initiative—specifically, the nature of future relations with Egypt—and over the formulation of an alternative, joint-Arab strategy. Between the first and second Baghdad conferences (October 1978–March 1979), a series of sanctions against Egypt were agreed upon by the other Arab states, but the degree of application in the months following the peace treaty varied considerably. At the same time, other divisions in the Arab world began to gain greater prominence. These divisions—including the breakdown of Syrian-Iraqi unity efforts, renewed tension in Lebanon, differences over policies toward Khomeini's Iran, and the continuing conflict in the Western Sahara—further weakened Arab efforts to take practical, effective measures against Sadat.

Thus, for most of 1979, inter-Arab relations were characterized by a general consensus against Egypt that remained, however, a relatively ineffectual one—that is, the consensus rejected Sadat's approach yet was not given operational form. The Arab states continued, however, at least formally to give top priority to opposing Egypt. This opposition was illustrated as late as November 1979, at the Tenth Arab Summit Conference, held in Tunis. Despite important divisions over Lebanon and other issues, the summit conference did manage to engage in a kind of damage limitation, emphasizing again the minimal anti-Sadat consensus achieved at Baghdad and avoiding further splits over both the implementation of the Baghdad resolutions against Egypt and the use of Arab economic weapons in general.

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A particularly significant characteristic of inter-Arab relations from November 1977 to December 1979 was the fact that, unlike a number of other periods of inter-Arab relations, divisions among the Arab states had little to do with their respective global orientations. For some countries, attitudes toward Moscow and Washington played only a small role in determining their positions on the all-Arab spectrum; for others, global orientations played no role at all. Like many other features of this period, this one was rendered inoperative by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

First Responses

The impact of the Soviet thrust was quickly felt in the sphere of Arab politics. First to react was Saudi Arabia, which seized on the Soviet's "act of aggression against the sovereignty of an independent state"[1] by attempting to reassert its role in regional and Arab affairs. The notion of "reassertion" must be emphasized here, for a combination of factors (including the Sadat initiative, the Iranian Revolution, the Ka'ba incident, and other signs of internal instability) had seriously weakened Saudi Arabia's role, formerly often a pivotal one, in all-Arab affairs. Thus, the Saudis immediately began to mobilize both Arab and Islamic support for joint steps to cope with the perceived Soviet threat. Their strategy was to press for the convening of an extraordinary session of the foreign ministers of the ICO *(al-munazzama lil-mu'tamar al-islami).*[2] Headquartered in Jidda, the ICO provided an appropriate multinational forum through which the Saudis could assert their leadership, giving them an initiative in all-Arab affairs that they had not had since November 1977.

Iraq was also galvanized into action by the Soviet invasion, resulting in a considerable strengthening of a nascent trend in inter-Arab relations—one of tacit, if not acknowledged, Saudi-Iraqi cooperation. In fact, the parallel responses of Saudi Arabia and Iraq to the Soviet invasion marked an important step toward the subsequent development of a full-scale Saudi-Iraqi alignment during the summer and fall of 1980. Cooperation between the two ideological opposites in the Arab world had first manifested itself during the two Baghdad conferences and had been reinforced during the summer of 1979, as both sides realized that the geopolitical imperative of containing Khomeini's Islamic Revolution necessitated a measure of mutual understanding. Their parallel interests

[1]Saudi Arabian News Agency (SNA), December 29, 1979, in British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), *Summary of World Broadcasts* (Middle East & Africa), December 31, 1979.

[2]For the history of the ICO, in particular, and modern Islamic institutions in general, see Nehemia Levtzion, *International Islamic Solidarity and Its Limitations* (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, no. 29, 1979) and Martin Kramer, *An Introduction to World Islamic Conferences* (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv University, Occasional Papers, 1978).

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were further emphasized during the Tunis summit in November, when the Iraqis refrained from pressing Saudi Arabia to put more "teeth" in the Baghdad anti-Sadat resolutions. Iraq's restraint at Tunis preserved a measure of harmony in the already weakened anti-Sadat front and indicated as well its recognition that Saudi Arabia had an important role to play (a parallel if not yet cooperative one) in the containment of Iran.

The Iraqi condemnation of the Soviets was elaborated during the first week of January 1980 in a series of articles in the authoritative *al-Thawra* newspaper. The first article drew parallels between U.S. and Soviet behavior, noting that both countries, as superpowers, were primarily interested in expanding their spheres of influence and thus were consistently engaged in efforts "to impose hegemony on small states and peoples." Reflecting the Iraqi shift in recent years toward the West, a major trading partner and arms supplier, the paper stated that "the Soviet Union is neither capable of nor ready to respond to the Arabs' development needs."[3] *Al-Thawra* expanded its analysis on the following day, with a poignant critique of Soviet policy. Until recently, the paper said, the Soviet formula for expanding its influence in the region had been to establish relations with regional parties based on "friendship, progressiveness, and a sincere hostility to imperialism," regardless of basic differences. In recent years, however, said *al-Thawra,* the Soviets had shifted away from this formula of relying on "superficial" friendships (an implicit minimization by the paper of Iraq's own treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union) to one of "seeking partners in a relationship to ensure ideological and political expansion in the region." (Although elicited by the invasion of Afghanistan, such criticism also reflected Iraqi displeasure at stepped-up activities on the part of the Iraqi Communist party in 1978 and 1979.) In the Soviet view, said *al-Thawra,* these partners—including such countries as Ethiopia, South Yemen (PDRY), and Afghanistan—would better serve "the USSR's short and long-term strategy." Furthermore, the paper continued, the Soviet "occupation" of Afghanistan must be seen in broader global terms, for "Afghanistan is the strategic key to the oil region." The Soviets' "blatant and large-scale intervention in Afghanistan's domestic affairs" held considerably graver implications than had previous moves into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, said *al-Thawra,* and this "must inevitably provoke the anxiety of all countries in the area, in fact all countries in the world, whether or not they have friendly relations with the Soviet Union."[4]

The Iraqi and Saudi positions were not yet as harmonious as

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[3] *Al-Thawra* (Baghdad), January 3, 1980, quoted by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), January 3, in BBC, *Summary,* January 5, 1980.

[4] *Al-Thawra* (Baghdad), January 4, 1980, quoted by INA, January 4, in BBC, *Summary,* January 7, 1980.

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they would be later in the year. In particular, these nations differed both on the importance of the Islamic aspect of the Afghanistan crisis and on the appropriate role of the great powers in the region. Thus, while the Iraqis pursued a course somewhat parallel to that of Saudi Arabia, their policies illustrated another, older theme of inter-Arab relations: that of Iraq as the "odd man out" of Arab politics. That at this juncture Iraq was even farther apart from the other Arab "radicals" than it was from the "conservatives" was manifested in the varying responses to the Soviet invasion by the newly active Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation.

Preconference Alignments

Consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria, the PDRY, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Steadfastness Front had been formed in December 1977 as a response to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The Baghdad conferences of October 1978 and March 1979, coupled with important steps in the direction of Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, had placed the front in eclipse. After Syrian-Iraqi unity efforts during the summer of 1979 failed, however, the Syrians again began treating the Steadfastness Front as a possible vehicle for its regional activities. Initial steps to revive the front were made on November 1, 1979, in Algiers when, on the occasion of the anniversary celebration of the Algerian Revolution, the leaders of four Steadfastness Front members held joint discussions. (The fifth member, the PDRY, also participated, but not at the head-of-state level.) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent responses of Saudi Arabia and Iraq gave further impetus to the front's revival, as each member attempted to cope with the dilemma posed by its status as a recipient of Soviet aid and support.

The first efforts at coordination came in the United Nations General Assembly, which voted on January 14, 1980, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet armed forces. Of the five Steadfastness Front members, Syria, Algeria, and Libya all abstained on the vote; the PDRY, having the least to lose in the inter-Arab arena, voted against the resolution; and the PLO observer in the General Assembly delivered a strongly pro-Soviet speech. Of the other Arab countries, only the Sudan and North Yemen (YAR) abstained. (The Sudanese ambassador was later recalled, for supposedly disregarding his government's instructions to vote in favor of the condemnation.)[5] All other Arab League members, including Iraq, voted to condemn the Soviets.

Of the three abstainers among the Steadfastness Front, Syria

[5]Sudanese News Agency (SUNA), January 16, 1980, in BBC, *Summary*, January 17, 1980; *al-Madina* (Riyadh), January 21, 1980.

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was the country most concerned with the growing anti-Soviet sentiment in the region, as more and more countries lined up to participate in the Islamabad conference. Bogged down in Lebanon, uneasy about Iraq, weakened by Egypt's withdrawal from the confrontation with Israel, receiving major shipments of Soviet arms, and facing mounting internal opposition, the Asad regime was certainly not prepared to act against the interests of its Soviet benefactor. This despite the fact that a failure to give an appropriate "Islamic response" to the Soviet invasion of a Sunni Muslim country would further weaken the regime's legitimacy with Syria's Sunni majority. While formally abstaining in the UN vote, the actual Syrian position was to concentrate on the dangers posed by Western "meddling" in the area[6] and to try to discredit the West's supposed concern for Islam, asking the question "Is Islam in Afghanistan different than Islam in Palestine?"[7] The overall aim of this two-pronged approach was to try to deflect the growing Arab and Islamic consensus against the Soviet invasion and to mobilize other Steadfastness Front members in support of Syria.

On January 16 the Syrians convened a one-day conference of the foreign ministers of the Steadfastness Front in Damascus. Mindful of the recent acrimony between Libya and the PLO, particularly with al-Fatah, observers considered it likely that the split would impede the work of the conference. Their dispute was purposely kept off the agenda, however, and the Syrians engaged in intense behind-the-scenes activity to promote a reconciliation.[8] These efforts had some success. With the Libyan-Palestinian rift under control for the moment, the Syrians turned to the main item on their agenda—mobilizing support to counter the budding Islamic consensus against the Soviet Union and its invasion of Afghanistan.

The conference finished its deliberations that same day and, that evening, issued its final statement and resolutions, which were replete with anti-American and pro-Soviet themes. The statement began by declaring that "world imperialism," led by the United States in collusion with Egypt and Israel, was fabricating an uproar aimed "at splintering Arab solidarity, at enabling the Camp David accords to end their impasse and at driving a wedge between the Arab nation and its friends, led by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries."[9]

The centerpiece of the conference's decisions was its response to the call for an emergency Islamic conference. This response, expressed in a cable sent to the ICO secretary-general and all Islamic governments,

[6]*Tishrin* (Damascus), January 12, 1980.
[7]*Al-Thawra* (Damascus), January 11, 1980.
[8]*Al-Kifah al-'Arabi* (Beirut), January 21-27, 1980.
[9]Radio Damascus, January 16, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Middle East & Africa), January 17, 1980.

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defined the parameters of inter-Arab maneuvering for the next eleven days prior to the Islamabad meeting, as the front strove to deflect the Arab and Islamic world from an anti-Soviet position.

The cable did not explicitly try to prevent the convening of an emergency conference. Rather, it attempted to alter its form and content. The form was to be altered by changing both the date and venue—so that it would not coincide with the beginning of Egyptian-Israeli normalization (January 26) and in order to deemphasize the anti-Soviet nature of the conference by moving it away from neighboring Afghanistan. Regarding the deliberations themselves, the Steadfastness Front sought to broaden the agenda of the meeting to include Arab-Israeli issues and the U.S. role in the region.

Key questions remained unanswered regarding the front's decisions: would the members boycott the upcoming Islamic conference if their proposals were not fully, or even partially, taken into account? Were their demands deliberately phrased in such a way as to preclude acceptance and thus force a boycott? Or was the front mainly concerned with the timing of the conference and not so much with the principles involved? In fact, each member of the Steadfastness Front would determine these issues for itself during the following eleven days, in light of its own particular interests, and draw the appropriate conclusions. These individual decisions illustrate that, at least after the event, the January 16 resolutions were not considered binding; the decisions also point to the front's overall state of weakness and lack of cohesion.

The Steadfastness Front's decisions did not impede the growing momentum toward convening an emergency Islamic conference, on schedule and in Islamabad. By January 21, twenty-nine states, more than two-thirds of the forty-one active members, had already notified the Pakistani government of their intention to attend. Among the Arab states outside the Steadfastness Front, only Iraq had not yet announced its participation. (Egypt had been suspended from the ICO in May 1979.) Saudi Arabia was determined to win the Iraqis over, as well. On January 19, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faisal visited Iraq "within the framework of coordination to discuss the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan."[10] On January 23 the Iraqis formally announced that they would participate in the conference, another sign of increasing Saudi-Iraqi cooperation.

The success of Saudi efforts to mobilize the other Arab states placed considerable pressure on the Steadfastness Front members to be flexible in their positions, in order not to be left isolated in the inter-Arab arena. The Algerians were the first to break ranks, announcing their participation on January 23. The Libyans continued to keep their own

[10]SNA, January 20, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, January 21, 1980.

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counsel, while the PDRY's nonparticipation was considered certain, owing to its status as a virtual Soviet satellite.

For its part, as the catalyst and host of the front's January 16 meeting, Syria was both the object of outside pressure and the initiator of lobbying efforts. Despite their diametrically opposed views regarding the Soviet role in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Syria had kept open the lines of communication, with the Saudis trying at intervals to bring the Syrians into line.

Syria's lobbying efforts were directed particularly at Jordan in an attempt to obtain its support for the proposals to change the date and location of the Islamabad conference.[11] Just one day after these Syrian-Jordanian contacts, however, Jordan announced that it would indeed send a delegation to Islamabad, thus foreshadowing the deterioration of Jordanian-Syrian relations later in the year.

The fifth member of the Steadfastness Front, the PLO, found itself in a dilemma similar to that faced by some of the others. Unlike Algeria and Libya, however, the PLO had a great deal at stake in the decision; unlike Syria, it had not the strength to adopt a firm stand nor the ability to make its various components take a joint position. Thus it was not at all clear whether the PLO would in fact boycott the Islamabad conference or whether, in the end, it would bow to the general Arab consensus (always an important consideration in PLO calculations).

As a result, the PLO continued, as one senior PLO official expressed it, to "tread cautiously on a circus tightrope"[12] as it conducted a delicate balancing act among the various actors in the drama. This balancing act was not limited to the PLO's relations with Arab states, but was also occurring within the PLO itself.

In contrast to Jordan's embrace of Iraq later on in 1980, Amman attempted, at this time, to walk the line between several Arab parties, notably Syria and the PLO on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Iraq on the other. King Husain himself took the lead in these matters, condemning the Soviet invasion but warning the Arab states against "diversions"[13] and emphasizing the need to put "Palestine and Jerusalem before Kabul."[14] Through all of the preconference maneuvering, the primary Jordanian interest remained that of promoting a "united Arab stand"; failing that, the Jordanians would at least remain on good terms with all parties.

The pressures on the four as-yet-undeclared Steadfastness Front members to participate in the conference continued until the last moment. On January 25, Pakistani officials announced that the Islamabad

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[11] *Al-Ra'y* (Amman), January 20, 1980.
[12] *Monday Morning* (Beirut), February 25–March 2, 1980.
[13] *Financial Times* (London), January 22, 1980.
[14] *Al-Ra'y* (Amman), January 23, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, January 24, 1980.

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conference had been postponed for "half a day," at the request of the Iranian foreign minister, in order to allow the rest of the front to attend (Iranian participation had itself been questionable until that point).[15] Late on January 26, Libya decided to end its holdout, sending a low-level delegation to Islamabad, led by its ambassador to Bahrain. More significantly, Syria's President Asad traveled to Saudi Arabia that same day for talks with the Saudi leadership. Neither side budged from its position; it is clear, however, that despite the final Syrian decision not to attend the Islamabad conference, the Syrians felt compelled at least to keep the lines of communication open with the leader of the anti-Soviet camp in the Arab world.

The Conference Deliberations

On January 27, 1980, the emergency ICO conference of foreign ministers was formally convened. Two of the five Steadfastness Front members, Libya and Algeria, had chosen to attend the conference, although neither sent its foreign minister. Two other members, Syria and the PDRY, stuck to their original intentions and boycotted the meeting. As we have seen, the ultimate decision of the fifth member, the PLO, had been the most difficult and thus had aroused the most interest. The conference had already begun its deliberations when the PLO finally set a course of action: a low-level Palestinian delegation, led by Abu al-Khair, the PLO representative in Pakistan, arrived in Islamabad at midday on January 27, in time to participate in the second closed session of the conference. The PLO's continued uneasiness with its participation was evident as it declared that Abu al-Khair "was attending . . . as an observer";[16] this in spite of the fact that the PLO is a full member of the ICO. The split between the Steadfastness Front and the rest of the Arab world was now compounded by a second split dividing the front itself.

On the following day, January 28, the Saudis, with the support of the smaller Gulf states, tabled a ten-point draft resolution dealing with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With little debate the Political Committee presented the resolution to the plenary assembly, and the resolution was quickly adopted on January 29.

Despite Libyan and, to a lesser extent, Algerian opposition, the final resolution was practically identical to the Saudi draft. As the centerpiece of the conference, coming precisely one month after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the resolution represented a major achievement for Saudi Arabia. The resolution consisted of eleven points, the most important of which condemned "the Soviet military aggression against the

[15]Radio Karachi, January 25, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, January 28, 1980.
[16]VoP, January 28, 1980, in BBC, *Summary*, January 29, 1980.

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Afghan people," denouncing it as a "flagrant violation of international laws, covenants, and norms"; in light of this "aggression against human rights," the conference demanded the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed in Afghan territories." No reservations were expressed by any of the voting participants on these two points.[17] The achievement of unanimity on these principles was a significant diplomatic triumph for Saudi Arabia.

Having achieved a consensus on the central issue of the conference, the Saudis' main concern now was to maintain that consensus. This was done by addressing a number of other issues, some of which had previously been excluded from the conference agenda. A number of other resolutions were passed on January 29, the final day of the conference. The first dealt with the other item on the official agenda: the Jerusalem and Palestine question. Among other points, the resolution condemned both the normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations and Israeli actions in southern Lebanon, and reaffirmed the support of the conference for the PLO and for "the liberation of al-Quds [Jerusalem] and all other occupied territories."[18]

Whether by intention or not, the Palestine resolution had accommodated Iraq's preconference desire to include the Egyptian-Israeli normalization on the formal agenda. Now the conference paid additional respect to Iraq's views: it adopted an Iraqi draft resolution directed at the "Western powers" who were attempting "to impose all sorts of pressure on Islamic states" by exploiting the Afghanistan crisis for their own ends. The result, it warned, might be to turn the region into an arena for superpower conflict.

In a foreshadowing of tumultuous events later in the year, the Iranian question presented the greatest threat to the consensus at Islamabad. At issue was the degree to which the conference would go in opposing the United States and in expressing support for a fraternal Muslim country. Iran insisted on a condemnation of U.S. economic sanctions, imposed in the wake of the hostage crisis. Libya, Algeria, and the PLO had a special interest in this resolution because a strong condemnation of the United States might balance off the anti-Soviet resolution and thus somewhat placate the Soviet Union. At one point, the Libyans actually threatened to walk out if the United States were not soundly chastised. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was interested in just the opposite. A strongly worded anti-U.S. resolution might detract from the anti-Soviet one for which the Saudis had worked thus far; it could cause damage to Riyadh's close relations with Washington; and it would lend

[17] *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), January 29, 1980.
[18] Radio Karachi, January 29, 1980, in BBC, *Summary*, January 31, 1980.

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further encouragement to Khomeini's Iran, a regime that was anathema to the Saudis. Once again, Saudi Arabia found its interests coinciding with those of Iraq. Its own draft resolution condemning Western pressures having been passed by the conference, Baghdad was now primarily interested in weakening its Iranian neighbor and rival. In the ensuing debate, which lasted more than three hours, Iraq took the lead in castigating Iran by linking the U.S. economic sanctions with the taking of hostages at the U.S. embassy.

In the end, the Iranians and Libyans were forced to retreat from their demands. While noting its opposition to any kind of threat, intimidation, or economic sanction against Iran, and while affirming Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the final resolution failed to condemn the United States by name. Instead, it merely noted concern over "the increasing tension between the Iranian Islamic Republic and the USA" and expressed hope that the two nations would "resolve their problem through peaceful means."[19]

The Consolidation of Two Blocs

For its proponents and opponents alike, the Islamabad conference was a watershed. The efforts of the Steadfastness Front members to direct Arab attention away from Afghanistan and toward the confrontation with Israel required a degree of coordination not previously evidenced by the front. Even though its resolutions of January 16 had proved to have no binding force, Steadfastness Front members uniformly expressed their disapproval with the results of the conference. The PLO was particularly quick to distance itself from these results, noting that it had attended only as an observer, had not taken part in the voting, and had expressed written reservations about both the Afghanistan and Horn of Africa resolutions.[20] (The Horn resolution had denounced Eastern-bloc intervention there.)

For Syria, the moving force behind the front's revival, the Islamabad conference was a warning signal, pointing to its increased isolation in inter-Arab affairs. To counter this isolation and to solidify support for its pro-Soviet policies, Damascus engaged in intensive contacts with other Steadfastness Front members, ignoring their lack of solidarity with Syria over the question of boycotting the Islamabad conference. These efforts culminated in a Steadfastness Front summit meeting on April 13–15, 1980, in Tripoli, where the front's members reaffirmed their support for Syria—"the main link in the Arab Steadfastness" against Israel—and emphasized once again the front's friendly and meaningful

[19]Radio Teheran, January 29, 1980, in BBC, *Summary*, January 31, 1980.
[20]VoP, January 30, 1980, in BBC, *Summary*, January 31, 1980.

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relations with the Soviet Union.[21] This emphasis had potentially far-reaching ramifications for inter-Arab relations, many observers recalling the cold-war days of the 1950s. The conclusion of a Syrian-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation in October 1980, together with the massive Soviet- and Eastern-bloc assistance rendered to Libya (which played some role in Tripoli's successful Chad intervention during December 1980), provided further evidence that a recognizable pro-Soviet grouping had crystallized within the Arab camp (notwithstanding the fact that each member's pro-Soviet orientation stemmed from different reasons). By contrast, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the two Arab "majors" on the Gulf, pronounced themselves satisfied with results of the Islamabad conference; most important, in this context, the conference laid the groundwork for the Saudi-Iraqi-Jordanian "centrist" Arab bloc that emerged in subsequent months.

The extent of Iraqi-Saudi alignment on Arab issues came into full view during the conference of Arab foreign, economic, and finance ministers that was held in Jordan's capital, Amman, on July 6–9, 1980. By contrast, the Iraqi-Jordanian rapprochement, the third component to this triangular set of relations (Saudi-Jordanian ties have been close for many years), had become apparent even earlier: it was, in many ways, even more far reaching than the others and was unprecedented in relations between the two countries since the fall of the Hashimite monarchy in Iraq (1958). This rapprochement was marked by substantial Iraqi economic assistance to Jordan and a long series of high-level meetings, culminating in the Jordanian king's visit to Baghdad on May 17–18, 1980. There King Husain described mutual ties as "a living model of what inter-Arab relations should be"; pursuing the same theme, Iraqi President Saddam Husain Takriti stressed that the special Iraqi-Jordanian relationship was rooted in "several geographical and historical factors" and went far beyond "temporary, circumstantial" ones.[22] In addition to contributing to the consolidation of the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian grouping, the significance of the Iraqi-Jordanian rapprochement for regional alignments was twofold. First of all, Iraq could now count on Jordan's backing in the Iranian conflict, soon to become all-out war. Secondly, Amman abandoned all pretense of being neutral in Baghdad's re-emerging quarrel with Damascus, openly siding with Iraq. King Husain's statement was that "some flaws existed in relations between Jordan and Syria," which was, he said, unjustly accusing Jordan of having encouraged antiregime activities in Syria. Furthermore, the king openly condemned the Steadfastness

[21]Radio Tripoli, April 15, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, April 16, 1980.

[22]*Al-Majalla* (London), April 26, 1980; Radio Amman, May 17, 1980, and INA, May 16-18, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report* and BBC, *Summary*, May 19, 1980; *Al-Ra'y* (Amman), May 17, 1980.

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Front's activities, describing them as forming "axes" and causing "the polarization of the Arab consensus."[23]

The Amman Conference

The July 1980 conference in Amman itself brought into sharper focus the processes in inter-Arab affairs described above. The course of the conference proved to be of more significance than the actual decisions taken, for it confirmed more clearly the existence of two distinct blocs in all-Arab affairs: an Iraqi-and-Saudi-led grouping, supported by Jordan and a majority of the other Arab countries, and the Syrian-led Steadfastness Front minority grouping.

The Syrian position was outlined at Amman by Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam and subsequently elaborated on by a Syrian-PLO "working paper." Khaddam called for a commitment by the Arab states "to shoulder the pan-Arab burden resulting from [Syria's] confrontation with the Zionist entity" and to help restore the "strategic balance" between Syria and Israel, to the tune of an annual allocation to Damascus of $5 billion. The joint working paper that followed contained a demand for the use of the oil weapon against the United States and its Western allies, beginning with a 25 per cent reduction in oil supplies.[24] In an almost desperate attempt to shame the conference into dealing with the traditional Arab bête noire, the Syrians scathingly criticized the conference's inclination to concentrate on "mere financial, economic and administrative issues" instead of on political matters related to the conflict with Israel.[25]

To Syria's disappointment, the majority bloc at the conference held a much wider view of the economic issues facing the Arab world, and remained determined to address them. King Husain outlined this view in his opening speech to the conference, which was entrusted, he said, with drawing up plans for how to "bolster the nation's unity, cancel the manifestations of sharp differences among it and draw up sound bases for Arab economic relations with all world states." These plans, Husain said, would make possible the entrenchment of "the intrinsic Arab power."[26]

The driving force behind this majority view was Iraq, whose foreign minister, Sa'dun Hammadi, emphasized the need to seize the "golden opportunity" provided by Arab oil wealth and to try "through cooperation and long-term planning" to "advance and strengthen" the Arab world.[27] This was achieved by designating the 1980s "a decade

[23]Al-Bayraq (Beirut), May 14, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, May 19, 1980.
[24]QNA, July 8, 1980; *al-Usbu' al-'Arabi* (Beirut), July 21, 1980; Jordanian Prime Minister Qasim al-Rimawi, interview in *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 11, 1980.
[25]Radio Damascus, July 7, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, July 14, 1980.
[26]Radio Amman, July 6, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, July 9, 1980.
[27]Amman Television, July 8, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, July 9, 1980.

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for joint Arab development." Hammadi minced no words in criticizing Syria's "shortsightedness" and "shallowness" of thinking,[28] and he accused Syria of promulgating the "slogans of liberating Palestine" in order to "cover up selfish regional interests."[29]

Both Saudi Arabia and Jordan stood solidly behind Iraq's effort to prevent a linkage between short-term political issues and long-term economic-strategic ones, although the Saudis in particular refrained from embracing the anti-Syrian tenor of Iraq's statements. The Saudi-Iraqi alliance was further confirmed by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi's statement that his country was not ready to use the oil weapon "unless all the Arabs agree to use it as well."[30] This declaration was a dramatic shift from Iraq's stand in the past, up to and including the Tunis summit of November 1979, and brought Baghdad into line with Riyadh.

The political section in the conference's final statement fell far short of Syrian demands. Furthermore, the main thrust of that statement was directed toward purely economic issues, in conformance with Saudi and Iraqi wishes. Thus, the lines of division that had first been drawn in January at Islamabad were now even more clearly defined.

The Iran-Iraq War

The response of the Arab world to the outbreak of war between Arab Iraq and non-Arab Iran basically conformed with these dividing lines. Most significant was the fact that the Steadfastness Front members all sided, in varying degrees, with Iran, thus putting other considerations ahead of Arab "solidarity." This move placed them even more firmly in opposition to the "centrist" bloc, and one result was the breaking of Libya's diplomatic ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. More important was the deleterious effect the war had on already poor Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Jordanian relations, culminating in the military showdown between Syria and Jordan during the November 1980 Amman summit.

At the same time, the outbreak of war pointed up the limits of the "Baghdad-Riyadh axis" (an Egyptian characterization) and concomitantly the limitations on Iraq's ability to play the leading role in all-Arab affairs. The first weeks of the war witnessed a concerted Iraqi campaign to mobilize Arab support behind its thrust into Iran. Formally, this campaign was successful; though, in actuality, only Jordan wholeheartedly embraced Baghdad's struggle against the "racist Persian aggressors." Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was more cautious. While openly backing Iraq's aim to redraw the demarcation lines along the

[28] *Jordan Times* (Amman), July 9, 1980.
[29] INA, July 8, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, July 9, 1980.
[30] *Monday Morning* (Beirut), July 14-20, 1980.

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Shatt-al-'Arab, Riyadh distanced itself from the virulence of Baghdad's propaganda machine. The Saudis, for example, hastened to deny an official Iraqi statement that King Khalid had called Iran an "enemy of the Arab nation." Clearly, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states had been placed in a dilemma, caught between the requirements of Arab solidarity, the desire to see Khomeini's nose bloodied, the fear that a spillover of the conflict might endanger their oil installations, and a lack of enthusiasm (mostly unspoken) for an Iraqi-dominated Gulf. This dilemma was resolved, for the time being, by the less-than-total success of the initial Iraqi blitzkrieg and by the resulting stalemate through the fall and winter months.

The Amman Summit

The process of fragmentation that had been openly eating away at the Arab consensus for nearly a year found full expression during the Eleventh Arab Summit Conference, held in Amman on November 25–27, 1980. In fact, the parallels with the January Islamabad conference were striking. Once again, Syria found itself in an acutely uncomfortable minority position, for the focus of Arab attention seemed to be directed at issues not connected to the confrontation with Israel. Thus, once again Syria felt compelled to press for postponement, and failing that, boycott of an important regional meeting. Once again, Syria exerted considerable effort to line up the Steadfastness Front allies behind its position. Once again, Damascus was careful to keep open the lines of communication with Saudi Arabia, in order to avoid a total break with its main financial backer.

This time, however, the stakes were higher on both sides—in part because this was a summit, not just a ministerial meeting; in part because of its restricted Arab character. The July conference and the Iran-Iraq war had continued the process begun at Islamabad of isolating Syria from the mainstream Arab line—and Damascus, having deviated from the requirements of Islamic solidarity at Islamabad, had no desire to have the even greater sin of deviating from Arab solidarity added to the list. Iraq and Jordan, on the other hand, were just as determined to hold the summit and even less willing to search for compromise formulas than they had been in July: Iraq's position stemmed from its desire to obtain collective Arab ratification in its struggle with Iran; Jordan's, from the need to justify its all-out backing of Iraq and, as the summit's host, to confirm its honored place in the mainstream of Arab affairs after years of insecure status. Faced with such irreconcilable positions, the Saudis had little choice but to come down in favor of the Jordanian and Iraqi stand for holding the summit as scheduled.

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The Eleventh Arab Summit Conference opened on November 25 with seven empty chairs: the five Steadfastness Front members, Lebanon, and Egypt (suspended from the Arab League after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty). This time Syria had been markedly more successful than at Islamabad in pressuring its allies to heed the boycott call. For the PLO, the dilemma of whether to boycott was even more acute than at Islamabad: the First Arab Summit Conference, held in Cairo in 1964, had created the PLO; the seventh, at Rabat in 1974, had confirmed that group's status as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people; and the central issue at Arab summits has traditionally been the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, to participate in the summit and risk Syria's wrath might be even more dangerous for the PLO's survival. With great pain, therefore, the PLO joined the boycott. Syria's bullying of Lebanon into joining the boycott completed the truncation of the Amman summit.

In case anyone did not get Syria's message that no Arab consensus could exist without its participation, Damascus decided to put it more directly. The second day of the conference was dominated not by the discussions of the participants but by the news that Syria had begun a buildup of troops along the Jordanian border. Jordan responded by mobilizing its own forces; by the first week of December, the number of troops on each side was reported to have reached 30,000. The Syrians justified this exercise in saber rattling in two ways. First, it was held up as an effort to forestall King Husain's alleged intention to ask the summit (dubbed the "conference of gloom and anxiety" by a Syrian paper)[31] to ignore the 1974 Rabat decision on the PLO and to delegate to himself the right to speak for the Palestinians in talks with the new U.S. administration. Second, it was a warning to Husain that Jordanian support for opposition groups in Syria might well result in Syrian military action against Jordan. Not said, but well understood by all sides was that the Mafraq-Baghdad desert road, on which Iraqi supplies unloaded at Jordan's 'Aqaba port were being transshipped, passed close to the Syrian-Jordanian border and could be cut by a Syrian military thrust. The Syrian-Jordanian border showdown eventually passed without military incident, thanks in part to a mediation effort by Saudi Arabia's Prince 'Abdallah. The very fact that the Saudis became involved indicated that Syria had been at least partially successful in conveying to the Arab world the message that Damascus intended to continue as a factor in the Arab political equation.

Given this background of boycott and mobilization, the resolutions of the truncated Amman summit were, not surprisingly, devoid

[31] *Tishrin*, November 26, 1980, reported by Radio Damascus, November 26, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, November 26, 1980.

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of innovation. In the political field, the summit reiterated previous summit resolutions condemning the Camp David Accords, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and U.S. support for Israel; it re-emphasized the Rabat formula on the PLO (also endorsed by King Husain in his closing speech to the summit) and rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for settling the conflict with Israel. Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, the summit called for an immediate cease-fire and a peaceful settlement to the dispute, at the same time supporting Iraq's "legitimate rights in its territory and waters" and praising Baghdad's response to various international appeals for negotiations.[32]

The summit also passed economic resolutions, stressing the theme of "joint Arab economic action," which had been expected to be the focus of the summit. Here too, however, it was apparent that events had altered the grand designs championed by Iraq in July: Baghdad was now interested mainly in marshaling Arab support for its fight with Iran, and in concentrating its own resources on that fight. Thus, the plan for a "decade of joint Arab development" proclaimed at the first Amman conference was now allotted only $5 billion over ten years, one-third of what had been initially recommended.

Despite, perhaps even because of, the grave doubts that the Syrian-led boycott had cast over the future of the Arab summit conference as a viable and relevant institution, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia all attempted to show the summit's outcome in a favorable light. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz was one of a number of Arab officials who stressed that the summit agenda had already been approved by the Arab conference of foreign ministers (in which the boycotters had participated) immediately preceding the Amman summit. According to 'Aziz, the absence of some countries from the summit itself did not matter. On the contrary, "their attendance could have led to confusion, sabotage and incitement of controversies. . . . their absence has created a positive and constructive atmosphere which has enabled the conference to easily succeed in its work."[33]

Despite these optimistic and sometimes disingenuous pronouncements, King Husain's notable comment in his closing speech—that Iraq was being "stabbed in the back by an Arab hand"[34]—was a more accurate reflection of the depth of division and bitterness within the Arab world at the close of 1980. That all sides were not completely comfortable with the deep rifts that had been consecrated at Amman was indicated by the postsummit efforts of Arab League Secretary-General Chedli Klibi and

[32]Petra-Jordanian News Agency (JNA), November 27, 1980, in BBC, *Summary*, November 29, 1980.

[33]INA, November 26, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, December 1, 1980.

[34]Radio Amman, November 27, 1980, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, November 28, 1980.

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the "Fraternal Good Offices Committee" (composed of the Saudi and Algerian foreign ministers, plus Klibi) to mediate the tension among Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. Their efforts were accorded at least outwardly friendly reception in all three countries.

The Ta'if Summit

A further illustration of the desire to cool down the passions of Amman and point the Arab world back in the direction of consensus politics occurred at the Third Islamic Summit of the ICO, lavishly hosted by Saudi Arabia in Mecca and Ta'if on January 25–28, 1981. Neither Libya nor Iran attended the summit: Libya because of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's split with Saudi Arabia over its request for an American-manned AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System); Iran because of the presence of Saddam Husain. Those Arab parties that did attend, however, attempted to play down existing inter-Arab tensions, albeit without compromising their basic positions. Thus, for example, Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim was able to meet with his Syrian counterpart during a preparatory meeting and even described the encounter as "friendly";[35] King Husain's speech at Ta'if made no reference to Arab divisions and dwelt solely on the dangers that Israel posed to the Islamic world. Nor did Saddam Husain's speech, which concentrated on the Iraqi conflict with Iran. As hosts, the Saudis were mainly interested in presenting a picture of a united Islamic world (under Saudi leadership) and likewise made no reference to Arab splits.

For its part, the PLO was delighted to be back inside the hall and in its customary position as a recipient of Arab and Islamic backing. Yasir 'Arafat took the opportunity to meet with both Saddam Husain and King Husain, something he had been unable to do at Amman. Even President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria refrained from lashing out at his Arab antagonists, contenting himself with blaming "U.S. imperialism" as the cause of Arab divisions. Syria and the PLO both continued to be uneasy about the Afghanistan issue, however (a reminder of the Islamabad conference exactly one year earlier). Asad called on the conference to refrain from merely lodging complaints and to work for a "practical" solution,[36] and 'Arafat took some pains to defend the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as "temporary."[37] Of all the Arab participants at the Islamic summit, only Lebanon's President Sarkis (a Christian) touched a raw nerve when he stated that, in the absence of a joint Arab and Islamic plan for Lebanon, continued Palestinian attacks against Israel would only give Israel the

[35]*Al-Akhbar* (Amman), January 22, 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report,* January 22, 1981.
[36]Radio Damascus, January 28, 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report,* January 28, 1981.
[37]VoP, January 28, 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report,* January 29, 1981.

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opportunity "to intensify its aggressions against south Lebanon"; in effect, then, he blamed the Palestinians for Israeli attacks.[38] (Predictably, Sarkis's plea had no effect: the summit's final statement ignored the Lebanese issue.)

Conclusions

By spring 1981, it was clear even to the most casual observers that the all-Arab "spirit of Baghdad" of two years earlier had completely evaporated. Of course, an operative Arab consensus based on a common anti-Sadat position had been precarious almost from the beginning and had in fact begun to unravel as early as July 1979, with the failure of Iraqi-Syrian unity efforts. It was not until Islamabad, however, that Arab disunity and fragmentation first came into full play. Ten months later, the dynamics set in motion at Islamabad came to a climax at Amman.

Those dynamics remained essentially the same throughout the spring of 1981, with some additions. After the renewal of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Egypt, one could point to the existence of three loose and somewhat overlapping groupings in the Arab world: the Egyptian grouping (now including Sudan, Oman, and Somalia); the "centrists" (led by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan, with the support of the Gulf states and Morocco, in particular); and the Steadfastness Front (led by Syria). One could also point to the unprecedented level of participation of two non-Arab actors (Israel and Iran) in what had been an essentially Arab regional subsystem. In addition to the major issues confronting nearly all the Arab states (the conflict with Israel, increasing superpower penetration, Persian Gulf security, and the Islamic factor), one can now observe, from the Atlantic to the Gulf, a nearly unending series of bilateral or more "local" conflicts (for example: the Western Sahara issue; Libya versus nearly all of its neighbors; Lebanon; and the Yemens). What remains to be seen is whether this process of Arab fragmentation will continue or whether the efforts at Ta'if to play down Arab differences and renew at least a minimal Arab consensus will be revived and bear fruit in some yet-unforeseen way.

[38]Radio Beirut, January 28, 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, January 29, 1981.

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NIGERIA: FUTURE NUCLEAR POWER?*

by Robert D'A Henderson

In his 1979 Reith Lectures on BBC Radio, Professor Ali Mazrui suggested that "those African countries which signed the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) should review their positions, and consider setting up a continental nuclear consortium allied to a strategy of developing a small military nuclear capability, first in Nigeria and later on in Zaire and black-ruled South Africa" as a means of enhancing their national identities and their international status.[1] At present, only six countries on the African continent have had, have, or are actively seeking a nuclear energy capability.

Among the North African states, Egypt has trained nuclear scientists at a modest research facility with a 2-megawatt (MW) Soviet-built reactor that has been operating since 1961. Egypt has only recently ratified the NPT, in February 1981, with an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement coming into force in August 1982. In 1974 the Nixon administration offered to sell two 600-MW power reactors to Egypt as part of a linked arrangement to sell the same type of reactor to Israel. A purchase agreement with Egypt was signed in August 1976, but by 1978 the agreement had not been submitted for U.S. congressional approval.[2] Reports suggest that Egypt may buy two nuclear power stations from West Germany. The other potential nuclear state in North Africa is Colonel Qaddafi's Libya, constructing a 2-MW research reactor supplied by the USSR. Libya, which ratified the NPT in May 1975 and has since entered into an IAEA safeguards agreement, currently lacks trained personnel, although its oil revenue would enable it to purchase the necessary facilities and perhaps foreign expertise.

In Subsaharan Africa, Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo) had a small research reactor installed by the Belgian government a year before its independence (1960). In fact, part of the uranium for the Allied Powers' Manhattan Project during World War II came from the Katanga mines in Zaire.[3] In February 1961, Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for a research reactor, fuel rods, con-

*This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the Eighth Course of the International School of Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, Venice, August 26–September 5, 1980.

[1]Ali A. Mazrui, "Africa's Nuclear Future," *Survival*, March–April 1980, p. 79.

[2]See Ernest W. Lefever, *Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma* (Washington: Brookings, 1979), pp. 71–74.

[3]I am grateful to Mr. Ian Smart for bringing this point, along with several others, to my attention.

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struction of a research facility at Kwabenya (near Accra), and the training of Ghanaian personnel.[4] The facility began operating in 1964, although the reactor itself was still under construction. After the 1966 ouster of Nkrumah, however, the new military leaders closed down the entire research facility, and the Soviet technicians were sent home. Recently, a government committee was formed to investigate the possibility of restarting the nuclear research program, utilizing the trained personnel from the original program who are still available in the national universities and technical institutes. Both Zaire and Ghana are signatories to the NPT and have concluded IAEA safeguards agreements. The most controversial nuclear state in Africa is, however, in the southern part of the continent.

While engaged in an extremely substantial nuclear program, South Africa has consistently refused to sign the NPT. Beginning in 1953, South Africa became a major supplier of uranium to the United States and Great Britain. As a result of the 1955 U.S. "Atoms for Peace" program of peaceful nuclear cooperation, the United States–South African Agreement for Cooperation Concering Civil Uses of Atomic Energy was signed in July 1957.[5] This agreement was amended and extended in 1962, 1967, and 1974. In 1974, the president of the South African Atomic Energy Board noted that, in view of its uranium resources and uranium enrichment expertise and technology, South Africa could develop toward marketing part of its uranium in the form of enriched uranium and eventually in the form of fuel elements for power reactors. But such a development "can be carried out meaningfully only if our engineers and scientists can gain experience with the behaviour of nuclear fuel in power reactors under operating conditions, and are given the opportunity to test their own nuclear fuel under practical conditions in power reactors."[6] In addition to its own internally developed uranium-enrichment technology, South Africa purchased its Safari I 20-MW thermal research reactor (located at Pelindaba) from the United States in 1961 (Safari I was operational in 1965, and Safari II in 1968), established its own pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba in 1971 (a commercial enrichment plant is expected to be operational by 1984), and awarded a French consortium the contract to build its first nuclear power reactor, Koeberg A, for start up in November 1982 (Koeberg B is expected to start up in 1983).

Much of South Africa's nuclear program is not under any IAEA safeguards. In August 1977 both the Soviet Union and the United States accused South Africa of planning to detonate a nuclear device in its

[4]Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 134.

[5]Testimony of Myron B. Kratzer (Department of State), in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 277.

[6]A. J. A. Roux, "South Africa in a Nuclear World," *South Africa International*, January 1974, pp. 165–166.

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Kalahari desert area; in any event, no nuclear explosion took place.[7] Recently, however, there has been some evidence of a nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean below South Africa, and although the South African government has denied all knowledge of or involvement in the event, a South African naval task force was reported to be conducting a secret exercise at sea at the time, according to a CIA report.[8]

The sixth African country is Nigeria, which ratified the NPT on September 27, 1968, but has no IAEA safeguards agreement in force. Nigeria currently utilizes no nuclear reactors or fissionable materials. It has publicly committed itself to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has supported calls for a nuclear-weapons-free zone for Africa (including South Africa). After the French nuclear test in the Algerian portion of the Sahara in February 1960, Nigeria joined other independent African states in protesting nuclear testing on the African continent and supported a move for a continental nuclear-weapons-free zone. Then, in 1974, Nigeria proposed such a continental zone before the United Nations, partly in response to widespread press reports that South Africa's intensive nuclear program was intended to establish a weapons-production capability.

Recently, in a well-argued article, Ashok Kapur pointed out that "the new Third World orientation is to create third party interference in superpower planning and to create the intellectual and resource foundation to strengthen the capacity to interfere. Resource diplomacy, conventional arms proliferation and use, and nuclear option-building are different instruments but they are products of this new orientation in regional life."[9] In relation to Nigeria, research has already been conducted into its resource diplomacy and conventional arms proliferation and use.[10] In this paper I seek to investigate Nigeria's nuclear-option building in terms of its technical expertise, mineral resources, nuclear-energy facilities, the transfer of nuclear technology, and the bureaucratic-intellectual constituencies of that nuclear technology. By analyzing

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[7]For two differing, popular views on this event, see Carel Birkby, "New Storm over Nuclear Weapons," *To the Point,* September 2, 1977, and "Does South Africa Have the Bomb?," *New African,* October 1977, pp. 969–972.

[8]See Thomas O'Toole, "New Zealand 'Confirms' Mystery Atom Test," *The Guardian Weekly* (Manchester), November 25, 1979, and "SA Ships in Zone of Suspected N-Blast," *The Guardian* (London), January 31, 1980. A second nuclear blast is reported to have taken place in December 1980 in the same area. (See the *Daily Telegraph* [London], February 19, 1981.) Furthermore, the March 1981 visit to the Pentagon by five South African military intelligence officers has led to speculation that South Africa has put out "feelers" for American "understanding" with respect to nuclear tests planned by Pretoria. (See the *Times* [London], March 17, 1981, and the *Daily Telegraph* [London], March 18, 1981.)

[9]Ashok Kapur, "The Nuclear Spread: A Third World View," *Third World Quarterly,* January 1980, p. 66.

[10]See James Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy," *African Affairs,* July 1976, pp. 317–330, and Robert D'A Henderson, "Choices and Changes in Nigeria's Defence Policy in the 1970s," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* forthcoming.

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these various components, I hope it will be possible to discern the Nigerian outlook for nuclear policy decisionmaking for the 1980s and 1990s.

Technical Expertise

On August 24, 1976, the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG) established by decree an atomic energy commission with responsibility for "the promotion and development of atomic energy and for all matters relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy."[11] Under the then military government, nuclear research programs were to be situated at "centers of excellence" at the University of Ife (in the southern part of the country) and Ahmadu Bello University (in the north). The University of Ife alone sent twenty graduate students abroad for postgraduate training in nuclear technology; many of these students went under an exchange agreement with McMaster University (Canada). Even so, for the near future, Nigeria will lack an adequate number of highly trained nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians to support a modest nuclear research program. There have been calls, however, for a major federal government investment for the development of indigenous nuclear expertise. The vice-chancellor of the University of Nigeria (Nsukka), Professor F. N. Ndili, recently called for the establishment of a national institute for nuclear studies in the country; he went on to urge the federal government to embark on a program to train more physicists and mathematicians.[12] Similar calls were made at the National Energy Policy Conference in Jos in August 1978.

A second option would be to recruit foreign nuclear expertise from either industrialized or Third World (semiindustrialized) nuclear states for this nationally sensitive industry. Among possible Third World countries with nuclear expertise (though at various levels) are India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Egypt. To pursue this option, if only for the short term, India is a particularly likely candidate in view of its own domestic nuclear industry. Besides exploding a nuclear device in 1974, India currently operates two nuclear power stations for electricity production, two more are nearing completion, and construction is to begin on a fifth one. Furthermore, India now has extensive experience in using natural uranium fuel and heavy water as a moderator, and the country is beginning to gain more advanced nuclear technology with its fast-breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam.[13] Regardless of which option will be pursued

[11] *New York Times*, September 5, 1976.
[12] *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), March 4, 1980.
[13] See Pearce Wright, "Home Technology for 5th Atom Plant" (Special Report on India), *International Herald Tribune*, December 1979.

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(possibly both, in a complementary fashion), the present civilian government has continued federal financial support for nuclear-technology training in line with the objectives of the FMG, previously in power.

Mineral Resources

During 1976–1977, the Nigerian FMG and the parastatal Nigerian Mining Corporation carried out a feasibility survey of uranium ore deposits in the Gombe area of Bauchi state. As a result of this survey, the FMG in partnership with the French Minatome Company formed in 1978 the Nigerian Uranium Mining Company (NUMCO) for the purposes of uranium exploration, exploitation, processing, and marketing. The Nigerian Mining Corporation, which represented the federal government, held 60 per cent of the NUMCO shares, and the Minatome Company, which provided the technical expertise for the project, had 40 per cent. By early 1980, NUMCO had established its headquarters in Gombe, although it has had its activities restricted to that area as "other suitable and interested organizations are allowed to explore in defined areas without detriment to national interest." In March 1980 the Nigerian minister for mines and power, Alhaji Mohammed Ibrahim Hassan, announced that "priority attention" would be given to the development of uranium ore deposits in Benue, Niger, Sokoto, Cross River, and Bauchi states.[14]

Another possible source of uranium ore is the huge deposits being mined in the French-speaking northern neighbor Niger. These deposits are currently estimated to constitute approximately 10 per cent of the world's known commercially exploitable uranium deposits (at the present world market price of $(U.S.)80 per kilo). Of course, if the world price rises, other known uranium deposits could become commercially viable in several countries around the world. These deposits are presently being mined and processed into yellow cake, and then milled and refined, under the technical expertise of foreign companies, including the French Commissariat for Atomic Energy. Nigeria has a 16 per cent participation share in the exploration of uranium in Niger, whereas Niger itself has retained a 45 per cent share.[15] Other possible sources of uranium from among Nigeria's African neighbors are the Central African Republic and Gabon, whose deposits are being developed by French concerns. It is not known at this time, however, if Nigeria has any plans to establish a mill and refinery to process uranium ore.

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[14]*New Nigerian,* November 28, 1979, February 7, 1980, and March 31, 1980; *Daily Times* (Lagos), March 29, 1980.

[15]*West Africa,* January 21, 1980, p. 102; *New Nigerian,* March 24, 1980.

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Nuclear Energy Facilities

At present, Nigeria has no operational nuclear energy facilities. A Van de Graaf accelerator has been planned as part of the nuclear research program at the University of Ife, although construction has not begun on either the research center or the accelerator facility. An estimated two-year construction period would be necessary before the research facilities could be operational, some time after which a research reactor would be installed and commissioned. When Nigeria established its atomic energy commission, it was reported that talks with West Germany had begun on the purchase of a nuclear power station. During his 1976 visit to Bonn, the Nigerian chief of staff, Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua (acting in the capacity of FMG prime minister), discussed the proposed scheme with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Because Nigeria was a signatory to the NPT, talks were started between the West German Kraftwerkunion AG (KWU), which constructs nuclear power-generating stations, and representatives of the Nigerian government for the purchase of a 450-MW, medium-size reactor. The scheme was then valued at about DM 1 billion.[16] Although discussions were also reported to have been held with the Canadian government over the possible purchase of a 600-MW Candu reactor, no agreement was reached in either case.

If Nigeria does decide in the future to purchase a nuclear power reactor, it will, in theory, have three options. First, it could buy a natural uranium–heavy water type, such as the Canadian Candu. In that case, at least initially, it would need to depend on foreign assistance not only to mill and refine local uranium and convert it into fabricated fuel elements but also to supply heavy water or the technology required to produce it. Second, it could purchase an enriched-uranium, light-water reactor of the PWR or BWR types favored in the United States, France, and West Germany. In that case, foreign assistance would be essential not only to process and fabricate local uranium but also to have the uranium enriched in one of the three or four plants operated by major industrial countries. Third, it could hope eventually to buy one of the fast-breeder reactor types still under development, which need uranium but which, more significantly, both consume and produce plutonium in their fuel cycles. Apart from the fact that this last option is more speculative and could not be taken up until a clearly commercial fast-breeder reactor design is internationally available—well into the 1990s—it would represent a leap into a new generation of nuclear technology, for which Nigeria could hardly hope to have the qualified personnel. In practice, therefore, the choice is almost certain to lie between the first and second options.

Two items stand out clearly. One is that Nigeria, which-

[16]*Daily Times* (Lagos), September 1, 1976.

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ever reactor option it decides to pursue, would be heavily dependent, especially in the earlier stages of the program, not only on foreign nuclear experts but also on foreign nuclear suppliers. Even if it made economic sense to build up a complete nuclear infrastructure locally—involving uranium processing, fuel fabrication and plants for producing heavy water, enriching uranium, and reprocessing spent fuel—in order to support only one or two power reactors, which is most implausible, Nigeria would be unlikely to shift from current priorities the huge share of government resources needed to purchase the relevant technology and equipment "off the shelf." More probably, therefore, it would have to rely on foreign suppliers to provide heavy water or enrichment services, and even to fabricate fuel elements.

The other item that stands out is that Nigeria, as a party to the NPT, is already under an obligation to conclude a "full-scope" safeguards agreement with the IAEA, involving regular inspection of all its current and future nuclear activities, and would clearly have to make such an agreement before it began to operate a power reactor or even a small research reactor. In addition, any foreign supplier of reactors, fuel elements, heavy water, or enrichment services would almost certainly insist not only on the application of IAEA safeguards but also on its own right to ensure the peaceful use of the materials or equipment concerned, possibly including its right to take back spent fuel elements containing plutonium and probably including a right of "prior consent" to the disposition of such spent fuel.

Nigeria is unlikely to purchase a nuclear power reactor in the foreseeable future. In any case, given the lead time for building and commissioning such a plant, the country could not have a power reactor in operation before the 1990s.[17] It might well, of course, prefer to begin by importing and installing a research reactor in order to gain experience and train technicians. What is evident, however, is that by committing itself firmly to any part of this process, Nigeria, despite its access to local uranium reserves, would in effect commit itself as well to international safeguards and inspection and to a considerable measure and period of technical and commercial dependence on foreign suppliers.

Technology Transfer: The Politico-Strategic Context

Nigeria has repeatedly denounced South Africa's intensive nuclear research and development program, which is based on Western nuclear cooperation and trade with South Africa and on South Africa's

[17] According to the IAEA, the time needed for a first nuclear plant to become operational is eleven years (including six years for construction). See *Steps to Nuclear Power* (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1974).

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own indigenous nuclear technology (that is, its enrichment process). Under the Atoms for Peace program and then through the sale of research reactors and now nuclear power reactors, South Africa has received extensive nuclear technology and facilities from Western countries, including the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France. It has been reported that South Africa now has a nuclear exchange agreement with Israel. In addition, it is generally accepted that South Africa has the capacity (in expertise, facilities, and nuclear materials) to produce nuclear explosive devices. Whether it also has the capability to produce a nuclear weapon of a size that could be delivered onto a distant target is still questionable. But South Africa does possess jet bombers (Canberras, Buccaneers, and Mirages) that are capable of carrying a conventional-size bomb to a target within the southern African subregion.[18] It has also developed the technology to assemble and operate surface-to-air guided missiles (the Cactus system), but it is unlikely that it currently has the capability to produce an intermediate-range missile necessary to carry a nuclear warhead or to produce a smaller tactical-nuclear weapon, despite suggestions that Israel could provide this expertise. Thus for the foreseeable future, South Africa is unable to threaten Nigeria territorially with "nuclear blackmail."

South Africa's nuclear capability is seen, however, as a physical threat to its neighboring black-ruled states in southern Africa and as a "psychological" threat to the African continent in that it is a further support for the maintenance of its apartheid system. Nigeria's ambassador to the UN, Mr. Leslie O. Harriman, as chairman of the February 1979 UN Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, pointed out in his concluding statement that South Africa had refused to accede to the NPT in order to continue with its nuclear program and threaten African states, and that it had challenged the OAU (Organization of African Unity) commitment to the denuclearization of Africa.[19] President Shagari in his recent address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York City continued to support the position maintaining both that Nigeria "will not allow Africa to be subjected to nuclear blackmail" by South Africa and that Africa must remain a nuclear-free zone. He went on to point out that "resources wasted on the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction can be better utilized in solving the problems of want and in improving the material conditions of human existence."[20] Yet only days before, at a press conference on the twentieth anniversary of Nigeria's independence,

[18]See Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis* (London: Julian Friedmann, 1978), chap. 7.

[19]United Nations, Special Committee Against Apartheid, *Report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa*, March 7, 1979, p. 44.

[20]*Daily Times* (Lagos), October 6, 1980.

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he stated that although Nigeria did not consider nuclear capability one of its priorities, it "reserved the right to do whatever she could to protect herself if racist South Africa persisted in acquiring nuclear weapons to threaten the continent." He agreed, however, that Nigeria had not reached the stage for such acquisition although "everything depended upon developments in the international community" in relation to self-determination and the abolition of apartheid in southern Africa.[21]

Nigeria has consistently pursued its antiapartheid policy in a number of international forums where the issues of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament are discussed. When the Ten-Power Committee was expanded into an Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in 1960, Nigeria was one of the eight nonaligned countries invited to join. Although renamed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1969, Nigeria continues to play an active role in this body. As a member of the Board of Governors of the IAEA, Nigeria was one of the main instigators behind both South Africa's expulsion from the board in June 1977 and its replacement by Egypt, although South Africa still remained a full member of the IAEA.[22] In 1978, Nigeria was elected to the "African seat" in the UN Security Council. Among its proposed objectives Ambassador Harriman listed such "activist" council steps as an oil and arms embargo, foreign investment ban, and so on against South Africa's apartheid regime and action to denuclearize the African continent.[23] From its chairmanship of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, Nigeria initiated the above-mentioned 1979 seminar on nuclear collaboration with South Africa. During the September 1979 Conference of the Nonaligned Movement, Nigeria was one of the main supporters for the inclusion in the conference's declaration of a call for convening another international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, tentatively scheduled for 1983 by the UN General Assembly.[24]

Partly as a result of its active participation in these international forums and partly in recognition of its emerging economic and military role in Africa, Nigeria's views on African affairs are increasingly being sought. In 1976 during the U.S. Senate hearings on the proposed sale of light-water reactors to South Africa, the State Department spokesman on African Affairs stated that consultations with the Nigerian foreign minister had been held in New York City. When asked if the foreign minister had expressed his opposition to the sale, the spokesman

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[21]*Daily Sketch* (Ibadan), September 30, 1980; *Daily Times* (Lagos), September 30, 1980; *National Concorde* (Lagos), September 30, 1980.

[22]Roger Murray, "Why the Atom Authority Kicked South Africa Out," *New African*, October 1977, pp. 970–971.

[23]Jane Rosen, "Nigeria in the UN Driving Seat," *Guardian Weekly*, January 23, 1978.

[24]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The NPT: The Main Political Barrier to Nuclear Weapon Proliferation* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1980), p. 28.

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confirmed that "he expressed his deep concern regarding it."[25] In addition to Nigeria's diplomatic opposition to South Africa's apartheid policy and its nuclear program, it was reported that Nigeria was threatening to use its enlarged naval force to seize any seaborne uranium shipments from the Rossing Mine in Namibia and that the decision to set up an uranium air shuttle might have been as a result of this perceived threat.[26] Nigeria has recognized that South Africa's nuclear-weapons capability or potential capability gives it "a diplomatic resource in a noncrisis situation and a potential military resource if the state is forced into a 'back to the wall' crisis," in the words of Ashok Kapur.[27] This factor, plus Nigeria's anti-apartheid policy, could lead to greater government investment in a nuclear energy program, although even with greater political will, it is unlikely that Nigeria could develop its nuclear technology and facilities to the level of weapons production by the turn of the century.

Such a national nuclear development program could, however, further enhance Nigeria's regional power status in West Africa. At present, in addition to its large population (estimated at between 80 and 100 million) and its huge oil deposits, Nigeria has established a large and increasingly effective military capability along with an emerging industrial production infrastructure. These factors have ensured it a major voice in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). If Nigeria did pursue a nuclear program, it could provide the basis for nuclear energy production for the ECOWAS member states. At the July 1980 Conference of the West African Science Association, the Nigerian federal minister for science and technology, Dr. Sylvester U. Ugoh, stated that the nations of the subregion should pool their resources so as to achieve solutions within the shortest time and at minimal cost; he also called for greater cooperation in the area of energy production, including nuclear and solar energy. Notwithstanding the mutual economic advantage of a joint regional approach to future energy production, it must be borne in mind that, should some West African countries choose the nuclear energy option, they could seek French (or other nuclear states') nuclear expertise and technology as opposed to any nuclear assistance that Nigeria might be able to offer in the future. Indeed, the French industry minister, Mr. André Giraud, in a recent interview, urged the expansion of civilian nuclear power as a means of preventing war over conventional energy sources. He went on to say that "we must be more liberal in our approach to peaceful nuclear power and avoid creating a

[25]Testimony of Mr. James Blake (deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, Department of State), in U.S. Senate, *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, p. 306.

[26]Martin Bailey, "How Britain Smuggles Uranium from Namibia," *Sunday Times* (London), December 9, 1979.

[27]Kapur, "The Nuclear Spread," p. 60.

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mood of discrimination against nonnuclear countries. Otherwise, you push some countries into starting their own programs, and then there are no sanctions left if they add a military program, too."[28]

Technology Transfer: The Socioeconomic Context

Although Nigeria is an OPEC member and a net exporter of oil, current estimates of its oil reserves suggest that they could be exhausted by the year 2000 at present rates of production. The country's energy requirements are supplied from either hydroelectric power resources or thermal power stations utilizing nonrenewable reserves of oil, natural gas, or coal. The major electricity-generating plants are the Kainji Dam (installed capacity, 760 MW) and the more recently commissioned, gas-fired, steam turbine power station at Sapele (720 MW). Two additional hydroelectric stations are under construction at Jebba (540 MW) and Shiroro (600 MW), and feasibility studies are under way for similar schemes at Lokoja, Ikom, and Makurdi. In addition to the gas-fired Sapele station, smaller gas turbine power stations at Afam (256 MW) and Delta (312 MW) have been using natural gas as fuel for some time; all three of these stations are located near the oil fields. The biggest potential consumer of natural gas, however, is the planned Lagos 750-MW thermal plant, which is unlikely to start up until after 1985. Even so, the gas being flared off at the oil fields (amounting to 95 per cent of the gas associated with the oil deposits) is to be halted by the end of 1983. There are also isolated oil-fired steam turbine stations in such towns as Katsina, Minna, Yola, and Makurdi, as well as a few remaining coal-fired plants in the east, such as the one at Oji.

In 1977 the maximum power demand on the national grid was 753 MW (up from 256 MW in 1970), with a projected growth to 2,189 MW by 1982. The 1972–1977 period showed an average 20 per cent annual growth rate in the demand for power. The prediction for the 1977–1982 period is an average of 25 per cent each year.[29] Part of this increased demand will be met by the additional hydroelectric stations on the Niger-Benue rivers, while in the south greater use can be made of the gas reserves (especially those not associated with the oil deposits) or to a lesser extent the coal deposits in the eastern section of the country. According to the guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan (1981–1985),[30] the government is to encourage a greater use of coal and

[28]Joseph Fitchett, "French Minister Backs Expansion of Nuclear Power," *International Herald Tribune*, January 30, 1980.

[29]Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of National Planning, *Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan, 1981–85*, 1980, p. 53.

[30]Ibid., p. 55.

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gas for power generation, both to reduce the country's dependence on hydroelectricity and to pursue developments in solar energy. This is partly because of the effect that further damming of the tributaries of the Niger and Benue rivers will have on water and storage levels of the existing and proposed dams. This environmental factor was highlighted during the 1977–1978 drought, when low water levels at the Kainji Dam resulted in a drop of electricity output leading to nationwide power cuts.

In the north, with its increasing industrialization, there is a constantly growing demand for electric power. At present, most of the northern areas are connected by transmission and distribution networks to the Kainji Dam, with additional networks being added. With the October 1980 commission of Nigeria's third oil refinery at Kaduna, which has a 740-km oil pipeline connection to the coast, some of the fuel problems in the north will be eliminated; in addition, a contract was recently signed for the construction of an electricity generating plant to be linked to the refinery. To improve the distribution of the finished petroleum products, pipelines have been built from the refinery to Kano (via Zaria) and Maiduguri (via Jos). But what other energy sources are available? There appear to be good prospects (and costs) for exploiting wind and solar energy by those African countries bordering on the Sahara or that have a coastline. Because of variations in wind speeds and the need to compensate for them, wind-generated electricity could prove more expensive than other energy sources. In the case of solar energy, both the technology and the equipment are available for small-scale use, such as water heating, water pumping, and household-power generating. While relatively inexpensive, this energy source is currently more relevant to rural energy requirements (that is, households) than to towns and cities.

In Nigeria's case—though perhaps more so in the northern part of the country—the transport of fuel (for example, via a gas or oil pipeline network) to regional thermal power stations, plus the stations themselves, could prove to be just as expensive as nuclear plants. Natural-uranium, heavy-water reactors, moreover, have a record of commercial operation in Canada and India, for example, and the expected life of a power reactor is comparable to that of a large thermal generating plant. Also, nuclear power stations hold out the prospect that, even if continuing dependence on the outside world were necessary, they would at least provide an alternative to exclusive reliance on the few remaining foreign suppliers of fossil fuels when Nigeria's own petroleum and gas resources run out. It should be noted that these resources will still be steadily consumed by the country's expanding petrochemical industries even if they are no longer used as an energy source. With Nigeria's growing population and industrial sector, one might reasonably expect that it will be able to use all its energy production (from whatever source) in the

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foreseeable future. It is very likely that nuclear power stations will become a viable and necessary policy option by the year 2000. It is unlikely, however, that any single power station will be constructed that can contribute more than 15 per cent of the total electricity generation in the national power grid: if such a station failed or had to be shut down, the whole grid could suffer power cuts similar to those in 1977–1978. It is significant that the guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan make no mention of nuclear energy as a possible power source, although the actual plan is yet to be released.

Bureaucratic and Intellectual Constituencies

Ashok Kapur has pointed out that new bureaucratic and intellectual constituencies have emerged in favor of a stronger emphasis on the nuclear factor in Third World decisionmaking.[31] In addition to those Third World countries which already have national nuclear energy programs, Nigeria fits into the category of those which have only nominal programs but which have a potential to expand them; this is in contrast to Third World countries that know they are unlikely to have the financial and technical resources to pursue such programs even in the future. Who constitutes these interest groups, and what role do they play in Nigerian decisionmaking? Basically, they include political and military leaders, the diplomatic service, university lecturers, and research scientists.

Addressing their domestic audience, Nigeria's political leaders can point to a nuclear program as a symbol of national power and national identity;[32] such a program places the country within a "technological upper class" in world affairs. It enhances their efforts to have Nigerian views taken into serious consideration and even included at the "high tables" of international discussion. Further, it reinforces their claims to regional power status as well as their claims to speak for the independent states of black Africa. Such a program can be seen as another way of consolidating the national identity internally and of promoting the nation's status externally. On the other hand, there appears to be little support among the military leadership for diverting national resources to such a program. In terms of national-security priorities, there would seem to be several reasons for this lack of enthusiasm. First, Nigeria has no regional neighbor armed with nuclear weapons. Whereas South Africa is believed to possess such a capacity, its delivery systems have effective range only within the southern African region. Next, the financial and technological resources to pursue such a program would almost certainly

[31]Kapur, "The Nuclear Spread," p. 61.

[32]By way of comparison, see B. W. Augenstein, "The Chinese and French Programs for the Development of National Nuclear Forces," ORBIS, Fall 1967, pp. 846–863.

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reduce such resources available for developing the country's conventional military power as well as its domestic security-related industries. Finally, the military leadership has placed major emphasis on improving the armed forces' efficiency, modernizing its conventional firepower, and creating a regional mobility for its forces.

The pursuit of a national nuclear program would strengthen Nigeria's claim for diplomatic participation in many specialized international forums. Its diplomats and their views would be accorded heightened status in those forums where they already participate, such as the IAEA Governing Board, the CCD, the UN Security Council and Special Committee Against Apartheid, and the Nonaligned Movement. Their lobbying and their votes would provide additional bargaining chips, both within such forums themselves and in parallel international discussions that might be unconnected to nuclear energy issues (for example, in the North-South dialogue). For entrée into higher diplomatic discussions and as a way of giving greater weight to the views expressed by its diplomats, the Foreign Ministry might well find it in its own interest to support a highly visible, though perhaps modest, nuclear program.

Finally, we have university lecturers and research scientists, who generally see a national nuclear program as access to scarce government resources. Such a program could guarantee funds for research projects and technical equipment, which are very expensive, indeed. It could lead to the creation of additional university posts or new departments; it might even lead to the establishment of specialized research centers. A nuclear program would require increased national representation at international conferences on the uses of nuclear energy, and on sponsored inspection tours of operational nuclear facilities. Further, those having scientific expertise would undoubtedly become involved in national policymaking, at a minimum as technical advisers and consultants.

Policy Outlook

For politico-strategic as well as socioeconomic reasons, Nigeria will pursue a nuclear energy strategy, if only at the level of establishing a pool of trained scientists and technicians for a small-scale nuclear research center. Its bureaucratic-intellectual constituencies will support a policy that gives a "high profile" to decisionmaking on the nuclear option (that is, to a national nuclear energy policy) while still accepting a "low priority" and proportional funding for nuclear research and development. This would be a lower-level adaptation of Kapur's "dual nuclear decisions" in the Third World (that is, no nuclear weapons at present and intensified research and development to build the nuclear

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option).[33] Nigeria's ratification of the NPT has not resulted, however, in the level of assistance and technology transfer expected. At the 1979 Havana Nonaligned Conference, Nigeria was a major promoter of the view that Third World countries have an inalienable right to develop nuclear power programs according to their own priorities, interests, and needs. Although Third World countries may be overly optimistic in their understanding of the kind of nuclear technology transfer that will result from the NPT (Article 4: nuclear states party to the NPT will assist non-nuclear signatories to develop their nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes), their complaints are not unlike complaints about the low level of industrial-technology transfer compared with what was foreseen in the North-South dialogue.

Nigeria is not at this time prepared to accept restrictions on its right of decisionmaking with respect to a nuclear option for peaceful purposes. Rather, for the present, it will follow the "high-low" policy outlined above, for this approach is consistent with its current level of technical expertise and industrial development as well as with its present need to finance declared national priorities, including industrial production, transport infrastructure, universal education, and health services. President Shagari's comments on nuclear policy at the twentieth-anniversary press conference support this order of priorities.

If Nigeria should decide to pursue a major, national nuclear-development program and is unable to acquire nuclear technology from one of the industrialized nuclear powers, it will have two choices. It could pursue a difficult and very expensive "go it alone" development program, not unlike that followed by France and China. (Pakistan appears to have adopted this approach in its own nuclear program, albeit outside the NPT.) Or, it could "shop around" for nuclear assistance from a developing country that already has a major nuclear program but may not be party to the NPT. Precedents for this last approach include the 1961 Indian-Egyptian nuclear-cooperation agreement, the reported nuclear collaboration between South Africa and Israel, and the recent nuclear-cooperation accord between Brazil and Iraq; of these, only Iraq and, recently, Egypt have ratified the NPT. As we look into the future, both these paths appear to be possible, if expensive, options. Yet, Nigeria wants an international acceptance of the principle of an "open door and helping hand" approach to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and *not* a "closed door and secret password" approach, within which it can decide whether to invest heavily in the nuclear option in the coming decade.

[33]Kapur, "The Nuclear Spread," p. 73.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Restructuring America's General-Purpose Forces

TO THE EDITOR:

Alan Ned Sabrosky's article "U.S. General-Purpose Forces: Four Essential Reforms" (Fall 1980 ORBIS) was quite disturbing, most notably in its conclusion that the United States could further reduce the size of the Army and Marine Corps combat forces. At a time of concern for the state of American military power it seems odd to propose additional reductions in manpower above the substantial declines that occurred during the 1970s.

Stalin is reported to have said that "nuclear weapons can kill people, but they cannot occupy territory, police it or organize it politically." Only ground troops can support these actions. Thus, while discussion often centers on the Soviet nuclear force, the most likely result of Soviet nuclear gains will be increased aggressiveness at the conventional level. This is influenced by both Soviet conventional superiority and the erosion of the Western option to escalate (which was never very attractive, anyway). It is this threat—of the Soviets' heightened aggressiveness in either the Third World or Europe—that the United States must be prepared to counteract.

Deployable Army and Marine manpower has fallen to a level below what it was during the "massive retaliation" days of the 1950s when conventional warfare was downgraded. The National Guard and the reserves are 42 per cent below strength, and with no Selective Service machinery active, the ability to mobilize additional troops is virtually nonexistent.

I realize that Dr. Sabrosky did not intend his reforms to produce a reduction in U.S. strength. His program was designed to reshuffle existing shortages in order to improve readiness. But reforms should have a higher goal than that. Sabrosky is concerned with quality, which is important, but he forgets that a balance must be struck between quality and quantity. Man for man, the German Wehrmacht was far superior to the Red Army, yet in 1945 it was the Soviets who were in Berlin and not the Germans who were in Moscow.

Sabrosky's desire to increase the tactical air force at the same

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time the ground forces are being reduced indicates the common error in American thought concerning the substitution of firepower for manpower. The point at which a diminishing rate of substitution is encountered was passed long ago. Airpower is useful to the ground forces as a form of flying artillery. It is not an especially effective independent arm.

The United States dropped twice as many tons of bombs on Vietnam as on Germany in World War II. But it could not stop the flow of supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, nor wipe out the sanctuaries in Cambodia, nor root out the guerrillas in the Delta by firepower alone. Not even the Air Force commanders believed they could.

The tactical air arm does need reform, and there are signs that it is moving in the proper direction. Less emphasis should be given to deep interdiction strikes that require large, sophisticated aircraft that are too expensive to build in adequate number, maintain, or lose. Tactical air should be tailored to ground support and battlefield interdiction, where the environment is more favorable and firepower more useful.

Bombing campaigns unconnected to ground operations lack an internal mechanism to bring a conflict to its conclusion. Because such campaigns do not threaten the political control of enemy territory, they do not create a strong incentive in a totalitarian regime to negotiate. Even as an interdiction weapon, the bomber is not time-relevant unless ground forces are available for offensive action during the period when the enemy's supplies are disrupted.

Sabrosky's underestimation of the importance of strong ground forces extends to his treatment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). It is hard to understand how his proposed reorganization could fail to reduce U.S. capabilities when he would reduce active Marine divisions from three to two and eliminate the two Army airborne divisions currently on active status, particularly when Sabrosky states that current airborne and Marine divisions "exceed . . . the realistic requirements for such forces." Furthermore, his reforms envision the remaining intervention forces as only light infantry, devoid of heavy weapons and mechanization. While such units would be easier to transport, they could possibly get into trouble more easily than they could handle it.

If we assume that American forces will not be committed unless a major crisis occurs, then we have to assume that the enemy will be well equipped and in substantial numbers. The Soviets would obviously fit this description, but they have also lavished large amounts of armor and artillery on their allies, and even nonaligned Third World nations have substantially increased their inventories of heavy equipment. Sabrosky's view that "heavy" units are unsuitable for the intervention role is a throwback to the early days of limited-war theory. In Vietnam this view initially excluded the use of armored units. It was soon discovered that mobility and firepower were just as important in Asia as elsewhere.

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Twenty-seven battalions of armor, armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry eventually were sent to Vietnam. A conflict in the Middle East would make armor even more valuable.

Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley, USMC, the RDF commander, has described his force as combining "airborne, air-assault, mechanized, armor, ranger and Special Forces elements." The Marines' amphibious brigade assigned contains an armored element, and both the Army and the Marines are working on new light armored vehicles for the RDF.

Heavy units will undoubtedly be needed for the counteroffensive in order to expel an aggressor from friendly territory, even if the RDF can avoid having to fight into an objective initially. Offensive action into the aggressor's homeland may also be necessary to conclude a conflict successfully. Vietnam demonstrated the folly of leaving enemy sanctuaries intact or enemy forces on friendly territory during negotiations.

Of course, to increase substantially our conventional forces in order to carry out any of the above will require a return to the draft. Sabrosky seems opposed to this. Even though he repeatedly refers to the limitations placed on policy by the volunteer-army concept (AVF), he concludes that one of the benefits of his reforms is that the AVF could be retained. But the AVF is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The end is a military adequate to the needs of national policy. If the AVF cannot fulfill these needs (and it cannot), then it should be changed.

The nation's top military leaders have reportedly told President Reagan that to increase military manpower by even 100,000 would require a draft by the mid 1980s. Certainly no one envisions the United States actually engaging in a conflict without a return to conscription. The total-force concept, of which the AVF is a part, calls for a draft in time of war. Given the high intensity of modern conflict and the political problems that attend a protracted struggle, however, it may be too late to crank up conscription after the shooting starts. So why not accept the draft as an integral part of U.S. military policy?

Conscription is hardly a new idea. Military duty is as old as war itself. Half of NATO's European soldiers are conscripts. America enacted peacetime conscription in 1940 and 1948 and has had a draft for thirty of the past forty-one years. Several polls over the past year have indicated that a majority of Americans would accept a return to the draft.

There is no question that the military is in need of some very thorough reforms. Dr. Sabrosky has performed a valuable service by stimulating thought on the subject; however, the proper end of any reform should be to strengthen American military capabilities. The Sabrosky reforms fall short of that goal.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH IN SPAIN

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The almost four decades of authoritarian rule under Francisco Franco produced little objective and scholarly research on international topics. Foreign policy was an area reserved exclusively for Franco himself, and what research and publication did take place was closely monitored and coordinated with Franco's own pronouncements. In contrast, in the six years since Franco's death there has been an extraordinary amount of work done in areas of research previously considered off limits to scholarly analysis. The field of foreign and defense policy boasts several new journals, and new institutes and study groups devoted to international affairs are forming. This proliferation of scholarly activity no doubt represents a pent-up demand for objective information after so many lean years. It is also true that Spain occupies an important position in the European geostrategic equation and would normally be the object of defense and foreign policy studies. Happily, many of these studies are now being conducted by Spaniards themselves.

This research report cannot be considered complete. New journals are contemplated; some, recently launched, will no doubt prove ephemeral. An attempt has been made to identify those publications and institutions that are most active now and that appear to have the greatest chance of surviving in an increasingly competitive marketplace.

Under the Franco regime, the Instituto de Estudios Políticos (IEP) produced, with its government-appointed and -controlled staff, two principal journals, the *Revista de estudios políticos* and the *Revista de política internacional*. Both publications parroted the official government viewpoint on such sensitive foreign policy issues as Gibraltar, the U.S.-Spanish Bases Pact, and Spanish colonies in Africa. In addition, the IEP served as a research umbrella for monographs documenting the Spanish position on various international issues. Perhaps the most notorious of

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the IEP-sponsored works was *Revindicaciones de España,*[1] written by two young regime apologists, Jose-María de Aréilza and Fernando María Castiélla, both of whom were destined to become foreign ministers.

Until Franco's death, the lack of objective foreign affairs research in Spain was evident even in those research organizations and study groups that were not part of the formal governmental apparatus. During the late 1950s and continuing into the 1960s, various "institutes of European studies" appeared in Spain's major cities, producing glowing reports of the benefits to be reaped from Spain's inclusion in the burgeoning European Integration movement under way north of the Pyrenees. In fact, these study groups were often simple excuses for initiating a degree of political activity denied Spanish citizens with less academic cover. Thus, Spain has long had a tradition of partisanship and bias in foreign affairs research and publication; it is only now, with the consolidation of plural and democratic institutions, that a trend of rigorous and objective analysis of Spanish foreign policy issues can be detected.

The IEP has been given a new charter and had its name changed to Centro de Estudios Constitucionales (CESCO). Although it remains a government body and is attached to the Presidencia del Gobierno, its new publication, *Revista de estudios internacionales,* successor to the *Revista de política internacional,* appears to be a journal of good academic quality with independent editorial review and close ties to the Spanish university community. In addition to articles on selected international topics, each issue contains a bibliographic section (reviews, notes, and a review of reviews), a chronology of international events of interest to Spain, and a section devoted to international documentation. CESCO also issues *Revista de instituciones europeas,* which provides a forum for scholarly articles on the various European institutions and includes a useful chronology of European Community events.

Recently, the Ministry of Economics has combined with the Ministry of Commerce to aid in the publication of an expanded *Información comercial española,* a technically sophisticated journal dealing with international trade issues as well as domestic economic questions. This journal has an excellent technical staff and has produced some of the best work in Spain on the country's international economic relations. Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also produced periodicals of interest to the international relations scholar. The Oficina de Información Diplomática (OID) edits a monthly publication, *Spain:* sixteen or so pages in several languages, including English, highlighting the official version of the news. Sections are devoted to foreign policy as well as to politics,

[1]This book, later withdrawn from circulation, was written while Hitler's armies were sweeping across Europe; it presented Spain's claims to a portion of territorial spoils as an ally of the victorious Axis coalition.

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economics, and cultural life in Spain. OID also produces, on an irregular basis, studies of ten or so pages called Reportage, many of which address foreign and defense policy. Two recent titles are *Security and Democracy in Spain* (no. 266) and *The Spanish Armed Forces in 1980* (nos. 301, 302, and 303).

It is to be regretted that the Escuela Diplomática, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' training school for diplomats, no longer requires the thesis-length study for completion of its course of studies and entrance into the Spanish Foreign Service. These *memorias,* held under restricted access in the Escuela Diplomática library, are in many cases "inside accounts" of sensitive foreign policy issues and negotiations. The authors have often had access to classified material, and for the international relations scholar these manuscripts are a treasure of primary source material.

Two other research institutions are connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sponsor research and publication programs related to geographic areas: the Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana (ICI), known under Franco as the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, and the Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura (IHAC). The former organization has expanded its programs beyond the strictly cultural level and now sponsors a broad range of programs in economic and technical areas as well as seminars, conferences, and study groups that yield various specialized publications. IHAC is smaller and has a more definitely cultural focus. It produces an annual review in both Arabic and Spanish, *Awraq.*

Another important government-related institution, attached to the Ministry of Defense, is the Centro de Estudios sobre la Defensa Nacional. Created in 1976, CESEDEN organizes nine seminars annually on topics of interest to the Spanish military. General staff officers as well as civilians, mostly university professors, attend the seminars. Unfortunately, the reports and studies from these seminars usually are not published, and access is quite restricted.

In the private sector, the most ambitious efforts in international relations research are clearly those of the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales (INCI), founded in June 1978. Modeled after the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, INCI describes itself as "a private and independent association dedicated to the study of the problems of peace, war, disarmament, social and economic change in the world, and international politics." Its current membership includes an unusually distinguished group of over 100 journalists, diplomats, academics, military officials, and other active public figures interested in Spanish foreign and defense issues. INCI has held seminar series on such issues as security problems in the Maghreb, Gibraltar, and Spanish security options for the future,

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papers and commentary having been commissioned from such well-known non-Spaniards as Christopher Bertram, Arnold Hottinger, and Ciro Zoppo. The papers are available in English,[2] and the entire proceedings, including discussion and debate, will appear in a book published by INCI and the Instituto Nacional de Prospectiva.

Another private group has launched a new journal, *Defensa,* devoted to serious study of the more technical aspects of defense policy. It is of too recent vintage, however, for more substantial comment from this side of the Atlantic. Other new journals, such as *Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas, Sistema, Leviatán, Historia 16,* and *Razón y fe* occasionally publish scholarly articles dealing with international relations.

Finally, the last several years have witnessed an impressive increase in the number and quality of scholarly books on international relations.[3] Barring a setback in the consolidation of democratic institutions in Spain, this scholarly renaissance should continue; and, at some point in the not-too-distant future, there should be little to distinguish Spain from any of its European neighbors with respect to the breadth and depth of inquiry into our discipline.

[2]Send inquiries to Don António Sánchez-Gijón, Secretaria General, Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, Almirante 1-4, Madrid 4, Spain.

[3]The following is a representative list of serious attempts by Spanish scholars to illuminate various areas of international relations: Vicenç Fisas, *El poder militar en España* [Military Power in Spain] (Barcelona: Laia, 1979); Manuel Medina, *Las organizaciones internacionales* [International Organizations] (Madrid: Alianza Universidad Textos, 1979); Roberto Mesa, *Teoría y práctica de relaciones internacionales* [Theory and Practice of International Relations], 2nd ed. (Madrid: Taurus, 1980); Javier Rupérez, *Europa entre el miedo y la esperanza* [Europe Between Fear and Hope] (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1976); António Sánchez-Gijón, *España en la OTAN* [Spain in NATO] (Madrid: Defensa, 1978); Angel Viñas, *Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía* [Franco's Secret Pacts with the United States: Bases, Economic Aid, Losses of Sovereignty] (Barcelona: Giralbo, 1981).

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reviews

FROM CHANGING THE GUARD TO GUARDING THE CHANGE

National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength. Edited by W. Scott Thompson. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980. 517 pp. $19.95 ($8.95, paper).

The United States in the 1980s. Edited by Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1980. 868 pp. $20.00.

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Superficially, the shift from Carter's foreign policy to Reagan's appears to be the most pronounced break since Truman's adoption of containment, which marked the decisive end of the traditional U.S. aloofness from peacetime balance-of-power politics in Europe. In a deeper sense, however, the current change is less than meets the eye. First, Reagan's reassertion of American power and anti-Sovietism is not really a novel departure, but a reaffirmation of the basic principle of containment. Second, the putative lapse in U.S. resolve during the 1970s was not really as extreme as the bitter rhetoric of recent years has implied. Because our liberal tradition has led Americans to view international conflict in absolutist terms, and thus to oscillate between complacency and hysteria, the underlying continuities in U.S. policy and in the Soviet threat have been underestimated. Third, like most presidents, Reagan will find it difficult to initiate or sustain as many dramatic changes as his campaign rhetoric would suggest. Criticism is always easier than implementation.

The probability that the new administration's policy will be less revolutionary than its partisans would hope, however, should not obscure the importance of the motive forces behind it. In American politics most changes occur at the margins; thus, the margins are important. Moreover, the rhetoric that reflects motives has an impact of its own, irrespective of the objective changes wrought by policy. (Jimmy Carter's policies would not have provoked as much anger and alarm if they had not been so couched in terms of militantly optimistic nostrums.) By the centrist standards of American politics, the novelty of the Reagan team's

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intellectual guiding lights is significant: they reject not only the outlook of Carter, but much of the approach of the Nixon and Ford administrations. The books under review are useful compilations of themes that reflect incoming attitudes in the new foreign policy establishment. Their diagnoses and recommendations represent many of the standards by which Reagan's accomplishments in foreign affairs will subsequently be judged.[1]

Changing the Guard: Counterestablishment Manifestoes

It is not completely fair to burden these books with the responsibility of speaking for the administration. They do not claim to be partisan tracts, and they were published before the 1980 election. A bit of the analysis—such as Mark Falcoff's chapter on Latin America in the Hoover collection—is also more moderate than Reagan policy. Well over half of the authors of the Institute for Contemporary Studies (ICS) book, however, either were Reagan campaign advisers or are now appointees in the government (including some at or above the level of assistant secretary). Several authors of the foreign affairs section in the Hoover book can be similarly categorized. No one visibly supporting Carter contributed to either. ICS and Hoover are also widely regarded as oriented not only to the Republican party, but to the wing that Reagan represented. Both books have the tone of advocacy—the Hoover volume in a somewhat muted way, the ICS book a bit more stridently.

These books and the organizations that produced them reflect the recent rise to prominence of a conservative counterestablishment in foreign affairs. Together with other disparate institutions such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Committee on the Present Danger, the American Security Council, and the Heritage Foundation, this new establishment has come to rival if not eclipse the more traditional liberal elite (represented in such organs as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, the Ford Foundation, Ivy League international-study centers, the Carnegie Endowment, and Brookings). Many—not least my own employer—would object strenuously to my attribution of any political identity to these officially nonpartisan organizations. Indeed, there is a fair amount of ideological and party crossrepresentation in most of them. (Yes, there really *are* Republicans at Brookings and Democrats at AEI.) But the fact remains that if one compares the center of gravity of opinion on both sides of the suggested divide, a marked difference is apparent.

[1]The half of the Hoover Institution volume edited by Alvin Rabushka concerns domestic issues. This review will focus on the half edited by Peter Duignan, on foreign policy.

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The political tendencies behind the volumes under review are noteworthy because they are comprehensive overviews of foreign and defense policies, and the particular arguments are best understood with the knowledge that the authors were clearly looking beyond the Carter administration. Such books are a genre.[2] In addition, fairness in this context requires a more than customarily explicit admission of the reviewer's own bias. (I favored a more conservative foreign policy than Carter's, but strongly opposed Reagan.) Objectivity is difficult in any political analysis, where empirical conclusions are hard to disentangle from normative instincts, and my criticisms will be taken with more than a few grains of salt by pro-Reagan readers.

These two books reflect premises about international relations that seem fundamentally different from the conventional wisdom of the early seventies that dominated the Carter administration (though not completely) until 1979. However critics characterize that conventional wisdom—as the post-Vietnam syndrome, starry-eyed liberal idealism, delusion of détente, insensitivity to the Soviet threat—the authors of the ICS and Hoover surveys obviously see their alternative worldview as hard-nosed realism. As suggested, though, there may be more similarity in the basic approaches than either Carterite human rights activists or Reaganite anti-Soviet crusaders care to admit. Both approaches have a sort of Wilsonian absolutist element—a tendency toward stark differentiation of other governments or political movements as either friends or foes—and an inclination to overemphasize the conflictual or the cooperative aspects of the superpower relationship, rather than to see it as a murky, shifting, but natural mixture of both. Neither quite resembles the pragmatic realpolitik or diplomatically supple approach more typical of European foreign policies. Both view national interests and ideals more categorically than conditionally. Where the earlier conventional wisdom may have erred in being too soft on Moscow and too hard on some friendly "authoritarian" governments, the new counterestablishment may prejudice U.S. interests by relying on the reverse, but equally simple, instinct. Perhaps my juxtaposition stacks the deck by setting up this review as a "moderate" critique. But if the real significance of these books lies in the extent to which they preview Reagan foreign policy, then the endurance of the new wisdom they represent may be judged by the success of that policy.

[2]Similar examples are the many topical volumes produced in the mid 1970s by the Council on Foreign Relations' 1980 Project and the beefed-up election-year editions of Brookings' annual *Setting National Priorities*. ICS has recently produced other guidebook-style studies, such as Arnold Meltsner, ed., *Politics and the Oval Office: Toward Presidential Governance*, which appeared just after Reagan's inauguration. None of these books was a strict partisan tract either. (Several chapters in the Meltsner book, for example, were written by Democrats, including my own "Managing Foreign and Defense Policy.")

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Policy Premises and Priorities

With the exception of the chapters on the Persian Gulf by Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Rowen in the Thompson book, the discussions of regional problems in these volumes are too diffuse to assess usefully in a brief essay. In overviews as broad as the Hoover and ICS collections, the best place to begin identification of unifying themes is with ideological underpinnings, conceptions of the principal instruments of national interest, and the connections between them. Ideological distinctiveness is clearest in the Rabushka-Duignan volume, even though it is less polemical than the one edited by Thompson. *The United States in the 1980s* is a capitalist manifesto, resting on norms that scholars would define as classically liberal, contemporary politicians as conservative, and left-wing critics as reactionary.[3]

The clearest focus on instruments for pursuing the national interest is in the Thompson book. *From Weakness to Strength* is a forthright brief for the imperative need to increase and use—or at least to be far more willing to use—U.S. military power. In both books there is an air of militant nostalgia or barely controlled anger directed against the conventional wisdom and the policies of recent years that devalued such priorities. The authors have no patience with trendy rhetoric about a "new international economic order"[4] or détente-inspired emphasis on arms control as a substitute for Western military primacy. None of the authors asserts that we can return to the world order of the first postwar decade. Then the United States had energy autonomy and close to half of the world's GNP; it dominated international trade, while enjoying both an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weaponry and an unchallenged ability to project conventional military forces in areas of the globe beyond Soviet borders. Progressive economic recovery of both the Soviet Union and the Western allies from the devastation of World War II, decolonization, and changes in the distribution of energy reserves make a return to that "golden age" illusory. But the message in both books is clear: the irresponsibility of policymakers pushed decline of these advantages much further than necessary, and a clear-headed reassertion of economic and

[3]Liberalism and conservatism are not alternatives but coincide when the former is embodied in the status quo. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," *American Political Science Review*, June 1957. By the same token, the Reagan movement is not really conservative since it seeks to repeal essential elements of the status quo: the results of "creeping socialism" since the New Deal, or "creeping pacifism" between Vietnam and Afghanistan. Because the adjective "reactionary" is pejorative, however, this review uses the popular "conservative" label.

[4]For example: "The proper response to this challenge does not lie in succumbing to the rhetoric of the new international economic order (NIEO). The need is neither 'new' (the demands have long been voiced), nor 'international' (but rather national 'delinking' and 'self-reliance'), nor 'economic' (but political and ideological), nor 'order' (but a North-South confrontation)." G. M. Meier, "U.S. Foreign Economic Policies," in Duignan and Rabushka, eds., *The United States in the 1980s*, p. 603.

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military power can rebuild a significant portion of the old American position.

There is a potential tension between the economic liberalism that dominates the Hoover book and the demands for massive expansion of defense capabilities in the ICS volume. It is interesting to recall that during the earlier golden age, Republican fiscal conservatives sought to restrain defense spending, while Democratic liberals tried to increase it. Indeed, Reagan's current plans for a military buildup echo Kennedy's policy of the early 1960s more than they recall the policies of Eisenhower or Taft. (It is also notable that the most vigorous pro-defense advisers during the Reagan campaign were disaffected Democrats.) Except for extreme devotees of the Laffer Curve, conservatives of the new counter-establishment recognize that there is ultimately some tradeoff between economic vitality and military expenditure. That tradeoff is not a quandary for these authors because increases will not *logically* undermine economic recovery so long as they are complemented by cuts in social expenditure and transfer payments, which are as nonproductive and wasteful to conservatives as is military spending to left-liberals. After all, the projected proportional allocation of GNP to defense under Reagan will still be less than it was in the fifties and sixties. The question not faced squarely in these books, however, is whether strategic logic can avoid being ambushed by political reality. If Reagan's economic program stalls, and domestic spending cuts energize counterattacks by injured constituencies, the tradeoff will emerge again. The one area treated a bit too skimpily by these two huge volumes is the linkage between strategic vision and tactical acumen.

For a democratic country, which (unlike the Soviet Union) cannot put a Draconian squeeze on civilian consumption and investment in peacetime, economic power is a prerequisite to military strength. Even if Reagan's domestic program succeeds, however, Washington is much more constrained by the international economy today than it was a decade ago. This point yields traces of ambivalence among the authors—not surprisingly, given the competing libertarian and Burkean strands in the conservative moment. The Hoover authors embrace the genius of the American tradition and the laissez-faire model. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, for example, capsulize Africa's problems as "a shortage of economic entrepreneurs and . . . an excess of political revolutionaries."[5] And, in one of the most powerful and scathing essays, P. T. Bauer demolishes every argument for foreign aid, presenting an impressive case (though too sweeping and insufficiently documented) that such aid is almost always perversely counterproductive and that free-market

[5]Gann and Duignan, "Africa," in Duignan and Rabushka, eds., ibid., p. 835.

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mechanisms of capital investment are the best hope for Third World economic development. But Yuan-li Wu argues for a more coherent strategic approach—and thus, implicitly, for more government intervention in trade—to link political objectives with economic policy. Richard Whalen, in turn, excoriates businessmen for "abandoning the values, attitudes, and business methods that formerly made us preeminent. . . . we Americans are rather like spendthrift heirs." Yet, he then socks business for not tempering the pure market orientation with political considerations.[6]

Similarly, the Hoover authors seem to agree basically that all would be well in a free-market global economy, but also to realize that politicization of economic interdependence—as well as the need for restraints on strategic trade with Moscow—requires controls on economic intercourse. This limits the freedom of maneuver Washington can hope to regain. G. M. Meier concludes his essay with emphasis on the need for greater "multinational policymaking . . . coordination and supranational decision units [and some system of international] functional federalism. . . . In this wider approach to policymaking, more progress can be made toward international deregulation."[7]

In short, the ideological premises of policy are in tension with America's diminished capacity to call the tune in international relations. Determination of the right course is not quite matched by detailed suggestions on how to orchestrate other nations' policies toward that course. In the same way, authors in the ICS volume recognize the crucial role of U.S. allies in improving Western security, but they are less persuasive in demonstrating how to overcome those allies' vivid disagreements about the nature of the Soviet threat and the moves required to meet it.[8] The Thatcher government, for example, has the greatest ideological affinity to the new administration. Yet, while professing devotion to enhanced NATO defenses, it came up with a plan to consolidate UK forces in a manner that would reduce the British Army of the Rhine and slash the ship complement of the Royal Navy by as much as one-third. In Paris, Giscard d'Estaing, who was edging toward warmer relations with Washington, has been replaced by a Socialist government having a decisive mandate and token—but symbolically significant—Communist participation. In Germany and the Low Countries, leftist factions have the governments under siege on the issue of theater-nuclear force modernization. NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles—which was designed to enhance alliance solidarity, and which several authors in

[6]Whalen, "International Business," in Duignan and Rabushka, eds., ibid., pp. 643, 653-655.
[7]Meier, "U.S. Foreign Economic Policies," p. 610.
[8]Kenneth Adelman makes the best effort of this sort with "Revitalizing Alliances," in Thompson, ed., *From Weakness to Strength*.

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the ICS book consider an inadequate military initiative anyway—has rebounded to undermine the political stability of several alliance partners. That the American electorate in 1980 apparently heeded the call to arms made in *From Weakness to Strength* is not enough.

Military Resurgence

The principal charge in counterestablishment criticism of the Nixon, Ford, and especially the Carter legacy is that those administrations failed to respond to the growth of Soviet military power. Criticism became most forceful after 1976, when the Republican foreign policy elites, previously divided by Reagan's campaign against Ford, united. They also gathered "neoconservative" fellow travelers into the coalition, when it became clear that Carter had turned his back on the Henry Jackson wing of the Democratic party. The ICS book, edited by Scott Thompson, is a cogent compendium of the particulars of this counterestablishment critique of the 1970s.

In that book, Fred Iklé (now undersecretary of defense) discusses the long-neglected subject of the eroded potential for industrial mobilization.[9] There is thus greater concern about our readiness to fight a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union, a capacity made progressively more attractive by the massive Soviet nuclear arsenal, which makes U.S. escalation a less credible response to Soviet attack—a subject that Iklé treats trenchantly in his chapter in the Duignan-Rabushka book. Again, today's conservative critique is reminiscent of the Democratic revisions of Eisenhower's defense policies two decades ago.

Miles Costick's chapter, also in the Thompson book, treats another aspect of the economic elements in defense policy: strategic trade. Costick asks the question "How was it possible for a country with a gross national product (GNP) less than half that of the United States, with a poor indigenous technology and with general inefficiency in its productive sector, to outproduce the United States in practically every category of conventional, tactical, and strategic arms?" and cites carelessness in allowing Soviet access to U.S. high technology as a significant part of the answer.[10] One need not deprecate the Soviet threat to suggest that two other factors besides stupidity in policymaking or commercial greed are important parts of the problem. One is the steady Soviet economic growth

[9]The chapter by Leonard Sullivan, "Correlating National Strategy and Defense Investment," goes into issues of weapons procurement and cost control. A valuable complementary analysis, more comprehensive and detailed, though occasionally exaggerated, is Jacques S. Gansler, *The Defense Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980).

[10]Costick, "Soviet Military Posture and Strategic Trade," in Thompson, ed., *From Weakness to Strength*, p. 192.

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in the first three decades after 1945. Currently popular recognition that Moscow faces economic stagnation in the 1980s obscures the fact that for most of the postwar era the *relative* gap between the U.S. and Soviet economies declined. Increases in Soviet defense spending in the past twenty years were great, but they were steady rather than precipitous, and not widely out of line with the expanding Soviet resource base. In comparisons of national defense effort, inattention to the *base line* distorts the implications of year-to-year changes—a trap that the editor of the ICS book falls into at one point.[11] The second point is that U.S. allies—whose technology now rivals our own in many respects—have been much less willing to restrict trade with the Warsaw Pact. This does not excuse negligence by Washington, but it does indicate the limited effectiveness of unilateral restraint. It is ironic that some conservatives and liberals betray a double standard, using the same axiom—"if we don't sell, others *will*"—*to justify nonrestraint, respectively, in conventional arms sales to* neutrals and commerce with Moscow. The axiom is simplistic in both cases but nonetheless has too large a kernel of truth to justify great confidence in America's single-handed capacity to improve international security.

The crux of the conservative critique lies in the balance of military forces, and its deterioration over time. There is no dispute over the fact that *trends* have been adverse to the West. Where liberals disagree is over the *absolute size* and significance of the disparity in capabilities. The forces dominant in the Carter administration until 1979—principally in the upper echelons of the State Department—understated the dangers posed by Soviet power. The counterestablishment critics, however, have tended to overstate Soviet military advantages. This is not surprising. First, the military balance is so complex that the data permit a wide range of interpretation, depending on which indices are selected as the focus of concern. Second, the logic of strategic debate in a democratic society, and the need to capture the public imagination, makes exaggeration a natural temptation. Now that the counterestablishment is in power, though, the overstatements of the 1970s may come back to haunt them and to rebound against the desired improvements in security (more on this later).

In the Hoover volume, for instance, Richard Staar shows a table of force comparisons, purporting to survey the military balance, in

[11]Thompson's conclusion, "Toward a Strategic Peace" (ibid.), properly criticizes the Carter administration for insufficient increases in defense spending after 1979, but does so by a deceptive analogy: "as a result of the invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950, which was a less serious matter . . . the United States tripled its defense budget." (p. 475.) True, but Thompson neglects to mention that the previous base line was a pathetically small defense budget typical of prewar American history, utterly incommensurate with the role of a global superpower. The Korean War increase established a new plateau of military spending, and since then annual budgets (discounted for inflation) have deviated only marginally from year to year.

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which the Soviet Union holds the advantage in sixteen out of twenty measures.[12] His table does not include the one index of significant U.S. advantage in strategic-nuclear forces: total warheads.[13] The table also compares the United States' 19 ground-force divisions with the Soviet Union's 169 and erroneously lists this as a ten-to-one Soviet advantage. Not only is Staar incorrect by his own terms of reference (the Soviets would need 21 more divisions for a ten-to-one margin), he also ignores the fact that U.S. divisions are larger and that many of the Soviet divisions are skeletal, relying on mobilization of reservists for combat deployment. A more useful basis of comparison, such as armored division equivalents, would show the Soviet edge to be less awesome. Moreover, almost a quarter of the Soviet divisions are in the Far East, arrayed against China. Staar's table also lists twelve U.S. aircraft carriers compared with three Soviet carriers. At the time the table was drawn up (1979), however, the numbers were really thirteen and two, respectively.[14] Even as of this writing, the third Soviet carrier is not yet operational. Most significant is the fact that American carriers are huge, while those of the Soviet Union are puny.

Staar is not to be blamed for these distortions, since he took the table in good faith from another source *(Aviation Week & Space Technology)*. But they are typical of the statistical manipulation that bedevils defense debate; many dovish assessments make similar self-serving errors in the other direction.[15] The problem is that "out" critics—who have time to publish and are not bound by bureaucratic strictures—dominate debate in the open literature. By overstating the case at the end of the 1970s, the hawks may have jeopardized the new consensus on defense.

Particular fallacious statements—such as the contention that by the early 1980s a Soviet first-strike could destroy "*all* our bombers at base"[16]—may lead some readers to dismiss the rest of an otherwise sensible analysis. Now that the hawks are "in" and the doves are "out," the latter can begin the counterattack, and exaggerated hawkish analyses

[12]Staar, "Soviet Union," in Duignan and Rabushka, eds., *The United States in the 1980s*, p. 745.

[13]Staar's table does list the advantage in warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It does not include the index of throwweight in intercontinental ballistic missiles, which favors the USSR, but neither does it include bomber payload, which favors the United States. In fairness, it should be noted that the overall U.S. advantage in warheads will probably decline in the next several years.

[14]*The Military Balance, 1979-1980* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 7, 10.

[15]For a glaring example, see the Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense* (New York: Times Books, 1979).

[16]W. Scott Thompson, "Introduction," in Thompson, ed., *From Weakness to Strength*, p. 9. (Emphasis added.) No serious specialists deny that most of the 20-30 per cent of the bomber force on alert could escape upon tactical warning. If the Soviets test SLBMs in depressed trajectory, which would decrease warning time, there is still the option of rebasing more bombers inland, to recoup escape time. Curiously, two pages later Thompson calls the B-1 "splendid"—a peculiar encomium for a weapon in a class of systems he considers completely vulnerable!

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of the military balance provide grist for criticism. Among nonspecialists, this might raise suspicions about the genuineness of a need for sustained increases in defense procurement. Similarly, frantic hyperbole about Soviet actions in the political sphere is not necessary to demonstrate to open-minded observers that the USSR is out for whatever it can get, and that there is a need for a stronger U.S. policy; exaggerations only offer ammunition to critics of the new consensus. Scott Thompson, for example, accuses the *Soviets*, not their South Yemeni clients, of assassinating North Yemen's president in 1978.[17]

Lurid portrayal of problems is understandable in a work of advocacy. But now that the counterestablishmentarians are governing, rather than campaigning, their own interests require better standards for assessment. Ray Cline, in the Hoover book, and Robert Ellsworth, in the ICS collection, encourage development of more objective and balanced intelligence analysis—certainly unobjectionable to politicians of any stripe. To systematize improvements, though, will be harder than most critics admit. Ellsworth mentions the now-familiar U.S. underestimates of Soviet ICBM deployments in the 1960s as an example of the ill effects of fashionable liberal bias. He does not mention, however, that those mistakes involved only *one* element of the nuclear balance, and that official estimates of other aspects (SLBMs, qualitative improvements, MIRV capability of the SS-9 missile, or Soviet ABM deployment) were apparently more accurate than assessments by hawkish critics at the time.[18]

A rejoinder might be made that the number of offensive launchers is the most important of the indices, and so the misestimates were more significant than the correct ones. Yet, the principal hawkish critique of SALT agreements has been that the focus on establishing parity in launcher numbers has yielded a net Soviet advantage because of disparities in the other qualitative indices. My point is simply that it will be very difficult, indeed, to "fix" the conceptual basis for intelligence estimates, as Ellsworth recommends, without simply substituting one set of "biased" intellectual short cuts for another. In trying to avoid this, the current administration would now have to take seriously the dissents of "soft" analysts, but doing so would risk subverting the vigorous reorientation of policy that is Reagan's first priority. Early assessments in regard to terrorism and El Salvador may reflect this dilemma.[19] Carter had the same problem: interagency studies in 1977 did not give him solid empirical support for his normative changes in policy on conventional-arms transfers or on withdrawal of troops from South Korea.

[17]Ibid., p. 15.

[18]Richard K. Betts, "Intelligence for Policymaking," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1980, p. 124.

[19]See the reports alleging politicization of these exercises: "CIA Said to Doubt Soviet Tie to Terrorism," *Washington Post*, March 19, 1981; Robert G. Kaiser, "White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1981.

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Guarding the Change

The counterestablishment's task today is less to convince than to implement. What are the odds that policy can create and sustain more effective political influence abroad and military counterweights to Soviet pressure? Some potential obstacles can be illustrated by three comparisons with the Kennedy administration.

First, in 1961 the expansion of U.S. military capabilities proceeded from a situation in which, whatever the previous deficiencies may have been, the base line of U.S. power potential relative to the communist states was much greater than it is today. The problem is less bleak than this difference suggests because we no longer lump China with the Soviet threat. Adroit diplomacy in maintaining the triangular relationship is thus a critical ingredient in prospective American success. President Reagan will have to adopt some uncharacteristic cynicism and continue to suppress his instinctive urge to treat Taiwan less shabbily, if the Soviet threat is as overriding a danger as counterestablishment views have assumed.

Second, despite the advantage in base-line power potential, the administrations of the 1960s eventually had to abandon some ambitious aspects of strategy. For a few years, nuclear deterrence rested on a counterforce, damage-limitation doctrine. As Soviet strategic forces grew in number and survivability, and as the campaign for civil defense provoked a public backlash, the projected financial and political costs of pursuing an effective damage-limitation strategy (meaning "only" about 60 million dead Americans) began to appear prohibitive. So, while war plans never abandoned the targeting of Soviet strategic forces (contrary to popular myth), they did give up attempts to maximize such options, placing more emphasis on the "assured destruction" component of targeting. Since the early 1970s, doctrine has been moving back toward more emphasis on counterforce, but there is no hope of re-establishing the near-disarming capability the United States had at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Indeed, given the long lead-time for a new bomber, and the intractable problem of devising a basing mode for the MX missile, there is relatively little Reagan will be able to do to alter the nuclear balance dramatically, even if he serves two full terms.

Third, overzealous pursuit of a more ambitious politico-military strategy in the 1960s eventually rebounded to shatter the more general and vital policy (containment) behind it. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson resolved to save the Third World from communist conquest and invigorated a strong program of counterinsurgency and forward defense. One of the outcomes was a massive commitment in Vietnam, which, whether or not it was "a noble cause," produced disillusionment and retrenchment in the 1970s. By the end of the decade, that overreaction

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had in turn led to a swing of the pendulum back toward containment. If renewed zeal and rhetorical oversell produce a fiasco having even a small fraction of the impact of Vietnam, then the Reaganites' basic plan may be wrecked by their own hand.

If the Western position is as dire as many of the authors in these two books suggest, then the challenge is indeed as Paul Nitze suggests in the ICS volume: to conduct "policy and strategy from weakness." In the political realm, this requires a more farseeing calculation of interests and tradeoffs than some administration spokesmen have in mind. Nitze suggests, for example, that "we capitalize on the new [post-Afghanistan] attitudes in the Third World and put renewed emphasis upon support for the basic principles underlying the U.N. Charter."[20] This tactic will not be served by warmer U.S. relations with South Africa,[21] motivated by a politically sterile strategic fixation on naval bases to protect the sea lanes around the Cape, or by concern with access to minerals—access that is more likely to be threatened in the long term by alienation of black Africans.

Edward Luttwak is correct when he argues that U.S. military policy is not as conceptually "strategical" and supple as the theorist would have it.[22] Whatever solution there might be, however, it does not lie in railing against "technicity," "managerialism," and systems analysis; nor in longing for a military leadership and mystique reminiscent of one's historical favorites. Concern with management and the vagaries of bureaucratic constipation are inexorably tied to the complexities of modern military technology and the logistical requirements of a country separated from its theaters of operation by two vast oceans. Inventive strategy is desirable, but President Reagan's defense initiatives will succeed or fail in the 1980s less by creating a new doctrinal vision than by working at the margins of current military options.

As disembodied strategic vision will have to accommodate to the limited elasticity of bureaucracy and budgets, so will Reagan's foreign policy have to accommodate to domestic constraints. In the honeymoon period these constraints have been minimal, and they are not likely to grow in regard to the *political* goals of the administration. But goals in the defense area, which are so central to the new policy, remain potentially hostage to success of the president's first priority: domestic economic recovery. Some of the most strident defense advisers in Reagan's campaign, such as William Van Cleave (who contributed a chapter to the ICS

[20]Nitze, "Policy and Strategy from Weakness," in Thompson, ed., *From Weakness to Strength*, p. 453.

[21]For counterarguments justifying less hostility toward Pretoria, see Gann and Duignan, "Africa," in Duignan and Rabushka, eds., *The United States in the 1980s*, pp. 845-850.

[22]Luttwak, "On the Meaning of Strategy . . . for the United States in the 1980s," in Thompson, ed., *From Weakness to Strength*, pp. 259-273.

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book), have already been frozen out of high positions in the administration, in part because they apparently did not fit strategic prescriptions to fiscal constraints.

If the manpower and procurement costs of improving conventional forces gobble up much of the budget largess during the first couple of years, if ideal solutions to the MX dilemma remain elusive and allied governments falter on theater-nuclear force modernization, President Reagan may come to see arms control as less of a narcotic delusion, which some of his advisers have believed it to be, and more of a necessary compromise to restrain Soviet capabilities. As Carter stubbornly held to an idealistic rhetoric of détente but was eventually forced to move back to a more confrontational policy, Reagan may have all he can handle in working for a strategic balance not substantially different from that embodied in the SALT II treaty. If many such compromises come to pass, most of the authors in the relatively moderate Hoover volume will be able to live with them, but some of those in the ICS book may be writing a comparable and perhaps desperate sequel in 1984.

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International Politics: Policymakers and Policymaking. By Robert L. Wendzel. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981. 476 pp. $16.95. For beginning students. Emphasis is placed on "the importance of concerning oneself with real world situations . . . and the necessity of dealing with such situations on a pragmatic, specific basis." Sections deal with the international environment; policy formulation; capability components; instruments of policy implementation; and intellectual errors, problems, and constraints.

Introduction to World Politics: A Conceptual and Developmental Perspective. Edited by Donald M. Snow. Washington: University Press of America, 1981. 220 pp. $9.75 (paper). A basic, programmed textbook.

Leaders of Revolution. By Mostafa Rejai with Kay Phillips. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979. 245 pp. $18.00 ($8.95, paper). This comparative analysis of revolutionary elites makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of social upheaval.

The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography. Compiled by Edward E. Mickolus. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 553 pp. $55.00. A companion volume to Mickolus's *Transnational Terrorism*.

Many Voices, One World: Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow. Report by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. New York: Unipub, 1980. 312 pp. n. p. The complete text of the MacBride Commission's final report, calling for a "New World Information and Communication Order." The result of eight conferences held between December 1977 and November 1979, the report rejects the notion of special privileges to protect journalists since the measures taken would "invite the dangers entailed in a licensing system." Journalists, the report concludes, "will be fully protected only when everyone's human rights are guaranteed."

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Marxism in the Contemporary West. Edited by Charles F. Elliott and Carl A. Linden. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 177 pp. $19.00. The current state of Marxist ideology in Europe and Latin America.

Paradigms and Revolutions: Applications and Appraisals of Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. Edited by Gary Gutting. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980. 340 pp. $18.95 ($7.95, paper). Fourteen essays, all previously published, are arrayed in four sections: philosophy, social science, humanities, and history of science. Each essay explores an aspect or implication of Kuhn's influential *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. A handy, valuable collection for anyone concerned with epistemological issues in the social sciences.

Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response. By Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979. 450 pp. $14.95. *This unique volume provides an analysis of modern terrorism and offers* possible ways to combat those who have propelled the world into an "Age of Terror." The authors stress the importance of intelligence and contingency planning as well as the need to avoid overreaction to terrorist activities. Also included are selected topical readings by a dozen theorists and practitioners.

Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm. By Ronald H. Chilcote. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 480 pp. $35.00 ($15.00, paper). Textbook emphasizing the systemic and developmental aspects of comparative politics. Extensive bibliographic information makes this a useful reference.

Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979. By Edward F. Mickolus. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 967 pp. $75.00. Descriptions of the more than 5,000 terrorist attacks on record are provided in this encyclopedic work by a CIA analyst. Several indexes and a glossary of terrorist organizations complete this most comprehensive volume on the subject to date.

The War Ledger. By A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 292 pp. $25.00. A detailed analysis of why major wars begin, what accounts for defeat or victory, which rules govern conflict behavior after the fighting stops, and whether the advent of the nuclear era altered the rules of conflict.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1981. Edited by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 502 pp. $35.00.

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This edition, the fifteenth, examines developments in Poland and Afghanistan during 1980 and updates information on membership, organization, and activities of Communist parties throughout the world. A masterful work, as always.

Civil Servants and Public Policy: A Comparative Study of International Secretariats. By Robert I. McLaren. Waterloo, Ont., Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980. 144 pp. $8.00.

The Study and Teaching of International Relations: A Perspective on Mid-Career Education. Edited by R. C. Kent and G. P. Nielsson. New York: Nichols, 1980. 358 pp. $26.50.

The Year Book of World Affairs: 1981. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, 1981. 288 pp. $41.25.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950. By Irvine H. Anderson. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. 259 pp. $18.50. A study of public- and private-sector dynamics in the United States that resulted in the control of oil import policies being placed in the hands of the major oil companies. The relative weight of individuals and pressure groups is handled with particular sensitivity.

Circle of Poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungry World. By David Weir and Mark Schapiro. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1981. 100 pp. $3.95 (paper). Documents a scandal of global proportions—the massive export of banned pesticides by the Western industrial countries.

Commodities, Finance, and Trade: Issues in North-South Negotiations. Edited by Arjun Sengupta. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 407 pp. $28.50. Essays focusing on the New International Economic Order with respect to commodities.

Crisis in the World Economy. By Andre Gunder Frank. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. 366 pp. $28.50 ($9.75, paper). A systematic discussion of capitalist accumulation of wealth and its effects—economic, social, and political—in the West and elsewhere in the world.

Energy and Environmental Balance. By Earl Finbar Murphy. New York:

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Pergamon, 1980. 281 pp. $25.00. A positive-thinking approach to the analysis and solution of the energy problem.

Energy in a Finite World: Paths to a Sustainable Future. Report by the Energy Systems Program Group of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1981. 225 pp. n.p. This brief, readable survey of energy prospects to the year 2030 is one of the most plausible, generally understandable attempts to date. Anybody interested in the long-term view would find it very valuable.

Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions. By Craufurd D. Goodwin, William J. Barber, James L. Cochrane, Neil de Marchi, and Joseph A. Yager. Washington: Brookings, 1981. 728 pp. $29.95 ($14.95, paper). A well-written history of energy policies going back to the Truman administration — a bit nostalgic, considering the simplicity of problems in the "good old days," but also a bit dated, going only to 1979 and not reflecting Reagan administration priorities in its conclusions. But the history remains interesting.

Exchange Risk and Exposure: Current Developments in International Financial Management. Edited by Richard M. Levich and Clas G. Wihlborg. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1980. 208 pp. $21.95. A comprehensive review of exchange risk in relation to uncertainty about currency ratio in general, the impact of inflation on firms, and the impact of exchange rates on the firm.

Food or Fuel: New Competition for the World's Cropland. By Lester R. Brown. Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1980. 43 pp. $2.00 (paper). Looks at the consequences of the decision to channel foodstuffs into the production of automotive fuel.

Foreign-Exchange Management in U.S. Multinationals. By Rita M. Rodriguez. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1980. 128 pp. $17.95. A thorough examination of the managerial process involved in exchange decisions and its impact on the international financial market.

International Energy Futures: Petroleum Prices, Power, and Payments. By Nazli Choucri with David Scott Ross and the collaboration of Brian Pollins. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. 247 pp. $27.50. The output of a study to construct a computer model of the international oil market: comes up with the same dismal conclusions.

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Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law. By Edgar Gold. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1981. 425 pp. $34.95. This book, primarily historical, traces the gradual intrusion of government control into the "freedom of the high seas." The author also usefully pinpoints near-term problems in sea transport.

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Arms Control II: A New Approach to International Security. Edited by John H. Barton and Ryukichi Imai. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981. 328 pp. n.p. Essays, by Japanese and American specialists, resulting from a conference sponsored by the Stanford Arms Control Program. The contributors are in agreement over the need to replace SALT with more realistic approaches to arms control that would, *inter alia,* check the rapid spread of military technology.

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The Defense Industry. By Jacques S. Gansler. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 346 pp. $19.95. A skillful analysis of defense problems confronting the United States.

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National Defense. By James Fallows. New York: Random House, 1981. 204 pp. $12.95. A book to be read, if only because the skeptical author asks unconventional questions and writes with remarkable clarity. Overall, the message is that the military establishment is going in the wrong direction, and doing it badly.

The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima. By Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 283 pp. n.p. A sequel to the author's *The Nuclear Question,* this book offers a humanistic view of the effects brought about by the "threat of nuclear annihilation."

Problems of Contemporary Militarism. Edited by Asbjørn Eide and Marek Thee. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980, 415 pp. $32.50. A detailed

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Dictionary of American Diplomatic History. By John E. Findling. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 622 pp. $39.95. Useful appendixes substantially enhance the value of this reference work.

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ably in recent years, particularly with respect to actions that might lead to war.

The Secretary of Defense. By Douglas Kinnard. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1981. 252 pp. $19.50. An insightful analysis of the five "pivotal" secretaries—James Forrestal, Charles Wilson, Robert McNamara, Melvin Laird, and James Schlesinger—and their contributions. A concise and well-documented work on a much-neglected subject.

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United States Foreign Policy and World Order. (Second edition.) By James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. Boston: Little, Brown, 1981. 467 pp. n.p.

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The Bureaucracy of Truth: How Communist Governments Manage the News. By Paul Lendvai. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 285 pp. $24.75. The gathering and dissemination of news in communist systems is described by a correspondent for the *Financial Times*. This thought-provoking book concludes that the Soviet-bloc press consists almost ex-

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clusively of newspapers without news; but we are reminded that the situation in the West likewise leaves much to be desired.

Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist Republic at the Crossroads of Europe. By David W. Paul. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 196 pp. $18.50. This slim volume offers a concise introduction to Czechoslovakia and its position in contemporary Europe.

Détente in the Napoleonic Era: Bonaparte and the Russians. By Hugh Ragsdale. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980. 183 pp. n.p. An engrossing case study of Napoleon's peace tactics and the influence of political illusions on the interaction of Russia and the West. In the view of one French diplomat harboring no illusions at the time: "Russia in time of war seeks to conquer her neighbors; in time of peace she seeks to keep not only her neighbors but all the countries of the world in a confusion of mistrust, agitation, and discord."

The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947. By Hugh De Santis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 270 pp. $23.00. A cross-disciplinary study of U.S. career diplomats' perceptions of the USSR; how "conditioning" and peer pressure affected behavior and judgment in the formulation of policy.

Eastern Europe and the Third World: East vs. South. Edited by Michael Radu. New York: Praeger, 1981. 356 pp. $32.50. Path-breaking study of a neglected but critical aspect of international relations.

Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 291 pp. $26.25 ($11.50, paper). A gloomy forecast on the prospects for liberalization in Eastern Europe. The ten contributors are convinced that the Soviets are not about to relinquish their stranglehold on the cultural, social, or economic sectors of the area, the case of Poland notwithstanding. The assessment is made for the "bloc" as a whole, eschewing the polycentric approach advocated by Laqueur and others.

The End of the Tito Era: Yugoslavia's Dilemmas. By Slobodan Stankovic. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 154 pp. $9.95 (paper). The author, a senior research analyst with Radio Free Europe, ponders the imponderable.

Forecasting in Military Affairs: A Soviet View. By Y. V. Chuyev and Y. B.

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Mikhaylov (Moscow: 1975). Washington: GPO, under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, 1980. 230 pp. n.p. Sixteenth in the Soviet Military Thought series.

The KGB: The Eyes of Russia. By Harry Rositzke. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981. 295 pp. $14.95. A twenty-five-year veteran of the CIA offers an insider's look into the operations of the chief adversary.

The Limits of Reform: The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Imperial Russia, 1802-1881. By Daniel T. Orlovsky. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. 299 pp. $25.00. A concise work that uses the MVD as a bureaucratic paradigm for nineteenth-century czarist Russia in much the same way that Allison treated the Cuban Missile Crisis in *Essence of Decision*. Orlovsky traces the change in the ministry from a progressive institution to a conservative supporter of autocratic statism.

The Mezhdunarodniki. By Oded Eran. Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove, 1979. 331 pp. n.p. An original work assessing the role of foreign policy specialists in Soviet foreign-policymaking. While much has been written about the Soviet view of the world, precious little has been known about how that view was reached. Using primary source materials almost exclusively, the author goes far toward bridging the gap in our knowledge between official Soviet pronouncements and behind-the-scenes maneuvering. The author is a research fellow at Tel Aviv University and was formerly a guest scholar at Brookings.

The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and The Soviet Union. (Volume 1.) Edited by David R. Jones. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1978. 247 pp. $31.00. The first in a projected fifty-volume series, this one has entries, arranged alphabetically, from A-series gliders to military administration. Entries have been selected that will be of use to both the specialist and the student, and nearly half appear in print in English for the first time. This encyclopedia is well researched and scholarly, but its use would have been greatly facilitated had the fifty volumes been condensed into twenty and the price likewise reduced.

The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and The Soviet Union. (Volume 2.) Edited by David R. Jones. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980. 245 pp. $31.00. Compared with Volume 1, this one contains longer essay-entries and makes greater use of analysis in the hope of "opening perspectives and promoting further research"; covers topics from military administration to the ship *Admiral Makarov*.

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The Peasantry of Eastern Europe. Volume I: Roots of Rural Transformation. Edited by Ivan Volgyes. New York: Pergamon, 1979, 192 pp. $22.00. A pioneering work that seeks to bring together, in a cross-disciplinary and cross-national format, comparative studies on the region's rural life. This volume concerns itself with such important questions as changes in the land-tenure system; national integration and economic development; and emigration policies and ethnic nationalism in the pre-communist societies of Eastern Europe.

The Peasantry of Eastern Europe. Volume II: 20th Century Developments. Edited by Ivan Volgyes. New York: Pergamon, 1979, 232 pp. $28.00. This second and final volume offers case studies of Russian peasants and their response to the imposition of Soviet rule; using the Soviet system as a paradigm, it examines attempts by East European states to adapt to the Soviet model.

The Politburo's Management of its America Problem. By Harry Gelman. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1981. 70 pp. n.p. Examines the "motivations, assumptions, and stratagems" of Soviet policy toward the United States over the past decade and seeks to lay the groundwork for a better U.S. strategy for dealing with the Soviets in an era of "competitive détente."

Romania in the 1980s. Edited by Daniel N. Nelson. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 313 pp. $24.00. The paradox that is Romania is addressed in these essays on Moscow's "wayward" ally.

The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930. By R. W. Davies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. 491 pp. $35.00. Number one in the Industrialisation of Soviet Russia series. The projected six volumes will cover the first two Soviet five-year plans (1929-1937); this one deals with the 1929-1930 period of initial collectivization. In essence, this work is a continuation of E. H. Carr's fourteen-volume classic, *A History of Soviet Russia*. Davies, who collaborated with Carr on the latter's *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, is well qualified to take up where the other left off. Examining the relationship between the state, the peasantry, and agriculture, Davies focuses on the impact that Soviet economic policy had on political and economic institutions and on the social environment. Carefully researched and replete with useful statistical tables and excellent bibliography, this volume (and no doubt those to come) will soon take its place alongside Carr's *History* as the definitive work on Soviet industrialization.

Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View. Edited by Robin Hig-

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ham and Jacob W. Kipp. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977, 328 pp. $25.00. Chronologically ordered essays that address topical issues relating to both civil and military aviation; points to industrial and technological innovation as key to the Soviet rise to eminence in the field of military aviation.

The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930. By R. W. Davies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. 216 pp. $18.50. Number two in the Industrialisation of Soviet Russia series. Here Davies turns his attention to the principal unit of Stalinist economic organization, the collective farm (*kolkhoz*), the salient features of which exist today much as they did in 1930. The author trenchantly relates the troubles encountered early on by state planners as they attempted to model the *kolkhozy* after the state farms (*sovkhozy*), which employed wage labor, thereby arousing the suspicion and hostility of the peasantry. Within a year, a compromise was reached that allowed for the retention of personal household plots by the peasants and further recognized the existence of a private enterprise system (still flourishing) coterminous with the state-controlled operation. Must reading for anyone who wants to come to grips with the essentials of organization in the Soviet state and economy as they have existed since the time of Stalin.

Soviet–East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent. Edited by Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981. 226 pp. $27.50 ($11.50, paper). Revised "think pieces" presented in 1979–1980 to a Chatham House study group on changing patterns in Eastern Europe.

Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. By Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson. New York: Pergamon, 1981. 320 pp. $35.00. Discusses the impact of internal and external events upon Soviet foreign policy and provides a behavioral analysis of the Soviet state as an actor within the system of states. The authors pay particularly close attention to Soviet sensitivities to power-bloc politics since the war.

Soviet Leadership in Transition. By Jerry F. Hough. Washington: Brookings, 1980. 175 pp. $11.95 ($4.95, paper). Generational profiles of Soviet political, military, and foreign policy elites as the key to the post-Brezhnev succession. Urges U.S. moderation as a means of influencing the coming struggle for power.

Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East. By Amnon Sella. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 211 pp. $25.00. Dealing with events

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since 1970, this book traces developments resulting from the loss of Soviet influence in Egypt and Moscow's subsequent shift from European Russia to Asian Russia and the Middle East as the new focus of Soviet attention.

The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance. By Galia Golan. New York: Praeger, 1980. 289 pp. n.p. Golan traces the sometimes stormy relations between the USSR and the PLO since the latter's inception in 1964; concludes that Moscow's decision to strengthen its ties with the PLO in 1968 was largely conditioned by the increased importance of the organization in the eyes of the Arab states and by considerations of the global balance of influence.

Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union. By Seweryn Bialer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 312 pp. $19.95. In the concluding chapter, "The Politics of Stringency," one of America's most incisive students of Soviet politics argues that "the most important macroeconomic decisions which the Soviet leadership will be called on to make in the 1980s concern the allocation of resources among investment, consumption, and military expenditures." Painful choices await Brezhnev's successors, especially if economic stringencies exacerbate the nationalities question. Pressures for change will increase significantly in the 1980s, undermining the stability of the past decade but not inducing a systemic crisis.

Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944. By Richard Pipes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. 526 pp. $32.50. This, the second part of Pipes' superb biography, traces Struve's conversion from Marxist theoretics to religion and constitutional democracy. The life of one of this century's great thinkers is at last brought vividly into print.

The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny. By Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko. New York: Harper & Row, 1981. 374 pp. $19.95. A remarkable first-hand account of the *Stalinschina* — "an entire historical epoch during which the vilest and bloodiest kind of evildoing flourished." The author — who himself spent twelve years in Stalin's Gulag for the crime of being born to an Old Bolshevik — has revised the figure substantially upward for the number of Russian deaths caused by Stalin: nearly 82 million. Whether or not one believes the figure to be realistic, there can be no doubt about the magnitude of Stalin's crimes, described so forcefully by Antonov-Ovseyenko.

Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (Revised and expanded edition.) By Andrei Amalrik. New York: Harper & Row, 1981. 224 pp. $5.95

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(paper). The author, killed in an auto accident in Spain last November, concedes he was "a little premature" with his dates but contends that "the stability the Soviet regime maintains is only a sham."

East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. By A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1980. 205 pp. $10.00 (paper).

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Volume IV: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union. Edited by S. Everett Gleason et al. Washington: GPO, 1980. 1,548 pp. $21.00.

Prelude to Appeasement: East Central European Diplomacy in the Early 1930's. By Lisanne Radice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 218 pp. $17.50.

Soviet Strategies and Policy Implementation in the Import of Chemical Technology from the West, 1958-1978. By Philip Hanson. Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1981. 95 pp. $3.75 (paper)

U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941. Edited by Kenneth Paul Jones. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC–Clio, 1981. 240 pp. $35.00.

WESTERN EUROPE

France. By John N. Truppen. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 243 pp. $23.75. Analyzes the growth of the French industrial sector since World War II as well as regional patterns of industrial activity. France still exhibits striking internal contrasts in the nature and intensity of its industrialization.

NATO—The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting. Edited by Kenneth A. Myers. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 469 pp. $35.00. Contributions from more than two dozen scholars and policymakers who examine the challenges confronting NATO and propose ways to avert a dissolution of the alliance. A significant work that commands attention.

West Germany: Politics & Society. By David Childs and Jeffrey Johnson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 231 pp. $25.00. General overview of West Germany's political, social, and economic arrangements; a valuable collection.

European Elections and British Politics. By David Butler and David Marquand. New York: Longman, 1981. 193 pp. $25.00 ($10.95, paper).

The Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974-1979. By Samuel D. Eaton. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 169 pp. $11.95.

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A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP. By Carol Cosgrove Twitchett. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1981. 160 pp. $28.50.

The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary. By Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981. 458 pp. $50.00.

Nations Without a State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe. Edited by Charles R. Foster. New York: Praeger, 1980. 215 pp. n.p.

Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives. Edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo and Simon Serfaty. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 217 pp. $16.00.

Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration: The Process Towards Direct Elections. By Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1981. 307 pp. $37.50.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Afghanistan: Key to a Continent. By John C. Griffiths. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 225 pp. $20.00. Griffiths has given us a handy, brief background-history of Afghanistan, a country that remains a mystery to the West; a quite readable book that will interest both the scholar and the layman.

In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. By Selig S. Harrison. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981. 228 pp. $12.00 ($6.00, paper). Harrison, a specialist in Asian affairs, uses primary sources to provide a in-depth assessment of the Baluch nationalist movement and the attendant separatist pressures growing in the Baluchi areas of Pakistan and Iran. The potenital for Soviet exploitation of these trends makes this book an important one, indeed.

America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations. (Second edition.) By Warren I. Cohen. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980. 271 pp. $8.95 (paper). This updated edition systematically reviews the turbulent history of Sino-American relations between 1844 and 1979.

China in the Global Community. Edited by James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim. New York: Praeger, 1980. 271 pp. n.p. Knowledgeable observers probe and explain discrepancies between rhetoric and reality in various strategic and functional dimensions of Chinese foreign policy.

China's Economy in Global Perspective. By A. Doak Barnett. Washington: Brookings, 1981. 752 pp. $32.95 ($16.95, paper). This extraordi-

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narily thorough discussion of the Chinese role in the international economy addresses global dynamics as well as the decisive influence of China's domestic modernization campaign on its actions in the international system.

China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution. Edited by Richard Baum. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 307 pp. $18.75. Ten analysts tackle the core issue in China's current modernization drive: the acquisition and use of modern industrial science and technology.

China Since the 'Gang of Four.' Edited by Bill Brugger. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 281 pp. $27.50. A collection of articles dealing with the dramatic changes in China, both in domestic politics and foreign policy, since the death of Mao.

China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy. By Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 336 pp. $22.95. Argues that Chinese foreign policy is a vital outgrowth of Beijing's domestic politics, values, and institutions.

Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath. By Joseph Camilleri. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980. 325 pp. $25.00. Interprets the nature and origins of the changes in Chinese foreign policy since the founding of the People's Republic.

The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO. By a Joint Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Tokyo. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1981. 232 pp. $19.50. The conclusion of a two-year research project; advocates a dramatically strengthened trilateral front to curb Soviet expansion.

The Indian Ocean in Global Politics. Edited by Larry W. Bowman and Ian Clark. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981, 260 pp. $25.00. Recent developments in South Asia, the Gulf, and Africa and their effect on Indian Ocean security concerns are examined in this collaborative effort, resulting from the August 1979 International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies. Also assessed are the roles played by the major powers and by international organizations.

The International Energy Relations of China. By Kim Woodard. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980. 717 pp. $50.00. Qualifies the

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author to be the energy minister for China; this book's historical and statistical breadth renders previous studies on the subject irrelevant.

Mao Tse-tung: An Ideological and Psychological Portrait. By Fedor Burlatsky; trans. by David Skvirsky. Moscow: Progress (distributor: Imported Publications, Chicago), 1980. 398 pp. $8.00. A sociopsychological study of Mao by a Russian scholar.

New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security. Edited by Joyce E. Larson. Washington: National Strategy Information Center (distributor: Transaction, New Brunswick, N.J.), 1980. 260 pp. $8.95. Proceedings of an international conference held in Thailand in late 1979; reflects official views of several Asian-Pacific nations.

Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan. Edited by Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. 486 pp. $30.00. Analyzes the growing forces of opposition in Japanese local politics in an effort to determine whether this is a temporary phenomenon or one that portends permanent changes.

Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization and Stability. Edited by Chong Lim Kim. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC–Clio, 1980. 238 pp. $26.50. Illuminates the role of political participation in the context of South Korean democratic development and political stability.

Science, Technology and China's Drive for Modernization. By Richard P. Suttmeier. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 121 pp. $6.95 (paper). Discusses the development of China's science and technology under the new leadership of the pragmatic faction; analyzes the implications for Chinese foreign policy and Sino-American relations.

Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao: The Chairman's Legacy. By C. G. Jacobsen. New York: Praeger, 1981. 170 pp. n.p. An interdisciplinary work charting the recent course of Sino-Soviet relations—from historical, territorial, ideological, and strategic perspectives—in order to provide conceptual parameters for defining future action-reaction patterns.

Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System. By Hungdah Chiu. Baltimore, Md.: University of Maryland School of Law, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1981. 31 pp. $1.50 (paper). A concise study of the structural and operational changes of the criminal justice system in the People's Republic since the purge of the Gang of Four.

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Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950. *Edited by* Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 332 pp. $17.50. A collection of papers probing from various perspectives the failure of the United States and the Chinese Communists to reach an accommodation immediately after World War II.

Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam. By James Walker Trullinger, Jr. New York: Longman, 1980. 235 pp. $17.50. A case history of a Vietnamese village and its people from early in the twentieth century to the end of the Vietnam War.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica. By Carl Stone. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980. 262 pp. $16.95. Political sociology by a former adviser to Michael Manley's PNP government; concentrates on class and classes in Jamaican society and how they have influenced political life.

Mexico and the Spanish Civil War. By T. G. Powell. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981. 210 pp. $17.50. In this objective discussion of Mexico's response to the Spanish Civil War, the author provides a valuable account of Mexico's foreign policy and domestic reality at a critical moment in Mexican history—when "Mexico remained so divided politically and so prone to violence . . . that only consistent army loyalty to the Revolutionary regimes prevented a full-fledged *Mexican civil war.*"

Mexico and the United States. Edited by Robert H. McBride. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981. 197 pp. $11.95 ($5.95, paper). Another general introduction from the American Assembly, this one edited by a former U.S. ambassador to Mexico (1969-1974). Besides the editor's overview of U.S.-Mexican relations, there are chapters on energy issues in Mexico, Mexican development vis-à-vis U.S. trade, commercial relations, the immigration problem, and the Mexican tourist industry (the largest in Latin America).

Mexico–United States Relations. Edited by Susan Kaufman Purcell. New York: The Academy of Political Science, Proceedings, vol. 34, no. 1, 1981. 213 pp. $6.50 (paper). Brief essays that touch on all the issues—political, social, and economic—and serve as an excellent introduction to the bases of conflict and cooperation between Mexico City and

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Washington. Written for the nonspecialist by authorities on both sides of the border.

The Politics of Mexican Oil. By George W. Grayson. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981. 283 pp. $21.95 ($6.95, paper). If you read nothing else on the subject, read this: perceptive, comprehensive, a pleasure to read, and replete with valuable tables, maps, and charts.

University and Government in Mexico: Autonomy in an Authoritarian System. By Daniel C. Levy. New York: Praeger, 1980. 174 pp. n.p. Mexican public universities enjoy substantially greater autonomy than one might expect in an authoritarian regime. The author concludes that "although the Mexican political system is far more authoritarian than democratic, a reconciliation model best characterizes government-university relations."

U.S.-Mexican Energy Relationships: Realities and Prospects. Edited by Jerry R. Ladman, Deborah J. Baldwin, and Elihu Bergman. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1981. 237 pp. $23.95. These edited papers, comments, and discussions—from a conference held at Arizona State University in December 1979—examine energy relations, past and future, from U.S. and Mexican perspectives. One conclusion: abundant Mexican oil will be important as a negotiating tool in U.S.-Mexican relations, but it will not be the dominant factor.

Advanced Developing Countries as Export Competitors in Third World Markets: The Brazilian Experience. By William G. Tyler. Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Significant Issues series, vol. 2, no. 8, 1980. 87 pp. $4.00 (paper).

The Brazilian Industrial Economy. By William G. Tyler. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1981. 152 pp. $17.95.

Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier. By Donald Freed with Fred Simon Landis. Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1980. 254 pp. $12.95 ($6.95, paper).

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy. By J. B. Kelly. New York: Basic Books, 1981. 530 pp. $25.00. The purpose of this book is to expose the incorrect idea that the modernization of the Arab Gulf has been completed and that the transformation is solely a function of oil money poured into the problem.

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The Arabs. By Maxime Rodinson; trans. by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 179 pp. $12.50 ($5.95, paper). A short, readable sketch of the Arab world, this book aspires to "demythify." Wrestling simultaneously with history, political culture, and current conflicts, the author (director of studies at l'Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes at the Sorbonne) weaves an engaging narrative, speckled with insights and colored by his moderately seasoned leftism.

Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority. By Ian Lustick. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980. 385 pp. $19.95. Details the circumstances of Arab citizens of the State of Israel and government policies toward them. The research includes field work and an investigation of primary, Hebrew-language sources.

Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and Leaders in the Middle East. By Paul A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981. 197 pp. $18.00 ($8.95, paper). Essentially a 100-page essay—the remainder of the book being appendixes, notes, bibliography, and index—serving as an introduction to Middle Eastern politics. Suggests itself for undergraduate text use.

Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971. By Elizabeth Monroe. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 254 pp. $20.00. A somewhat expanded and very much updated edition of a historical study that has well withstood the test of time. (The first edition was published in 1963.) Merges British home and foreign policies with consummate skill.

Capitalism and Revolution in Iran. Bizhan Jazani; trans. by the Iran Committee. London: Zed Press, 1980. 151 pp. $7.95. A compilation of previously published articles by the founding theoretician of the Iranian People's Fedaye Guerillas (Fedave Khalq). A postscript has been added concerning the ouster of the shah. This book is a must for those who would understand the ideology and workings of this important leftist group.

Challenges in the Middle East: Regional Dynamics and Western Security. Edited by Nimrod Novik and Joyce Starr. New York: Praeger, 1981. 133 pp. n.p. The published legacy of a 1980 conference cosponsored by the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. Contributors include Aharon Yariv, Nimrod Novik, Mark Heller, and Abba Eban. Commentary is offered by Yonah Alexander, former Ambassador Robert G. Neumann, Alvin Cotrell, Dmitri K. Simes, and Michael A. Samuels.

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Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980. By Polyvios G. Polyviou. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981. 246 pp. $44.50. An important discussion of the underlying political and constitutional conflicts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; examines the numerous attempts to resolve their differences.

Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East. Edited by Jeffrey Z. Rubin. New York: Praeger, 1981. 303 pp. n.p. Eleven essays on aspects of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic forays between 1973 and 1975. The authors include sociologists, labor-management specialists, international relations professionals, and journalists. Aside from substantive analysis of Kissinger and the Middle East, this volume aspires to comment more generally on the nature of third-party intervention in disputes.

Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations. By Julius Stone. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 209 pp. $17.50. A critical examination of the state of international law, particularly that portion purportedly in support of Arab claims to Palestinian statehood; may be used as a comprehensive legal brief describing Israeli positions on the pertinent issues.

The Middle East in World Politics. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 217 pp. $25.00. Papers from a conference on the Middle East sponsored by the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The contributions come largely from the Australian academic community.

The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day. By Walter F. Weiker. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981. 303 pp. $37.50. A scholarly and detailed study of the problems. While there is one chapter on economic programs, the book focuses on the political and sociological aspects of modernization.

Not by War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East. By Paul Jabber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 224 pp. $18.50. An interesting and original study of the prospects for arms control in the Middle East. The author examines the prospects for multilateral approaches to arms control — conventional and nuclear — in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and brings to bear on his subject the legacy of the "Arms Rationing System" of 1950-1955.

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The Oil Economy of Kuwait. By Y. S. F. Al-Sabah. Boston: Keegan Paul International, 1981. 166 pp. $29.95. Economic analysis giving special attention to petroleum; by a Kuwaiti analyst familiar with the industry.

The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. By Bruce R. Kuniholm. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. 485 pp. $27.50 ($10.50, paper). A very thorough study of the post–World War II superpower rivalry, centering on the Eastern Mediterranean. The author tries to show how U.S.-Soviet competition in Greece, Turkey, and Iran after the Second World War set the stage for the outbreak of cold war.

The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-1957. By Avi Plascov. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1981. 268 pp. $45.00. A detailed historical study of the social, political, and economic issues from the birth of the State of Israel through 1957. Beyond its commendably styled text, the book also contains detailed maps, photographs, and a very valuable bibliography, including many archival and Arabic sources.

PLO: Strategy and Tactics. By Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Arnon-Ohanna. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 218 pp. $22.50. Two Israeli scholars cover the emergence, ideology, and social background of the PLO's leadership; its external relations, and its internal structure.

Security in the Persian Gulf. 1: Domestic Political Factors. Edited by Shahram Chubin. Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. 90 pp. $10.00 (paper). A comprehensive examination of the indigenous origins of instability in this volatile area.

The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Sadat. (Second edition.) By P. J. Vatikiotis. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 528 pp. n.p.

AFRICA

Coffee and the Ivory Coast: An Econometric Study. By Theophilos Priovolos. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1981. 218 pp. $24.95. A commodity study by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates; recommendations are made on how the Ivory Coast might stabilize its export earnings.

Fear Thy Neighbor as Thyself: Psychoanalysis and Society Among the Anyi of West Africa. By Paul Parin, Fritz Morgenthaler, and Goldy Parin-

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Matxhey; trans. by Patricia Klamerth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 408 pp. $28.00. Ethnopsychoanalytic research on the Anyi people of the Ivory Coast. The authors' interdisciplinary approach yields a view of the Anyi culture as "conflict-ridden."

Let Us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama Against German Imperialism (1884-1915). By Horst Drechsler. London: Zed (distributor: Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport, Conn.), 1981. 278 p. $18.95 ($8.95, paper). Historical examination of the German colonial administration in Namibia and of the causes and consequences of the popular uprisings. Portrays the effects of colonialism on Namibian society and briefly examines the South African occupation and the beginnings of the armed struggle being waged by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

The Riddle of Violence. By Kenneth Kaunda. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981. 184 pp. $9.95. The president of Zambia passionately recounts his nation's involvement in the struggle to gain independence for Zimbabwe. Kaunda, though he advocates nonviolence, relates how he felt compelled to accept the inevitability of armed struggle with Rhodesia: "Chains are worse than bayonets."

Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup. Edited by John Seiler. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 252 pp. $24.50. A collaborative effort assessing the effects of the 1974 coup on the domestic and foreign affairs of the major countries of southern Africa. The fourteen contributors, though often arriving at vastly different conclusions, agree that no solution to the regional conflict is likely for the foreseeable future.

USSR and Countries of Africa: Friendship, Cooperation, Support for the Anti-Imperialist Struggle. Edited by E. V. Tarabrin. Moscow: Progress (distributor: Imported Publications, Chicago), 1981. 320 pp. $7.90. Essays written by a team of specialists from the USSR Institute of Africa.

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Les Etats-Unis et le Salvador: une approche sans nuance — *William D. Rogers*

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Regards sur la politique étrangère de l'Italie — *François Puaux*

Plaidoyer pour une Italie ambiguë — *Sergio Romano*

Les Pays-Bas entre l'atlantisme et la tentation neutraliste — *Joost Peter Van Iersel*

La RFA, un allié pas comme les autres? — *Robert Picht*

Le trilatéralisme: une vision japonaise — *Hisashi Owada*

Les étapes d'un retour aux parités fixes — *Rinaldo Ossola*

Les échanges Sud-Sud: progrès et contradictions — *Jean Lempérière*

URSS: le clan des modernisateurs et les relations Est-Ouest — *Robbin F. Laird et Erik P. Hoffmann*

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